NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS

(CONTU)

Fifteenth Meeting July 11-12, 1977

Room 2222 Rayburn Building Washington, D. C.

BEFORE:

STANLEY H. FULD -- Chairman
Retired Chief Judge,
New York Court of Appeals
Special Counsel, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman,
Hays and Handler

MELVILLE B. NIMMER -- Vice Chairman Professor of Law UCLA Law School

MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION:

Daniel J. Boorstin Librarian of Congress

George D. Cary Retired Register of Copyrights

William S. Dix Librarian Emeritus Princeton University John Hersey, President Authors League of America

Rhoda H. Karpatkin Executive Director Consumers Union

Dan Lacy Senior Vice President McGraw-Hill, Inc.

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

	•	į
		1
		1
•		1
		1
		1
		1
		1
		1
		1
		ı
		l.
		1
•		I

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA	1. Report No. CONTU 77-0007		2.	J. Recipie	ent's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle	1 00010 // 000/		· 	5. Report	
TRANSCR	IPT OF CONTU MEET	ING NUMBER 1	15		11-12, 1977
				6.	
7. Author(s) National	Commission on New	w Technologi	ical Uses of	8. Perform	ning Organization Rept.
9. Performing Organization	Name and Address				et/Task/Work Unit No.
	l Commission on N hted Works (CONTU		gical Uses of		. 93-573 ct/Grant No.
	ton, DC 20558	,			
12. Sponsoring Organization	n Name and Address	·		13. Type o	of Report & Period
Same as	Box #9			meeting	transcript of held 7/11-12/7
Dame 110			-	14.	5 Mera 7/11 12/10
15. Supplementary Notes	 ,				
Bases; Professor the National Bur copyright for co interlibrary los to photocopy; Be practices of jou and Bert Cowlan Satellite Associ right issues fro		n Economics Institute for some and software continuity become continuity on authorized the graph of the graph	of Property For Computer Scare; Vernon Palenes more econored study in the photocopying momics Center analysis of contents of c	Rights; Roy iences and 's lmour on the comical to so to the atting; and Dr. A and the Pomputer and p	Saltman from Technology on te economics of the obscribe than tudes and Allen Ferguson toblic Interest bhotocopying copy
Computer Software Automate Economic New tech	pying rs e ed Data Bases cs hnological uses o	Pro	TU operty Rights, ed works	economics 1	thereof
Computer Software Automate Economic	pying rs e ed Data Bases cs hnological uses o aphy	Pro	perty Rights,	economics 1	thereof
Computer Software Automate Economic New tech Reprogra Journals	pying rs e ed Data Bases cs hnological uses o aphy s	Pro	perty Rights,	economics 1	thereof
Computer Software Automate Economic New tech Reprogra Journals	pying rs e ed Data Bases cs hnological uses o aphy s	Pro	perty Rights,	economics (thereof
Computer Software Automate Economic New tech Reprogra Journals	pying rs e ed Data Bases cs hnological uses o aphy s	Pro	perty Rights,	economics (thereof
Computer Software Automate Economic New tech Reprogra Journals	pying rs e ed Data Bases cs hnological uses o aphy s	Pro	perty Rights,	economics	thereof
Computer Software Automate Economic New tech Reprogra Journals	pying rs e ed Data Bases cs hnological uses o aphy s	Pro	perty Rights,	economics	thereof
Computer Software Automate Economic New tech Reprogra Journals	pying rs e ed Data Bases cs hnological uses o aphy s	Pro	perty Rights,	economics	thereof
Computer Software Automate Economic New tech Reprogra Journals 176. Identifiers/Open-Ended	pying rs e ed Data Bases cs hnological uses o aphy s	Pro	ed works	ity Class (This	thereof
Computer Software Automate Economic New tech Reprogra	pying rs e ed Data Bases cs hnological uses o aphy s	Pro	19. Securi Repor	ity Class (This	22. Price / MF

•



MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION (Cont'd.)

Arthur R. Miller. Professor of Law Harvard Law School

E. Gabriel Perle Vice President - Law Time, Inc.

Barbara Ringer (nonvoting) Register of Copyrights

Hershel B. Sarbin President Ziff-Davis Publishing Company

Robert Wedgeworth Executive Director American Library Association

Alice E. Wilcox Director MINITEX

PROFESSIONAL STAFF OF THE COMMISSION

Arthur J. Levine Executive Director

Robert W. Frase Assistant Executive Director/ Economist

Michael S. Keplinger Senior Attorney irector/

Christopher Meyer Staff Attorney

Jeffrey L. Squires Staff Attorney

Carol A. Risher Information Officer

Dolores K. Dougherty Administrative Officer

David Peyton Policy Analyst

- C O N T E N T S -

Statement of:	Page
Dr. Fritz MACHLUP, Professor of Economics Princeton and New York Universities	3
Dr. William C. BAUMOL Professor of Economics Princeton and New York Universities	19
Dr. Yale Braunstein New York University	34
Roy G. SALTMAN Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology National Bureau of Standards	67
Vernon E. PALMOUR CONTU Contractor	112
Dr. Bernard FRY Dean, Graduate School of Library Science Indiana University	148

				1
		·		1
				\
			T.	
	1			1 1
		,		1 1
	1			·
				1
				·
,	·			,

ł

Tel: (202) 557-0996

Washington, D.C. 20558


AGENDA

FIFTEENTH MEETING JULY 11-12, 1977

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON, D. C.

2222 RHOB

Monday, July 11, 1977



Roy G. Saltman, Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, National Bureau of Standards, Project Director for a "Policy Oriented Analysis of the Interaction of Law, Economics and Technology in the Use of Copyrighted Works in Automated Scientific and Technical Information Systems." Briefing on the final project report covering recommendations regarding copyright for computer data bases and software.

William G. Baumol, Professor of Economics, New York University and Princeton University. Briefing on contract report on the "Economics of Property Rights as Applied to Computer Software and Data Bases." The briefing will summarize the contractors research on the economic factors regarding copyright protection in the new technologies.

Lunch-

Fritz Machlup, Professor of Economics, Princeton University and New York University. Briefing on economic factors involved in royalty payment mechanisms.

Vernon E. Palmour, CONTU contractor, will discuss his revision of a study of the economics of interlibrary loan and at what point it is more economical to purchase new materials or subscriptions rather than photocopy.

Bernard Fry, Dean, Graduate School of Library Science, Indiana University, will present the results of a study on the attitudes of journal publishers on the licensing of photocopying or providing authorized copies.

3:00 - 4:00

4:00 -5:00



Agenda Page Two

Tuesday, July 12, 1977

9:30

Reports By:

Allen Ferguson, President, Public Interest Economics Center (PIE-C) and Bert Cowlan and Andrew Horowitz, Co-Directors, Public Interest Satellite Association (PISA) on "An Analysis of Computer and Photocopying Copyright Issues from the Point of View of the General Public and the Ultimate Consumer." Mr. Ferguson will summarize the economic analysis conducted by PIE-C. Mr. Cowlan and Mr. Horowitz will discuss the results of the meetings of the public interest/consumer group meetings and present PISA's comments on the PIE-C final report.

	,				
		t.			
					. 1
					1 1 1
					1 1 1
					1
			,•		1 1 1
		. •	1		1
					1
					1 1 1
					1 1 1
					1 1 1
					1

JUDGE FULD: May I call this fifteenth meeting of CONTU to order.

Machlup. He is a noted authority on the Economics of
Information. He is Professor Emeritus of Princeton
University, and Professor of Economics at New York University. Dr. Machlup is the author of a large number of
books and articles both in English and major European
languages. Particularly, he is the author of: "The
in the United States"
Production and Distribution of Knowledge /, which gave production
in the United States
rise to the widely used term of: "Knowledge Economy."

He is currently engaged in an extensive project to prepare a major revision of that work.

We welcome you, Professor.

DR. MACHLUP: Thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF DR. FRITZ MACHLUP PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS PRINCETON AND NEW YORK UNIVERSITIES

DR. MACHLUP: Judge Fuld and Members of the Commission. I have no prepared statement; all I brought with me is, perhaps, my mind, and a few notes which I took at another occasion. I must even confess that I have not read some of the publications that have come out of this Commission. I note from one of the Press releases that I probably should have read a research study on the question of creating a transaction-based royalty -

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

11

12

13

14

25

payment mechanism; and I should have read the discussion on providing copyright protection in the employment of the proliferating photocopying machines. Thus I am not troubled these documents. knowledge of with any

Perhaps I should make a preliminary remark.

In my own considerations as an economist, i never ask what anybody's 'right' is, because this Commission here to find out what the rights are but to find is out what the rights ought to be under statutory law, or under interpretations of such law. So I am not troubled with any such notions as / who has a right.

Secondly, I am not influenced by

"technocrats" who come out with new gadgets, and say, "You said that this can't be done, it is too complicated. I have a way of solving this problem quite easily".

I am not impressed, because I donot whether this problem ought to be solved. So, if someone can come up with a new, wonderful machine, or a counter or measuring rod of some sort, or a formula, this doesn't impress me as long as I question the social desirability of that kind of measurement. I have to know first whether this serves a good purpose. Tf I address myself to the question

of possible royalty payments for the

photocopying of copyrighted material

2		1
ET, N.) 20005		2
927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005		2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
TEENT		4
927 FIF WASH		5
		6
		7
		8
Ш		9
RVIC		10
4G SE	2	11
ORTII FESSI		12
REP.		13
ILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS		
OLUM CORD-		15
ER-C		14151617
MILL		17
		18
		19
		20
24		21
347-022		22
PHONE (202) 3	,r	23
0 1 4	,	24
		25

myself two questions:

- 1. Who pays for it, and who receives payments?
- 2. Do these payments and receipts serve a good purpose from the point of view of society as a whole?

second question
And by this/ I mean: Do they serve to promote
the progress of the arts and the sciences?

This, as you know, is the/clause of the

Constitution; and this is probably a very good reminder

that we are not to ask whether / helps me, or you, or a

third person, but whether it helps the nation in its

of
interest/ seeking adequate promotion of the arts and

the sciences.

We ask ourselves: Do the publishers of journals lose much by the photocopying of their output -- of the articles contained in their journals? Do they lose so much that it would be a real disincentive to publishing these journals at all?

That is probably the first question to ask. In order to answer it, one has to know more about the economics of journal publishing -- of which we know rather little; and one would have to know how much the loss of sales and subscriptions to these journals would be if there were a wide use of photocopying machines for free reproduction of the contents of these journals.

There is very little empirical material for answering this question. I did see some relevant material that came out of the British experience with their National Lending Library; and I looked up what was really done there, and how many copies were asked of this or that article in this or that journal.

I was very much impressed by the fact that there were 1,288 copies ordered of articles in Science, the Journal of the American Academy for the Advancement of Science. This was the largest number taken from any journal. The circulation of Science was 154,200, at that time. Photocopying for British readers, therefore, amounted to less than one percent of the circulation. I do not believe that any of these people who asked for photocopies of particular articles would have become a subscriber to that journal or would have purchased the issue containing the interesting piece. My conclusion — which is a casual empiricism, not based on conclusive evidence — is that the loss to the A.A.A.S., the publishers of this journal, was nil!

One of the largest numbers of photocopies ordered was of the Scientific American: 630 copies were ordered,

and the circulation was at that time 500,700. That means that the photocopying was 0.12% of the circulation. Again, I doubt that any subscriptions or sales were lost to Scientific American by this proliferation of photocopying.

Even larger was the number of photocopies ordered of the <u>Journal of Biological Chemistry</u>: 784 copies. The circulation of that journal is 7,200. The loss — the potential loss — would be 1% but, again, I doubt that any one of those who asked for these photocopies would have subscribed to the journal.

I would like to hypothesize that very much of the photocopying that is done in American libraries is not of current issues but of past issues of journals. The publishers of these journals would hardly make much money by looking in their warehouse and pulling out a copy of a past issue for sale, if occasional orders of such back issues were actually received.

I could go on adding more of this kind of "anec-dotal evidence" to reach the conclusion that the publishers of journals lost virtually nothing from the large amount of photocopying of articles printed in the journals they publish.

I come to the other part of this question: Who could pay, ultimately, the royalties if such payments were to become mandatory? Who would pay for it if photocopying became more expensive because of some royalty payments to be

made to the publishers of the photocopied journals?

Chiefly, I would say, students, professors, researchers.

I do not know whether they all would pay out of their own pocket. My hunch is that a great deal would come, ultimately out of public funds, because people who do a great deal of photocopying are usually researchers, and they may have grants, and these research grants are largely made by public organizations and foundations -- the National Science Foundation, the Ford Foundation, etc.

So, if they had to pay more for photocopying, that would be charged against these research grants or contracts; in effect the government would pay for it. I do not say that 100% would come out of the public coffers, but a considerable part probably would.

If this is so, what would a system that provided for royalty charges on photocopying articles from journals really amount to? It would amount to payments, coming partly out of the pockets of students and of professors who have no grants, partly out of the pockets of interested general readers, but largely out of public funds.

Where would the public funds come from? They would

come either from general tax revenues, or they would be at the expense of other uses of these public funds, for the largest part probably at the expense of productive uses of the research grants made. The funds would go to the publishers of the journals, without any proof whatsoever that the publishers of these journals really needed those revenues either for their survival or as an effective incentive to publish articles.

What is important here to realize is whether these payments would really constitute an effective incentive for the publication of meritorious articles that otherwise would remain unpublished and, therefore, not be disseminated. That is the question before all of us and, especially, before this Commission.

Permit me to make some comments regarding the mechanism of collecting and paying royalties. I do not know what kind of gadgetry would finally be developed, but I fear it might be a nuisance to the user; very often a potential reader of an article has it photocopied only because it is so convenient to have it for future reading and possible future reference. He may not even know precisely what he is photocopying or has others photocopying for him, he just prefers the photocopy to a stack of unread journals on his desk or shelf. However, if there were any trouble or nuisance connected with photocopying, he may say "The heck with it! I won't read it!"

The result would be a definite decline in the dissemination of knowledge, and that would be a clear disadvantage of

the scheme. It would be "counterproductive" in that it would be against the very purpose of the copyright laws.

Judge Fuld and ladies and gentlemen: I should not take more of your time, but I would like to stress again that I realize that these are possible solutions to the problem of how one could collect royalty charges for photocopying and how one could arrange such payments going to the publishers. But, granted that this problem can be solved, I question that it is a problem that deserves to be solved. For it is merely a problem of how to steer some public funds to a group of people who, according to our knowledge, have thus far survived and probably will survive without the addition revenues from photocopying. There is no indication that they are actually losing a great deal of business -- sales and subscriptions -- through the proliferation of royalty-free photocopying.

This is the end of my very informal formal presentation. I am, of course, willing to answer any questions that are asked.

JUDGE FULD: Thank you very much. Yes, Mr. Lacy.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Dr. Machlup, suppose we accept the assumption that photocopying does not diminish the number of subscriptions to or purchasers of the original printed work. And we assume that a particular journal has, let's say, a thousand, or one could say 10,000--it doesnt' matter--subscribers who subscribe to the journal, itself. And let's say 200, or 2,000 persons get photocopies of the journal.

 ~ 17

As we all know, the so-called first cost of producing a limited-circulation scientific journal is vastly higher than the incremental cost of reproducing a copy. All thousand people who bought copies of the printed work made a contribution to those first costs -- initial costs -- in addition to the incremental costs.

We are proposing that the 200 who had gotten the photocopies would not make any contribution to that.

Now, I can readily see that one might use a de minimus argument that there are so few, and it is so difficult to collect the money, and the money is so small, it is not worth doing.

But if we put that assumption aside, and assume that there were convenient remedies, do you see any reason why people who get it in the reprographic form should not make the same contribution to the first costs that they would if they were getting it in printed form?

DR. MACHLUP: Yes. A very strong reason!

The point is that, since the incremental cost -the marginal cost -- is zero, it would be in the best
national interest that there be no cost to the one who
makes use of that knowledge.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Well, there is very little incremental cost to the subscription.

Why should a subscriber pay anybody?

DR. MACHLUP: He does that only for	his own
convenience. He is probably more interested	
as a regular reader and a subscriber of that	journal.
I am a subscriber of a number of journals. I	don't
subscribe just for the purpose of	paying the
first cost I am not thinking of the profit-	and-loss
of the publisher. I am thinking that I like t	hat journal
near my desk because I am a regular reader of	that journal,
and I want to have the issues of that journal	near at
hand.	

On the other hand, if I am only an occasional reader of the journal, then I am not a subscriber, and it would be ridiculous -- it would be a waste of the nations funds, if I were to subscribe to a lot of things that I do not regularly and the best way, not only for me personally, but for anybody in the United States, would be

to use the cheapest possible way of getting hold of that one article that one occasionally wants to get; and that would be through photocopying.

COMMISSIONER. LACY: Nobody is suggesting that he ought to subscribe to the whole journal in order to get the one article, but the fact that he goes to the trouble of ordering that one article suggests that, far from being less useful to him than the subscription -- serving less of a purpose than the subscription is to the regular sub-

scriber -- he is particularly served by it. Why should the regular subscriber subsidize him by meeting the first cost?

DR. MACHLUP: I would not call it a subsidy, sir.

The use of the word "subsidy" anticipates a conclusion from a particular theory; but the point is still this: This man who has a vague interest in one journal article -- in a particular journal article --

COMMISSIONER LACY: It is specific. It is not vague.

DR. MACHLUP: Sometimes a specific interest, but not always. I am a great copier myself for my own research. If the particular journal is not on the shelf of the library, I very often say, "The heck with it", and I do not read it, because it is not usually a "must read" article but only one that "maybe will be helpful in my research, I shall see later." But if it takes more time or more bother than it would to take it off the shelf and quickly get a photocopy, then I say, "The heck with it."

And that is the chief disadvantage of anything that could be put in my way as an obstacle to the reception and dissemination of knowledge.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Two other quick questions.

I am impressed by the fact that we assume that transfer payments that would involve royalty would be so small as to be of no real use to the publishers; but so large as to be a burden on the Federal government to

 21

support the sources for scholarship in the country. But passing on to another question:

DR. MACHLUP: May I interrupt, sir?

COMMISSIONER LACY: Yes.

payments to the publishers would be small. I said the loss that the publisherssustain from photocopying is small.

I did not say that what they might get,—if you put on a tax on photocopying,—is small. The payment by the photocopier is, of course, the receipt by the publisher. The receipt would be almost as large as the payment that is made, though not quite so large, because of the cost involved that might be deducted.

But I did not, I definitely did not, say that the/payments would be large and the receipts would be small.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Well, if the payments were substantial, it might make a considerable change in the economy. It might permit the publisher of learned journals to lower the subscription rates; to expand the number of copies produced. And marginal journals, which do not now find publication because they are not among those you mentioned that survive, might survive if there were a substantial flow of money.

DR. MACHLUP: That would presuppose that the journal publishers are very bad businessmen.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Most of them are! Most of them are

learned societies and universities.

DR. MACHLUP: I agree. / would presuppose that the subscription rates of the journals are dependent on other income received. Our economic models tell us otherwise; namely, that these other payments received would not be part of the marginal cost of producing the journal and, hence, would not affect the profit-maximizing subscription rate, or not even the subscription rates that are/considered optimal by the editors and publishers of journals published by scientific organizations.

COMMISSIONER LACY: It might provide the margin of survival for a marginal journal.

DR. MACHLUP This could be.

COMMISSIONER LACY: One other last point.

There are, of course, many kinds of serial publications of which this image of the rarely photocopied scientific journal is not true. I am thinking, for example, of newsletters which, typically, are very expensive, which typically have a very small circulation and, typically, are very cheap to reproduce, at a cost of five percent, or two percent of the subscription cost. There is considerable reason to believe that there is very large duplication of those. I assume you would contemplate some means of separating those, that do deserve some protection, from those that do not.

DR. MACHLUP: Frankly, sir, I am not sufficiently informed about newsletters and periodical issues other than scientific and scholarly and, therefore, I had better not answer that question.

COMMISSIONER. LACY: Right!

JUDGE FULD: Any other question? COMMISSIONER Wilcox?

COMMISSIONER WILCOX: I wonder if your research is showing any differences, either in the practices or in the effect, between the Scientific, Technical community and the Social Science community and the Humanities?

DR. MACHLUP: I did not go into the photocopying question in my research. I did research however, on subscriptions, subscription rates and prices of journals, and the size of the subscription.

are just coming out of the computer.

They will be processed on the day that they are compiled. I can tell you something that came out from the first printouts, namely, that the subscription rates in the natural sciences and engineering technology are much higher than the subscription rates in the social sciences and in the humanities.

The numbers

Secondly, the former rates not only are higher, but they have been rising much faster during the last ten years.

Thirdly, where subscription rates are different for individuals -- for example, the individual members of a society -- and for institutional subscribers such as corporations or libraries, -- the revenues from the latter have been increasing very, very much faster; indeed, the numbers of subscriptions from individuals have been falling, and in some instances falling at a larger percentage than the price increase; in other instances they have been falling at a smaller rate than that at which the price increased.

On the whole we find that societies that have different subscription rates now receive more and more of their total revenue from sales to nonindividuals, that is, to libraries and corporations. This is a rather gloomy picture; it is chiefly true for the natural sciences and the engineering fields.

JUDGE FULD: Mr. Dix?

COMMISSIONER DIX: Professor Machlup, you drew your examples of the ratio between copies made, and circulation of the journals from the most heavily copied journals.

We, here, I think, more often believe the damage may be done to the relatively marginal journals, with small circulations, and I wonder if you have extended this kind of analysis to those; and what the results might have been.

DR. MACHLUP: I have here in my notes only one, of the Journal of Biological Chemistry, with a

formation.	**					
study of photocopying	myself,	l am using	here secondary	in-		
little over one percent of circulation. Not having made any						
in	the United	Kingdom	amounted to a			
circulation of 7,	200. But e	ven there,	the photocopying			

It is your impression -- as I believe COMMISSIONER DIX: you said earlier -- that more or less across the spectrum, there is not much evidence of damage.

DR. MACHLUP: This is my impression.

Mr. Levine? JUDGE FULD:

MR. LEVINE: Professor Machlup, if you could, once again, give us the statistics on the Journal of Biological Sciences. I thought you read them, and it was more than ten percent.

You are right. You are absolutely DR. MACHLUP: I made an error, and I apologize.

Maybe I did not have my glasses on, at that point. It is ten percent. It may

if my notations here are correct. make a difference

I would have to go back to the original -- I got this from an article by Maurice / in the Journal of Documentation, 1975,

'The Effects of Large Scale Photocopying Services on Journal Sales! It is generally available.

Since I don't have the article with me, but only this cannot check my figures. beg your pardon for having misread my notes.

JUDGE FULD: Are there any other questions?
(No response)

JUDGE FULD: Thank you very much, Professor.

DR. MACHLUP: Thank you, Judge Fuld.

next speaker. He holds appointments in the Economic

Departments in Princeton and New York Universities.

He is the author of numerous texts and articles on a wide range of Economic topics. He has been directing a major investigation into the Economic characteristics of information focussing on Public Goods characteristics and economy-of-scale factors which influence production, dissemination, and use of scientific and technical information.

Today, Professor Baumol will report on the Economics of Property Rights as Applied to Computer Software and Data Bases, which was sponsored by the Commission.

Thank you for being here.

STATEMENT BY WILLIAM C. BAUMOL PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS PRINCETON AND NEW YORK UNIVERSITIES

DR. BAUMOL: Thank you very much for having me.

I would like to say, first of all, that I have

brought along with me my colleague, Professor Yale

Braunstein, Who will soon emerge -- as the knowledgeable

member of the group; and, after I complete my discussion, if you have any questions, I would very much appreciate it if my colleague could join me.

JUDGE FULD: We would be delighted.

DR. BAUMOL: I would like to say that, in making my presentation this morning, I have little to add to the masterly summary that has been prepared for your use the CONTU staff. As a matter of fact, after a hiatus of some weeks, I was, myself, forced to rely on the staff's memorandum for reviewing what I had said.

But seriously, I assume that the merit -- such as it may be -- of a direct appearance, as compared to the rather weighty document -- weighty in size; I am not suggesting that it is weighty in substance, but as a substitute for that weighty document -- is the opportunity to stress, not primarily our conclusions, but to stress the logic of the Economist's approach to the issues that are before you.

Therefore, I will summarize my conclusions only briefly and, instead, try to emphasize the reasoning behind them.

In addition, necessarily, when we have gotten to matters of computational techniques, methods of solving certain calculation problems, unavoidably—our discussion being somewhat technical——I will try to indicate what the

purpose of those analyses is, and the general rationale of their approach, but hope that where we have been unclear, that you will prod us to try and go further in the direction of being a bit more lucid.

Now, the first and basic conclusion of our report:-which I suppose will come as neither a great surprise, nor as one of its major contributions -- nevertheles: is worth emphasizing; and that is the desirability of copyright over the available alternatives.

That is not to say that copyright is without shortcomings. Indeed, some of these are quite serious and they will be dealt with later by me -- at least by implication. But, basically, one must face up to the fact that there are two alternatives:

First is the failure to do anything to protect the interests of the producers of new knowledge, - with the resulting disincentive to invest in such new materials, and a potentially enormous loss; and

The second alternative is the adoption, by the producers, of new programs of secrecy designed to prevent the proliferation of those ideas before the investment in them can be recouped.

The merit of copyright lies not in itself, but in the shortcomings of a process of secrecy. The process

25

of secrecy, when one thinks of it, has a number of shortcomings.

It reduces the availability of valuable new materials. By its very process, secrecy is designed to prevent others from using new ideas. In many cases, it may be unenforcible, particularly in the case of final products, which can be purchased, analyzed and, thereby, reproduced.

It increases the difficulty, not only in learning of the new materials but even in learning about the existence and availability of the new ideas, thereby reducing their use indirectly.

It often leads to wasteful duplication in the process of creation of new ideas, each such producer possibly being induced to work on his own little secret materials.

It leads to waste of resources, Fourth: designed to prevent leaks of new materials.

It may, for example, lead to the deliberate and unnecessary injection of complexity in new ideas, in order to increase the difficulty of discovery and reproduction; and leads to waste of resources by rivals who would have devoted those resources to the discovery of secrets.

In short, one can say, to the critics of the

1 i

24.

copyright approach, that the only thing worse than a copyright system is failure to adopt the copyright system.

Having arrived at a disposition on the desirability of the approach, per se,/is the issue of what features it should adopt, and our report addresses itself to two basic issues: the breadth of coverage; and the length of protection.

The first of these issues is: Who should be protected from what?

The second issue is the period for which the protection should extend.

The first of these issues we approach, as it were, from the flank, asking whether there are any uses of copyrighted materials which should be excepted. In a sense, here, I am dealing with issues very similar to the to which Professor Machlup has just directed himself, and I point out that within these general terms that I am expressing -- not dealing with the issue of photocopying in particular -- there are two grounds that can be raised for exemption of particular users from copyright obligations.

One is the special merit of particular users, or uses, of materials of copyright. We may say that particular users should be exempted, either on distributive grounds because they are impecunious, or for other reasons

20

21

22

23

24

25

are unable to pay; or one can argue that they are particularly meritorious and deserving and that, therefore, it is of Social interest that they should be exempted from payment.

Then there is the second ground on which one might argue for exemption from copyright protection, and that is that one may argue that, in particular cases, enforcement is simply impractical or uneconomic.

I am going to take -- and our report takes -a very different position on these two cases. favor exemptions in the latter case. The Economist's view is that it is irrational to pursue benefits whose magnitude is insufficient to make up for the requisite cost; itself. In other words, it is merely arguing the standard position in cost benefit analysis that it is irrational devote one million dollars in efforts to obtain a benefit which is worth one thousand dollars.

This is not a mere sordid calculation in terms of dollars and cents. It is not the Economist's unworthy concern with pecuniary magnitudes, Rather, the issue is that Social resources are wasted on such unjustifiable undertakings, because those resources might otherwise have bee available for purposes that are vital to Society.

So that our view is that there are cases in appropriate to provide exemptions; first of which it is

. 14

all, because the benefits are not worth the cost and, furthermore, because the adoption of unenforcible rules undermines enforcement of other and practicable rules, as well.

Matters are quite different for exemptions on grounds of alleged merit. Exemptions of groups of users on the basis of need, Social contribution, etc., in our view, amount to a concealed sub-cross subsidy by other users.

Economists question this on two grounds:

First, we believe that while subsidies are sometimes justified, subsidies on grounds of need or Social contribution should be paid for by the community as a whole -- that is, out of public funds -- not by other customers of some particular classes of product.

Second, we believe that any subsidy should be granted explicitly and openly so that all can judge it on its merits; and that subsidies which are granted in an implicit and concealed manner are dangerous and questionable

Finally, we can argue -- and do argue -- on somewhat more technical grounds that where it is necessary to price in a way which more than covers marginal costs -- that is, where it is necessary to cover initial costs, as in the case of publications which are not reflected in the low cost of additional copies of some published work --

2

.3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

.12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

that it is, in fact, sociably desirable that that burden be shared as widely as possible; that, in fact, the resulting distortion of allocation of resources will be minimized if that burden is widely shared.

We therefore conclude that such exemptions as there are should be limited to cases where enforcement is impractical, and that exemptions to groups on the basis of need or social contribution should, if possible, be avoided.

Before turning to the issue of length of copyright, I must say a word on the issue of trade-off between breadth of protection and the length of the copyright period, because this will help to explain the logic of our analysis of length of copyright protection.

Both of these -- that is, the breadth of coverage and the length of the copyright period -- are designed to provide incentives for the investment of effort and resources into the creation of new and copyrightable materials.

Either an increase in the breadth of protection, or an increase in the length of the copyright period, is justifiable merely as an increase in the reward for this sort of effort and, therefore, as something which increases the incentive to do that sort of work.

4.

.14

Therefore, it follows that a decrease in one of these -- that is a decrease, for example, in the length of the copyright period -- can be compensated by an increase in the other -- say, by an increase in the breadth of protection -- with no necessary loss incentive.

Moreover, there are still other ways of compensating for a decrease in one of these.

For example, if one is permitted more sophisticated pricing principles -- for example, if one encourages price discrimination in the selling of copyrighted materials -- or other means which increase the revenues of the product -- it may be possible to decrease copyright period without any net loss in incentives.

These preliminary remarks are important in following the Economist's view of the optimal protection period, because to the Economist, the copyright period is an unfortunate but an unavoidable price, which Society must pay in order to stimulate the flow of new and useful materials.

For copyright amounts to the grant of a monopoly to the creator of those materials for some specified period, but the grant of a monopoly, obviously, has all of the unfortunate implications, with that form of market organization, in terms of pricing and mis-allocation of resources.

It is not for nothing that social and economic

policy in the United States has, for many years, sought to discourage monopoly and, of course, as in the case of patents, the logic of copyright is the grant of a monopoly for some specified period as a means to stimulate the creation of new materials.

Now, several conclusions follow from this observation.

The first is that if increased breadth of protection, or encouragement of more sophisticated pricing techniques, can substitute for great length of copyright period, then that is sociably desirable.

Second: The implication of these observations is that the optimal length of copyright involves the determination of the point at which the benefits of greater length, in terms of stimulation of the creation of new materials, is just balanced by the social cost incurred by further extension of the period of monopoly.

All of this, of course, is part of the third conclusions which follows from it: that increased length of copyright period is not a virtue in itself; it is not inherently desirable. That is to say: If the same results can be achieved without it, that is something which should be desired.

The fourth and final conclusion is that, at least in theory, the optimal length of copyright period is unlikely to be the same for all types of material.

1104 CARRY BUILDING 27 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

That is, for example, -- and I am not arguing this as more than an example -- it may be desirable to have a far shorter period of copyright for computer software than it is for books and journals, because in each case, what is involved is the balancing off of the benefits which one gets by way of stimulation of creativity through a lengthening of the period, as against the social costs one gets by the grant of monopoly for a more extended period.

Now, taking these considerations into account, our report has provided a fairly simplistic computational procedure which is designed to show what data are needed to balance off the costs and benefits of extended length of copyright protection, and to provide a rough calculation of the optimal length of copyright.

of course, as with all abstract and mechanical calculations, the results are not intended -- nor should they be taken -- as being a right, and definitive, simply because they come by an obscure and incomprehensive process, like the electronic computer. These are merely meant as preliminary guides; as a device to help you in thinking about the issue. But the important thing to recognize in thinking about the issue, is not the numbers, or the formulae that emerge from such a calculation, but that trade-off which I have been emphasizing to you for the past few minutes: namely, the fact that an increased length of copyright period is not a

. 1

19.

virtue in itself. It has both benefits and costs, and only by weighing the one against the other can one arrive at a rational length of copyright in terms of the interests of Society.

Our report contains many other materials which inevitably must be omitted from a short summary such as the one I have just presented. I can only say that our work has convinced us of the importance, and difficulty, and significance of the task of the Commission. If our work has succeeded in contributing in some measure to the completion of this task, it will have served its purpose.

In any event, I must once again express

Commission

my gratitude to the / for the opportunity to appear

before you today, and hope that in dealing with any

questions you may have, that some helpful materials will

emerge.

Thank you very much.

May I ask Professor Braunstein to join me?

JUDGE FULD: Yes. Mr. Cary?

COMMISSIONER CARY: I have two questions. The first one relates to the problem of length of protection.

A Commission in Great Britain recently published a summary of their views on the problems that we are discussing here. They took the view, as I recall it, that

 21

term of protection actually, there was no reason for
changing the term of protection for software vis-a-vis
other works and they came to this conclusion: Namely
that even though I think they realized what you have said,
that many types of computer software are going to be of
short term duration. The fact that the law gives them
protection for a longer period really doesn't change
anything, as far as they are concerned, and I can see that
from a practical point of view for those writing the
Statute, it would be much simpler if all would specify
the same term.

What comment do you have on that?

PROFESSOR BAUMOL: I have two comments to make.

The first is: Clearly, there is always the matter of a rational compromise. One can go to either extreme.

That is, to insist that one must avoid complexity at all costs and, therefore, have absolutely no flexibility in term.

Or the other is to say: Because the theory says that each copyrighted item has its own optimal length of copyright protection, one should lose one's self in an enormous and unmanageable number of copyright periods.

Frank Wright once characterized that approach as "irrational passion for dispassionate rationality!"

(Laughter)

The fact is that, of course, there are reasonable compromises; and all I suggest is that this group should consider the possibility of two or three copyright periods; not an infinite number, nor simply take for granted that one must be the right number because it happens to be the smallest number.

The second issue -- I have not read the British report to which you refer, but I think that the conclusion, nevertheless, is untenable because, remember, if you think of what the purpose of copyright is, it is to get new ideas going; to reward the person who produced the new ideas -- to provide the group who produced the new ideas; /- an inducement to increase that flow and, then, to provide the flow of benefits from those new ideas to Society, as a whole, as abundantly and as freely as possible.

Notice what happens with the termination of the copyright period. The period of the copyright marks the borderline between the time when the bulk of the benefits flows to the creator of the idea, and the period when the bulk of the benefits flows freely to the rest of the community. If the typical length of usefulness of software is, say, three years, or five years, and the copyright period is twenty years, or fifty years, it means that, in effect, typically, the period when the ideas will flow freely to

the community as a whole, will never occur.

COMMISSIONER CARY: If the computer program the software really is of no value, say, after five years, does it make any real economic difference?

PROFESSOR, BAUMOL: No! But what that augurs is that the copyright period should be less than five years, so that there is a sharing of benefits between the creator and the rest of the community.

The reason the community grants a monopoly to the creator is not because it loves monopoly, or because it loves the creator, but because that is a way to increase the benefits that flow to the community. And, therefore, it makes no sense if one grants what is, in effect for all practical purposes, a permanent monopoly to that creator -- that is, a monopoly for the useful lifetime of that product -- so that from its birth to its death, offered only on monopoly terms.

COMMISSIONER. CARY: Thank you very much.

The second question I have relates -- well, it may be sort of a tangential issue -- but it does relate. in a way, to the problem of trade secrecy, which you develope in your report; namely -- and I must confess that I did not read the original draft of your report --

PROFESSOR: BAUMOL: That is understandable!

of the terminology. But, assuming that you have copyright in software, do you think it is economically desirable, or feasible, or necessary, to require -- as is done in most other cases where the person desires the protection -- the deposit of actual copies of this with the Copyright Office, for example. You came up with a lot of arguments as to why it is difficult to do so. It is expensive to do so, and so forth.

Do you find any connection there between the disclosure problem which you just had in the Trade Secrets area, as requiring the deposit or not.

Could you comment on that?

DR. BRAUNSTEIN:: I will take that one since I wrote part of that section.

For the record, I am Yale Braunstein also of

New York University. Let me answer. I think that, since

one of the purposes of copyright -- one of the benefits of

copyrights over trade secrecy -- is that we saw it can prevent

wasteful duplication. I think it would be, if not mandatory,

advisable to have on the deposit, at least a description

of the software as to what its purposes are; maybe what

its data requirements are, or what-have you, in the exact

language of ita-whether it be readable; or in machine readable

form; or whatever.

I think, in this field, that if at least summaries, or brief descriptions of the programs, were deposited; if the Copyright Office, itself, did not distribute that widely, I think you would find even that firms would begin the business of making those descriptions available by fee, or whatever, to people who are interested, and I think there would be a definite economic benefit from that type of dissemination of information about the software, itself

of the same question, if you have -- well, take data bases, for example -- which are updated hourly, daily, or what-have-you, depending on the nature of the group that is issuing that, how would you, just as a technical matter, go about updating this description with the Copyright Office?

Do you send something every day; every week; every month; or yearly?

DR. BRAUNSTEIN: I will have to draw on my knowledge of Economic data bases, which are the ones I use widely. From the user's point of view here, it is not so often what the update is that is important, as knowing when updates occur and with what frequency they occur. So if the Census Bureau's information of population in

25

Metropolitan areas is updated every ten years. accurate data; and every five years with estimates, the statement saying that it is updated in ten-year intervals with accurate Census data/in five year intervals with survey information, will tell me almost as much as I would want to know, short of the exact number that I would be looking for. So the deposit requirements in that area should be a description of the frequency of the updating; the type of material that is updated; and, possibly, the source of material being updated -- enough so that the researcher in the field can make an intelligent decision as to whether that data base is going to meet his needs. or not.

COMMISSIONER CARY: Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: Dr. Baumol, in the summary in the beginning of your statement, you define "major issues": and the more specific issue, you say, is whether computer software should be copyrightable and, if so, what the terms of the copyright should be.

Is my impression incorrect, that you have not really confronted the issue, whether software should be copyrightable, but have assumed copyrightability and proceeded, then, to compare the benefits of copyright against the alternatives?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

24

25

DR. BAUMOL: I am not quite sure that I understand the terms of your question. I think the argument that I have just given you in my presentation was meant to cover computer software, as well as the printed page, to argue in favor of copyright.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: In favor of copyright, as opposed to -- but you have assumed copyrightability, have you not?

PR. BAUMOL: Meaning?

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: Meaning the use of copyright to protect software would accord with the basic philosophy and purposes of copyright.

I think that I went through the DR. BAUMOL: reasons that we reached that conclusion. When you say "copyrightability", I am not quite sure whether you mean there is a constitutional base --

JUDGE FULD: Whether it is desirable.

DR. BAUMOL: I certainly address the issue whether it is desirable.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: That is the distinction I was making.

DR. BAUMOL: Yes.

What I have argued is that, in principle, it is desirable because it can serve as a stimulus to the creation of work in this area; and that, in fact, as compared to the use of secrecy, it has significant advantages.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Now, of course, it may be that empirical information may turn out to show that the stimulation which a copyright system provides for creativity in the area is minimal. If that, in fact, were to turn out to be the case, of course, it would not meet the cost-benefit test. As far as I know, there has not been any study that suggests or that reflects that there is very large stimulation to be derived from it.

JUDGE FULD: Are you finished, John?

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: Yes.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Professor Baumol, let me say that

I have frequently used your writings in the past, and found
them always to be very illuminating, and very helpful.

DR. BAUMOL: Thank you very much.

COMMISSIONER LACY: There are a couple of questions that I would like to raise.

One is in connection with the use of the word "monopoly", frequently throughout the study.

I have seen many other writings on the subject, and I think it would be worth taking a few minutes to clarify the meaning in this context. It is a perjorative word, of course --

DR. BAUMOL: No. I am not treating it like that.

COMMISSIONER LACY: I am not suggesting that you do.

I am talking about the common use of such a

perjorative word.

Also, I think, one could be led into, even, mistakes in economic analyses, as that is used in this context.

We should recognize that monopoly given to an author by copyright is only monopoly over his own work -- the sort of monopoly a peach farmer has over the peaches that grow on his farm; or that a carpenter has over his carpentry; or that a consultant has on his consultation.

He has to sell the product of his work and, frequently, have acute competition with a great many other people who are in the same market. Mr. Hersey writes a novel and, by copyright, is given monopoly over that novel. It is offered for sale in competition with, let's say, 3,000 other novels and perhaps 100,000 other novels in print, plus thousands of other opportunities for equivalent kinds of satisfaction.

A wheat farmer, where he has monopoly over his wheat, takes it to the market and sells in competition with all the other wheat farmers. There is a difference to distinction the extent that there is more/between the quality of Mr. Hersey's novel, and the quality of, let's say, Jacqueline Suzanne's novel, than there is between the wheat of one farmer and another.

Nonetheless, essentially, you have a monopolistic entry over one person's product in a very competitive market.

1104 CARRY BUILDING 927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000S $20 \cdot$

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

PHONE (202) 347-0224

Now, this affects prices.

You suggest, in one place, that a monopolist has no incentive to point towards the incremental cost; but a publisher marketing the product is, of course, under great pressure -- because of price competition in the industry -- to price as closely as he can and to cut the incremental cost.

As a matter of fact, he has already sunk his first cost before the book goes on the market. His marketing strategy in the pricing level is to give the maximum increment over incremental cost without regard to its first cost.

This is true throughout the Copyright area.

There are a dozen competing text books that are offered for high school courses, that takes the pressures off of correspondence courses, and this is coming to be true in the computer software field, as well. Numerous computing programs offer to handle the Accounts Receivable, or similar common functions.

So that I think when one uses the word "monopoly" one should use it with great care to avoid the suggestion that there is any control of the marketplace except for that one product, itself—which is normal in a highly competitive situation.

1104 CARRY BUILDING 927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

PHONE (202) 347-0224-

The only other point I would raise in connection with the term of "copyright" I don't think is really very important because I suspect that most computer data bases are software, which are not revised frequently and, after a period of a few years, are substantially useless; and the continuation of the copyright inhibits use and the rewards of the user.

That is true of all copyright/material.

I think, in one sense, a copyright is needed: a long as a work has value that Society is prepared to pay for and recognizes, when it is sold competitively with other products and is able to get a price higher than the incremental cost of using it, there is no reason why it should not be rewarded.

If it is ten years old, or two years old, I see very little logical difference in the rewards that Society is willing to pay, but it is likely to be less after 20 years, than it is after two years. We have no reason to believe that this is inhibiting the use of the work. By and large, copyrighted work circulates much more freely than non-copyrighted work, before there is more incentive, it seems, to have it on the market.

It seems to me that the question of convenience might weigh more heavily on this rather tenuous argument about balancing benefits.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

One other question: Have you taken into account that, under the Universal Copyright Convention, we are obligated to the terms of at least 25 years of copyright protection.

DR. BAUMOL: It is a quaint custom, which says that, at a certain point, one asks questions,-when statements are more appropriate.

If I may just go over a few brief comments on your statement.

First: I agree that, generally, there is no absolute monopoly involved in the grant of the copyright, hor is monopoly necessarily an undesirable thing. fact, the term "natural monopoly" is a term which has been invented to show -- with all its shortcomings -- it might be better than the available substitutes, in certain circumstances.

Nevertheless, the grant of a copyright -- like the grant of a patent -- is designed to offer the creator, or the possessor of a particular piece of property, as much monopoly power as is possible under the circumstances.

In some cases, the monopoly power that is granted is very small, because the available substitutes are very close.

In other cases, it may be enormous. It may vary from case to case.

It is, of course, where the monopoly power
happens to be large--or one has a unique and highly
valuable idea for which there are no close substitutes-that this becomes an important issue. And these are the one
over which the entire discussion

must focus.

Now, given those ideas, you see, it is true that if one were to argue that the software copyright period should be five years because no software package has a useful life of more than four years, I would say that is nonsense. Then you may as well have a copyright that lasts forever, since five years, or six years, or seven years, or twenty-five years, would have exactly the same economic effect.

The heterodox position which we are taking

-- and it should be emphasized that this follows from

the logic of our analysis -- is that if the useful life

of a piece of software is normally four years, then the

optimal copyright period might be three years, or two

years; not as a matter of justice; not as a matter

of fairness or equity; but as a matter of getting the

maximal flow of benefits to the community as a whole.

Remember, here I am taking the view that most economists will take: that the justification for

copyright is the stimulation of new ideas for the benefit of the community as a whole, and that the notion of copyright or patent is, as it were, to provide a preliminar period during which the bulk of the benefits flow to the creater of the idea; and the subsequent period, during which the benefits flow to the rest of the community.

Where that optimal period occurs, it is not clear.

But it is somewhere in between zero at the one extreme,

and the period beyond which the product is useless at the

other.

Now, I recognize that one has to deal with Treaty constraints, legal constraints, and others, and clearly, whatever action is taken must not violate whatever such constraints have been pre-imposed upon the decisions that are made. I recognize that; and I can only argue that one approaches as closely as one can to such ideals as one can formulate within the limits of what is permissible by such commitments.

MR. LEVINE: One comment on the last point,

Professor Baumol:

Your suggestion that the term should be shorter in order to enable the ideas to flow freely while they have a useful life and then, you suggested patents and copyright in the same sentence.

The distinction between patents and copyright is precisely that the idea is not protected, but only

., 19

the expression of the idea is protected. So that when a
novel is written, anyone is free to use that idea, although
no one is free to use the particular way the idea happens
to be expressed. Patent is different. Patent protects
more than merely the expression of the idea and, in effect,
protects the idea as well; and the trade-off has been for
a much shorter term of protection for patents than for
copyrights.

I wondered whether you considered that in your analysis?

DR. BAUMOL: Well, we certainly have considered it; and I agree that there is some degree of difference between the two. I was not trying to imply that they were equivalent though my expression might have suggested that -- and probably did. But I was arguing that, in this one feature, there was a common element in the analysis. You see, the question in both cases is: What is the optimal length of life?

Now, one can get it from a table of random numbers.

One can look for some declaration by the data transmitted by some obscure means; or one can argue -- as "dismal" scientists do -- and say, "Look, where do the trade-off costs and benefits go in the wrong direction?"

All I have done is to see where the dismal scientist's preconceptions lead us to, and have, therefore, said: "What are the costs, themselves? What are the

23

24

25

benefits, and where does one judge when the trade-off stops being favorable to Society and starts becoming In that respect, one must regard the two unfavorable. approaches -- the two institutions: Patent and Copyright -- as having a feature in common.

It clearly follows, from exactly the feature that I have cited, that it may be desirable to have a different/life for one, than for the other; but the logic should be the same.

That is the point I am making.

JUDGE FULD: Rhoda?

COMMISSIONER KARPATKIN: Judge Fuld, we received in the mail a preliminary draft of Computer Software Protection Statute." I think it was at the request of Mr. Hersey.

I would be very interested in having a member of the Staff summarize that for Professor Balmol, and hearing his reaction to it; as to how it fits into his analysis.

Does any member of the Staff JUDGE FULD: volunteer?

MR. SQUIRES: My name is Jeffrey Squires. And I have been designated as that member of the Staff to summarize something which I haven't taken a look at, in months, I suppose.

First of all, in concept or in outline, the
suggested Statute is similar to the Copyright law that
we now have. It provides protection against the creator
or the proprietor not being able to control the duplication
of the work the software.

However, it differs, in at least the important concept, that the idea as well as the expression -- if you use those two concepts as a dichotomy -- are protected under this Statute and, once one has created and jumped through the proper hoops to register and deposit a copy, similar to what is the case under Copyright, you can control the dissemination of the product for a certain specified period of time -- and I think it was just a suggestion -- for a term of ten years. Ten, twelve years -- I cannot remember, exactly.

But the important distinction, if I recall correctly, is that both the idea as well as the expression are protected in that, In that sense, it is a hybrid of the Copyright/Patent protection.

MR. LEVINE: I guess I might clarify what that draft Statute was: It was prepared at the suggestion of Mr. Hersey as part of his additional, or dissenting views on the Software Committee Report of CONTU, and was prepared with Staff assistance. But it is not the CONTU committee report.

JUDGE FULD: Are you in a position to answer that; or address yourself to it?

DR. BAUMOL: I would be happy to but I think Professor Braunstein has something he wants to say.

DR. BRAUNSTEIN: I am intrigued because I am worried about what the novelty requirement is, for the idea to be protected.

MR. SQUIRES: Another dichotomy that is manifested in the difference between Patent and Copyright is: originality as opposed to novelty -- whatever they mean -- and I am not sure. But in this draft Statute the concept of originality, rather than novelty, was employed.

of computer software that is exactly duplicative of something that you have created, but I had no access to yours
and I created mine out of whole cloth, I deserve protection
and I can get protection under that Statute, whatever
that protection is worth; and it may be worth very little.

DR. BRAUNSTEIN: I am worried about that whole notion of using copyright, or something else, to protect computer software and the ideas embodied in that software, where, in many cases, that may be appropriate. But there are also many cases where the ideas behind the software have

originally been expressed in non-computer related works -whether it be a statistical package, or an airline reservations package of software, or whatever. And I am
worried about the protection extending to other people,
who would then try to develop software for their computer
systems to do those tasks, also. -- whether they would be
prohibited, or have to pay royalties, or whatever to
the person/has this copyright, or whatever it would be
called.

DR. BAUMOL: If I may generalize: My reaction is, in a sense, a logical extension of some of the things that were said before.

The first is that, if there were some way of defining and testing the novelty/originality, etc., then principle-broadening of what it is that is covered by copyright is, in general, desirable.

The danger is, of course, that one will run into tremendous problems in carrying out such a proviso, and that it would become so complicated as to be destructive!

I am not arguing that it will be. I am arguing that it is something which must be thought through carefully -- the scenarios played through in advance with exquisite care before one commits himself to something that may backfire and prove extremely costly.

2

23

24

25

My other comment is that I would urge that if the ten-year protection period -- which is suggested in this draft Statute -- is a number that is picked out of the air -- and I don't know that to be the case -- I am not suggesting that it is --

MR. SQUIRES: It is!

It is worth careful consideration, DR. BAUMOL: along the lines we have been arguing, before one commits one's self to an arbitrary period of time and, once again, consider the possibility of, perhaps, two or three protection periods -- depending on the materials covered.

It was picked out of the air, and in COMMISSIONER HERSEY: one of the comments that I provided with this, was the suggestion that the period of protection might be adjusted to precisely balance out the desirability of the stimulation of new ideas and their circulation, and protection.

The cogency of your argument on "term", seems to me to be one of the things that may support dealing with this issue outside of copyright, rather than within copyright; that if you are bound by the term of the Copyright Statute of life plus 50 years, or 75 years, or by International Agreements to 25 years, or whatever it might be, there is no chance for this kind of flexibility, and that seems to me to be one more argument to try and deal

íľ

i÷.

with this, outside of copyright.

DR. BAUMOL: That may well be. It may be that the constraints are so serious that you are forced to adopt a solution which might otherwise have been second best.

basic argument-of keeping programs outside of copyright-has to do with the nature of the Object Program which is, in effect, a mechanical device, after it has been transformed from source to object code. And my question is whether it is appropriate for copyright protection to protect something that is, essentially, a mechanical device.

DR. BAUMOL: I am not sure whether it is that which, to me, would be the crucial issue. The crucial issue is always in terms of effect, not the description of the object protected and, for example, your point about the constraints, to me, is a very important one, and something to which I would give a great deal more weight, I think, than I would to the description of the object as mechanical, or not.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: Then the issue of effect might be the effect on other forms of copyright--if this protection were afforded to what is, essentially, a mechanical device.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

j2

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

 $\succeq 1$

25

DR. BAUMOL: Yes. That, I agree, is very important.

MR. FRASE: Mr. Baumol, during the time that your colleagues did this study for the Commission on the Computer issues, I know that you have been involved in other studies of publishing.

Would you have any comments to make on your views on the photocopy issue; and whether you agree with Professor Machlup?

DR. BAUMOL: I have reservations about an attempt to enforce payment on photocopying of copyrighted materials simply because I suspect that, despite all the techniques I have heard of, that:

 $No.\ 1:$ The cost is likely to exceed the benefits, and

No. 2: There are likely to be serious enforcement problems which can cause a breakdown in the system.

So that my argument is not like Professor Machlup's, in opposition, in principle, except the principle against undertaking programs whose social benefits are outweighed by their social costs.

Now, these are factual questions.

It may be that there is a device, a surveillance device, which will not only immediately identify an act

] [

...1

of photocopying a piece of copyrighted material but will immediately identify the name, rank, and serial number of the culprit. Maybe so. And maybe it can do so at minimal cost. In that case, I might, very well, revise my views. At the moment, I am skeptical.

MR. FRASE: Suppose that there were minimal costs, and there were not these problems of enforcement. Would you say what your economic theory would be as to why you might, then, support such an arrangement?

DR. BAUMOL: Well, the answer -- once again, forgive me for quoting myself. One likes to defend one's consistency.

that when there is a difference between total cost incurred in some process -- such as publication -- and the sum of the payments that can be received if one charges merely marginal or incremental cost, and those payments are not to be made -- that is, the difference is not to be made up by public subsidy -- then the payments are best made up by as large a class of users as possible; not merely because there is 'fairness in spreading the load', but because you can show, analytically, that in that way, you get minimal misallocation of resources.

So my answer is, in principle, "Yes". The users of photocopies of copyrighted material should, in

≯	1
927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	. 8
MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS	9
	10
	11
	12
	12 13 14 15 16
	14
	15
	16
	17
	18
	19
	20
24 GHTS	21
PHONE (202) 347-0224 REPRODUCTION RIGHTS REFERED	22
INE (202) 347. TODUCTION SESERVED	22 23 24
PHON PERP	24

fact, -- I don't say their share, because I don't know what their share of the cost is -- bear an appropriate share of the cost, if the cost, itself, of collection does not exceed the benefits; if the trouble of collection does not exceed what is obtained from it, and if the problems of compliance are not so serious as to undermine much more than one gains in the process.

COMMISSIONER CARY: One additional question which relates to that problem:

Would you, then, go on to say that you would favor the concept which you have alluded to earlier; that economists in general would be inclined to favor no exemption, in this type of a situation?

DR. BAUMOL: That is right! That is, I think, economists in general -- clearly, one cannot speak for an entire profession -- but I must say that, somehow, economists have managed to be much less different in their views than any other discipline that I know of, and, at the same time, have achieved the reputation of absolute disagreement on everything!

But be that as it may, I think I do speak for the bulk of the profession when I say that we are not against subsidy. We believe that it is a good thing to provide housing to the poor, and research grants to

un-tenured faculty members. But those research grants should not come out of publishers--just as the Arts should not be subsidized by the artists.

If we believe in subsidizing the Arts, it should be done openly, and it should be done by the general Treasury -- not by particular classes of individuals.

MR. KEPLINGER: Professor Baumol, we have heard at length, in previous meetings from technologists, that their predictions were that technology may lead the future world in the production and dissemination of information.

I believe I have heard you speak, before, of what you think some of the economic forces are that may change the way information is disseminated in the future—— which you think may have some relevance in this Commission, in its thinking about how the law might apply to, essential copyright such as data bases and computer software.

Could you spend a few minutes and share some of those ideas with us?

DR. BAUMOL: Certainly! Let me say that I deplore people who forecast the future. So you have invited me to violate all of my preconceptions on this issue. But this is one case where I think -- what is the cliche -- events cast their shadows before them?

1104 CARRY BUILDING 927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

with

In a study/which I was involved several years ago and had the good fortune to work with my old friend. D.r. Dix, before; we examined the costs of Library operations, and -- along exactly the same lines -- I examined something about cost of publications, etc.; and one of the things that emerged from the empirical data was that, in fact, these costs are remarkably different from the behavior of costs in the economy as a whole; namely, that costs per unit of library operations over a very long period, for which we have data, rise cumulatively and consistently, far faster than costs in the economy as a whole. As I remember it, costs -whether taken per volume or per student -- over the period when the rate of inflation in the economy -- some of us still remember this -- was something like 1-1/2% per year, these costs of library operations were rising, roughly, 6 to 7 percent a year, compounded and cumulative.

Now, that doesn't sound like much. I can assure you that anyone who has lived with compounding should consider these as frightening a set of figures as they have ever encountered. Just to give you an illustration, the greatest inflation in English economic history before the Twentieth Century was the great Tudor inflation which began one year after the accession of Henry VIII and, indeed, ended with Cromwell's takeover

of the reigns of government. In that 120-year period, prices octupled.

Now, the rate of inflation that was involved was approximately 1.3% a year, compounded. Yet, here, we are talking about something between 6 and 7 percent a year, compounded; roughly a doubling every ten years, a quadrupling every twenty years and so on and so forth, a geometric progression—in the words of Mr. Malthus.

First, let me ask: Is this a fortuitous phenomenon
Is this something which occurs because librarians
are either villainous, or peculiarly inefficient?

The answer is, clearly, "No".

It is a phenomenon which one finds in virtually all human activities in which labor is an essential element in the quality of the product. One finds this in other activities, such as universities, as a whole.

One finds it in the Performing Arts. One finds it, incidentally, in profitable, or allegedly profitable operations, such as automotive insurance, where what is being sold is medical service, legal service, and repair where, service, and,/therefore, human activity is, once again, an essence of the end product.

Because, in these products, there is no room for increased productivity of the sort one finds in manufacturing. There is no offset to rising wages; to rising

3.5

library costs, and the result is that costs rise-cumulatively and constantly-in just the manner that is
observed.

Now, what does all this have to do with the question I was asked?

The answer is that what this means is that certain types of activity in publication, in libraries, and elsewhere, is going to grow as it has been growing, cumulatively, more expensive, not in terms of inflated dollars, not as the economy as a whole inflates, but far faster than is happening and has happened in the economy as a whole.

It is going to mean that there is increasing pressure for finding substitutes for the procedures which have traditionally been employed in the dissemination of knowledge. And there are means at hand, because -- for precisely analogous reasons -- one finds the opposite trends in the use of electronic devices, for the accumulation, storage, and dissemination of knowledge.

One can now get, for fractions of a dollar, electronic storage devices which only a decade ago cost millions. This is literally true. And there is no reason to suspect that the end to that trend is in sight.

What this means is that we are going to be faced with increasing pressure to look for and adopt substitutes-

1104 CARRY BUILDING 927 FJFTEENTH STREET, N.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 MILLER-COLUMBIAN. REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

substitutes which we may not like; and substitutes which we may not be fully happy with--but electronic substitutes for things which were previously provided by storage, and library stacks, and by reproduction through printing devices.

What it means is that electronic means for the storage and dissemination of knowledge -- which, today, are not adopted because they are more costly than we are sometimes led to believe -- will become less costly in the decades ahead, while the cost of the traditional methods of dissemination of knowledge will grow more and more difficult to finance.

We already see these pressures. These pressures grow stronger, and I think there is every reason -- both in logic, in analysis, and in empirical data--to expect that they will grow stronger still. I think that, unless there is a major breakthrough, there will be means of dissemination and storage of knowledge adopted--in two decades--which strike us as Science Fiction today, and they will be adopted not because they will be fun--or because they will be lovable,-but because the economics will force us in that direction. I make this statement not because these are things which remain to be invented,-but because these are devices, these are pieces of equipment, which are already in existence and which are kept from use only by

unfamiliarity, and by the fact that, for the moment, they are still more costly than the traditional approaches.

But the distance in cost, in separating these and the traditional methods, grow narrower every day; and the crossover points are upon us.

JUDGE FULD: Thank you very much, Professor Baumol.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: I had one question.

This was a very eloquent statement; and I hate to turn to earthly things.

DR. BAUMOL: It's better that way.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: You have spoken in your presentation about possible exemption because of the impracticality of enforcement. I wondered whether you had any specific cases, examples, types of situations in mind, in speaking about the possibility.

DR. BAUMOL: Certainly I was thinking, of course, of photocopy/ and I am not arguing that all photocopying should necessarily be exempted.

l am saying that, certainly, there are many categories of photocopying -- the occasional photocopied item, etc. -- and I would think, at least for the moment, that enforcement is both excessively costly and even if the costs were devoted to it, would still be ---

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

COMMISSIONER HERSEY (Interposing) I understood you to be speaking of the act of enforcement with respect to computer software in your paper, as a whole.

DR. BAUMOL: Once again, I would have to examine the fact that computer software would be very hard to defend as something which should be exempted on these One might argue there are certain types of arounds. computer software where usage would probably be de minimus; and there may be easy device systems to distinguish that sort, from the other sort. You may want to examine that. That is: that the record-keeping becomes more expensive than it is worth. One might, for example, ask the author of computer software who saw that it was likely to earn \$50.00 per year -- as we do on some of our scholarly publications -- and that the record keeping was not worth it, to simply designate that particular piece as exemptible. The can think of other ways of going about it.

But, in general, I was not thinking of computer software, personally.

COMMISSIONER, PERLE: I am profoundly upset at some of the things that led you to the conclusion that you reached. Given a structure which provides for single term copyright, in years, for all methods of expression of ideas with which we have been able to live, is this something unique?

Is there something special about computer software that differentiates from all other types of materials that are granted copyright protection?

DR. BAUMOL: First of all, just because something has existed for many years does not, per se, render it desirable. Tradition is, often, a very poor guide for the future, except that it may teach us not to repeat it.

I am not arguing that a long period of protection is always undesirable, although I am very suspicious of it. But the fact is that we have lived with all sorts of excessive pollution; we have lived with crowded cities; we have lived with many sorts of things which I am sure you would join me in being very happy to change, permanently.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: Granted!

DR. BAUMOL: What is very special about computer software, presumably, is the short period of useful life of the product.

of our analysis stands up, then that should call for a corresponding period of copyright protection, ideally, permanently.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: The logic of that leads one to the conclusion that there would have to be a whole series of terms of copyright protection, of every sort.

DR. BAUMOL: No, sir. No, sir. There is a ruleof-reason which says that just because two is better than one, five million is not necessarily better than two.

You know, there is a rule of reason which says that there are diminishing returns to increasing fineness of calculation.

Of course, if it costs nothing to provide additional distinguishing periods, so that we could, without effort, without cost, without difficulty, add to the number of sub-categories -- each of which had its own period of protection -- obviously, one has assumed-by that assumption, the conclusion that an infinite number of periods of protection is operable. But you and I know better than that. We know, in fact, that increasing numbers of categories mean increasing costs; increasing difficulties of enforcement; increasing complexity. And I have not pre-judged that more than one period is optimal. I am arguing, though, that one should not pre-judge that one period is optimal.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: Okay. Then you are not really saying if that/this Commission should recommend a period of protection, that it is, necessarily, one which will be different.

DR. BAUMOL: That is right! But what I am arguing against is what we have just seen illustrated -- excuse me for picking on you, in a friendly way -- an arbitrary choice of, say, ten years.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

It is just as arbitrary to pick the period given to us by tradition, as it is to pick a 10-year number because ten happens to be nice.

All I ask of this Commission is that it weigh the possibility of two or three or, maybe, five, or maybe one copyright period; comparing the cost and benefits, and not saying one has always worked, therefore we will not consider it any more."

COMMISSIONER DIX: May I follow that up just a minute?

Your premise here then, on this duration issue, is that there is a social cost in extending protection beyond the point at which it is needed.

DR. BAUMOL: That is right.

definition of when it is needed, and when that ends.

But it seems to me that you have advanced a concept which is new to me, and which I find helpful, that there ought to be -- at the point where protection ends -- still some value left in the cup.

DR. BAUMOL: That is precisely it.

COMMISSIONER DIX: Somebody ought to want to copy at the point that protection ends. If you extend the protection to the point at which nobody wants to copy it, then you have kept it on too long.

DR. BAUMOL: That is exactly right. And let me

1104 CARRY BUILDING

add that our analysis also tries to provide some help point in judging where that intermediate/is. It does not give the magic formula which tells you when you have succeeded in squaring the circle, but it does give you at least the elements which must be weighed--and shows what sort of data one needs in order to weigh them.

So we have not merely confined ourselves to the generalization that there is some intermediate period.

We said, "How does one go about evaluating that?"

COMMISSIONERDIX: Thank you.

JUDGE FULD: Any other questions?

MR. LEVINE: Just one comment, and that is, obviously, that another factor that has to be considered is the error factor, and whether it is better to err in making the term too long than making it too short -- what the pluses and minuses are.

DR. BAUMOL: Indeed, That is true in any decision process. There are errors both ways. I could not agree more with what you have just said! But one should be careful in not making that statement sound as though it is implying one answer is more correct than the other. Ignorance is ignorance, and does not weigh more on one side than it does on the other.

JUDGE FULD: Again, our thanks.

	1
1104 CARRY BUILDING LER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE 927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005	2
	3
	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
	10
	11
	12
	13
	14
	15 16
	16
MILL	. 17
	18
	19
	20
24	21
9 347-02	22
P.HONE (202) 347-0224	2 3
P.HO	24

DR. BAUMOL: Thank you very much.

JUDGE FULD: We will recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the meeting was recessed until 1:30 o'clock, p.m., on the same day.)

- AFTERNOON SESSION -

JUDGE FULD: Our next speaker is Roy G. Saltman. He is Program Manager for Technology Transfer at the Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology of the National Bureau of Standards. His area of interest is the impact of technology on the Federal Government and on our Society, in general.

He served as Executive Secretary of the Committee on Automation Opportunities in the Service Areas of the Federal Council for Science and Technology, and as Project Director of the NBS Study on the Effective Use of Computing Technology. He has been active in the Computing field for more than twenty years, serving in both the private and the public sector and has Degrees in both Engineering and Public Policy.

It is a pleasure to welcome you, Dr. Saltman.

STATEMENT BY ROY G. SALTMAN
Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology
National Bureau of Standards

MR. SALTMAN: Thank you, Judge Fuld and Members of the Commission. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to share with you some of our project's preliminary results. The project is more or less completed, but the project's final report has to go through the review process of the Bureau of Standards and, as such, I must necessarily call the results "preliminary", but I think they have been well

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

PRUNE (202) 347-0224

considered.

This study began in October 1974, before the establishment of CONTU, and has been sponsored by the Division of Science Information of the National Science Foundation. The objective of this project has been to study the impact of computer technology and copyright on the availability of computerized scientific and technical information. As such, an analysis of the interaction of law, computer technology, and economics has been required.

As you may know, the originator of the concept of this project was Michael Keplinger, your Assistant Executive Director. Among the eight members of the project's Advisory Panel have been Commission Members Arthur Miller and Barbara Ringer. Thus, the project's connection with CONTU has been more than coincidental. Through Mr. Keplinger assistance, and with the concurrence of Executive Director Arthur Levine, the project has benefitted from discussions held with the professional staff of CONTU. It is most appropriate, therefore, that the project's pertinent results be presented to you.

Let me state very clearly and emphatically, however, that the project's work has been pursued independently. While the assistance of the members of CONTU and its professional staff is gratefully acknowledged, the project's findings, recommendations, and conclusions are

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

PHOME (202) 347-0224

solely its own. Furthermore, sponsorship or acknowledgement of assistance rendered should not be construed as necessarily implying the concurrence in the results of this study by the sponsor, the National Science Foundation, or of CONTU. In addition, permit me to cite the indispensible assistance in copyright law received from Abe A. Goldman, retired General Counsel to the Copyright Office, whose services were made available to us through a contract with CRC Systems, Inc.; as well as the assistance of Professors of Economics Yale Braunstein and Janusz Ordover of New York University.

The subject of this study has not concerned an activity in which there is a comprehensive or coordinated investment program aimed at achieving a specific goal.

Consequently, recommendations are not based on a quantification of benefits and a resulting cost-benefit comparison—as is the case withmany policy analyses. In order to establish a firm basis for recommendations, basic principles of copyright have been surveyed; and an analysis has been made of the impact of information technology on copyright law as that technology has advanced during the Twentieth Century. That particular aspect of the project was carried out by Abe Goldman and, as to the specific chapter and report on that subject, I will not be reporting on that particular aspect of the project, today.

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESS: ONALS

Fundamental concepts of economics have been reviewed to assure that recommendations are well-grounded in that discipline.

As an outcome of the evaluation of fundamentals and of the historical analyses, it has been possible to enumerate a set of basic principles that are employed as the foundation of the recommendations. The project proposes these "Findings of Basic Principles" in the sense of what Professor David Truman has called "the rules of the game" in his classic study of pluralism, The Governmental Process. Truman found that while opposing interest groups might contend specific property rights, the members of the groups shared common fundamental views and attitudes that prevented the erosion of individual rights that would have the effect of hurting everyone.

In addition to the findings and recommendations, conclusions have been drawn by the project about methods of reducing transaction costs in the marketplace for copyrighted works, about the impact of technological change on policymaking, and about the existing and expected mechanism of policymaking in copyright. Certainly these findings, conclusions and recommendations of this study are not to be taken as the final, definite view. Other analyses of the legal and historical precedents may reveal different interpretations and, consequently, different

conclusions and recommendations.

The Findings of Basic Principles are as follows:

- 1. The concept of common law copyright conforms to the philosophy of the Enlightenment, enunciated by John Locke, that each person has the right to the fruits of his creations.
- 2. Due to the inherent rights in the copy, an intrinsic market failure results from the ease of copying or plagiarism of intellectual property. Correction of the failure requires the public good of statutory copyright protection.
- 3. The principle of inherent ownership and consequent statutory protection do not imply a value judgment as to the relative merit of an individual work, or the inherent right to financial remuneration. The economic value of a work is to be determined in the marketplace where copyright protects the distributors of intellectual works, as well as the creators.
- 4. If free economic competition is possible, opportunities for it should be maximized, including opportunities for entry of new products and new competitors
- 5. Copyright protection assumes the concept of the quid pro quo of social contract. The application of this concept requires that, in return for the protection of law, the copyright holder make a public disclosure of

his work.

- 6. The dissemination of scientific and technical information should be maximized, subject to resource constraints, excepting where such principles as personal privacy, trade secrecy and national security take precedence
- 7. There would be transaction costs attached to the market for intellectual property even if there were no copyright protection. The trade-off in structuring the market is in the kinds of transaction costs society is willing to tolerate, as well as the size of such costs. All other things being equal, the size of transaction costs should be minimized.
- 8. Decision making on copyright involves the achievement of a balance of equities between user needs and owner rights that should include consideration of the general public, as well.

Rather than justify these particular findings at this moment, I would prefer to present, for your consideration, a discussion of the study's recommendations related to computer programs and computerized data bases.

I think you will find that, during this presentation, I will make reference to these findings of basic principles and that they will, in a sense, be discussed in the course of the discussion.

Some of the questions concerning the copyrightability of computer programs are these:

- (a) Is a computer program the writing of an author and, thus, eligible for copyright protection under the Constitution?
 - (b) Is a computer program a "literary work"?
- (c) Can a computer program be sufficiently "original" that it meets the requirements for a copyrighted work?
- (d) Should a program in object code be treated any differently, under copyright, than a program in a source language?
- (e) Should copyright protection be denied computer programs on the basis of the strength of the software industry?
- (f) Is protection of the specific expression of of a program-but not/the underlying conception--sufficient protection to be valuable?
- (g) How long should protection last, if a program is copyrightable?
- (h) What should be a buyer's usage rights in a program.

On the subject of the writing of an author, in general, a computer program is written by a human being, and is written in a specific formal language. In general -- just to deviate from the text for just a minute -- a

high level language is a specific formal language in the linguistic sense of having a specific syntax, and -- when one writes in a formal language -- one in effect uses that syntax of the language and "natural" language, in which we generally speak -- that is, English or any other common natural language -- has a great many redundation it, and many meanings -- subtle meanings -- which cannot be put in a formal language but, nevertheless, such language is being described, in a sense, as "formal

Those persons engaged in the occupational special of writing programs are known as programmers. I believe that there are about two or three thousand people capable, in this Country, of writing programs, mainly in high level language, but some of them are more specialized in what we might call "assembly language" and some even in what might be called "object code".

language" through the expertise available in linguistics.

Others engaged in the tasks of determining requirements for blocking out the logical flow of programs may be known as systems analysts. Engineers, scientists, and others may write programs or conceptualize them for a programmer's use in the course of using a computer to assist them in solving problems in which they are engaged. In the United States today, there are probably several million persons who can comprehend—

25

at least superficially-a computer program written in FORTRAN a widely-used programming language.

In opposition to the copyrightability of computer programs, the point has been made that a computer program is a set of instructions for a machine, and, in fact, according to this view, -since the machine cannot operate without the program,-the program is really part of the machine". Thus, programmers are really engaged in "machine design", according to this argument, and the output of their work is more appropriately protected under a different legal mechanism than copyright.

Several points can be made in rebuttal to this line of reasoning.

First, there is nothing inherent in a computer that cannot be carried out by trained human labor -- given either enough time or enough people to undertake the work. That is, the computer program written by a programmer is a set of instructions understandable by other persons; and it consists of individual steps that are possible to be accomplished by trained humans, if the time restraints are relaxed. The capabilities needs are these:

- The ability to distinguish negative, zero, and positive numbers;
- The ability to perform arithmetic and (b) elementary Boolean algebra; and

 21

(c) The ability to currently select the next instruction, given explicit and unambiguous directions as to where to find it.

It hardly seems fair to the author of such a set of instructions, or as to the public interest in economic efficiency, to deny Government protection to the author's expression simply because, for purposes of speed and accuracy, the instructions are to be carried out by machine instead of by human labor.

If it is to be put forward that computer programs are not in a language in which humans speak to each other, that point can be accepted without damaging the case for copyrightability. Categories of works now copyrightable include musical works -- that is, sheet music, not necessarily including any accompanying words; pantomines and choreographic works; and pictorial, graphic and sculptural works. None of these communicate to humans in natural language.

Certainly included in the category of pictorial and graphic works are engineering and architectural drawings and schematic diagrams, all of which can be employed as instructions to those persons engaged in the construction of machines, devices, and structures.

Close to the concept of the computer program is musical notation, and similar notations for sequences of

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

choreographic motions. Musical notation is, in essence,	
a set of instructions for the operation of mechanical devices	
so as to produce a particular sequence of sounds, each with	
a particular pitch for particular lengths of time. It	
follows that the question whether a computer analysis program	
is still a computer is analogous to the question of whether a	
piano without someone playing it is still a piano! Dis-	
cussion of such a question is not likely to be fruitful	
in the present context.	

It may be helpful to point out, however, that a computer program is more than simply a set of instructions used to operate a machine. Computer programs are involved, in their operational use, in a variety of real human purposes. Some of those purposes involve research and other professional activities, while other purposes may appear to be mundane. However, the development of a computer program that will be used in connection with any real human purpose must include an understanding of the human and physical systems with which the program will be associated.

Implicit in any set of calculations that represent the real world is a model of that portion of the real world. Clearly, the computer programs now in use throughout the United States that assist physicians in the diagnosis of heart ailments on the basis of an analysis of electrocardiogram signals constitute models of the heart's operation

1.3

1.4

Similarly, but perhaps not so obviously, accountants have begun to realize that the system of financial records of an organization including the records of collections, inventory and disbursements, is nothing less than a financial model of the organization.

In effect, the computer program is an implementation of the view that the physical world, and at least part of the human world, is amenable to rational analysis and quantification, and to understanding deduced from these processes. Scientists, engineers, economists and statisticians must be listed among those whose core of professional work conforms to this view. No person need accept this view, either in its entirety, or uncritically. In fact, a world run solely on the basis of this view might very well lack fundamental and essential value judgments that cannot be deduced or quantified.

Copyright protection, however, as pointed out in the Findings of Basic Principles, requires no value judgment as to the individual merit of a particular writing of an author; and it is clear that the program in source language written by a programmer is such a writing.

While the most fundamental statutory test of copyrightability is whether the category in question constitute a writing of an author", it is useful to further consider the Basic Principles.

ÿ

1.7

Under these Principles, this study finds that the author of a computer program is entitled to the fruits of his creation; and that the ease of copying of this form of intellectual property constitutes an intrinsic market failure, requiring the public good of statutory copyright protection. In addition, this study finds that without copyright protection for computer programs, losses in information flow, increased procedures for secrecy, and less opportunity for creativity would result. I will cover that last statement in greater detail.

Programs as Literary Works: Seven categories of works are now granted protection under Section 102 of the 1976 General Revision of Copyright Law. While the definition of "literary works" given in Section 101 of the new Act is broad enough to include computer programs, it is not necessary that computer programs be defined for purposes of the statute as literary works. An alternative is a new category of copyrightable work to be enumerated in Section 102, namely: "Computer Programs".

One reason for consideration of this question is that computer programs are used in different ways than prose or poetry; as are the other six protected categories. The limitations on exclusive rights granted to users of literary works, for example, as specified in Section 110 of the 1976 General Revision, may or may not be appropriate

for computer programs. In particular, the applicability of the limitations of Section 110 to computer programs used for computer-assisted instructional purposes is worthy of examination.

Similarly, as the uses to which computer programs are put, or the manner in which they are used, differ from more standard literary works, additional modifications of the copyright statute may be appropriate to specify the assignment of property rights with respect to each type of work. Categorization of computer programs separately from literary works might assist the process of specifying these differences.

I will cover that point about the literary code when we come to the object code. I want to make some comments on that point, also.

On the subject of Originality: While no specific research study can be identified yielding definitive results that computer programs can be "original", as the meaning of that term is understood in copyright law, experience and knowledge of the field make possible an unequivocal affirmative response.

Many books have been written on the subject of how to write programs; and how to write better programs. If originality were not possible, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for Gerald M. Weinberg to have

written the book <u>The Psychology of Computer Programming</u> including sections on "programming as Human Performance" and "Programming as an Individual Activity."

Similarly, it would have been far less likely for Dennie Van Tassel to have written on "Program Style" in his book on <u>Program Style</u>, <u>Design</u>, <u>Efficiency</u>, <u>Debugging</u>, and <u>Testing</u>, or for Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., to have written of "the joys of the craft" or of "craftsmanship" in his book on <u>The Mythical Man-Month</u>, <u>Essays on Software Engineering</u>.

The following quotation by Van Tassel supports the concept of originality as well as the concept of the program as the writing of an author:

"The main purpose of a program is to be read by humans rather than machines. People must read and understand the program in order to correct, maintain, and modify it. If we were concerned only with the machine, programs would be written so machines could read them easier than people could. Programs are also documents for future reference, they are educational media for instruction on coded algorithms, and they are used for further development of better programs

Of course, the more complex a program's function,

the greater the variety of unique ways of expressing the steps in the performance. On the other hand, it is questionable whether a program carrying out an elementary and well-defined function, such as the calculation of the roots of a second-order polynomic —could be considered "original". This is, in essence, analogous, perhaps, to the title of the story, which is generally not copyrightable — a very elementary kind of functional sentence which is so elementary that it might not be considered to be original by the Register of Copyrights, and so it might be denied copyrightability.

We feel, however, that it is likely that the registration process will be self-regulating.

Only programs having an intrinsic originality are likely to be submitted for registration.

Protection of Object Code: I really am talking, here, about the protection of object code as a computer program,—not as a sequence of ones and zeroes. We might note, here, the differences between the different classes of computer languages. There is what we call "high level language", such as a formal language as I discussed previously, which has specific syntax, closely related to "natural language", but with elimination of the ambiguities, so that a machine is perfectly clear on what it is to do with these instructions.

]4

s i 宾

COMMISSIONER CARY: Excuse me. Would FORTRAN fall within that?

MR. SALTMAN: Yes it would, sir.

On a lower level, more machine-related, is
"assembly language". Assembly language is still a source
language in which many source programs are written. The
management programs for machines -- what are normally
called "operating systems", or, sometimes, "compilers"
-- are very often written in assembly language because
they are more machine related. They are management programs
which assist the machine in dealing with the application
programs that the programmers write to carry out functions.

Assembly language is a one-to-one relationship with the machine code -- that is, in the machines that are typically being used today. One does not know how machines will be designed in the future, but the machines that John Von Neumann had originally proposed are, in effect, still being employed. Assembly language is a kind of one-to-one relationship with machine code but, nevertheless, a programmer can understand it. The instructions are written in mnemonic form, and the operations of the instructions still relate to the variables of a problem rather than the machine addresses.

When one gets into object code, what happens is that the mnemonic, which are the instructions,

25

someone submitted a sequence of ones and zeroes which would be an object code to the Copyright Office as a literary work under the category of a literary work -the Copyright not having been given the previous submission of similar sequences of ones and zeroes, would probably have to accept for registration such sequences of ones and zeroes.

The question in my mind is whether that could be constituted as a computer program, -not simply a sequence of ones and zeroes accepted by the Copyright Office for registration.

It seems to me that, if that is constituted a computer program, then there is an implied ability of the programmer, or the copyright owner, to begin an infringement suit against somebody else who had written

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

13

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

a similar computer program.

Now, it may very well be that, if one were to write a similar computer program -- similar enough to be copied -- and changed the mnemonics in such a fashion; and arranged for the computer programmer to put, in a machine, a different sequences addresses, one could still have an infringement, but the ones and zeroes sequence would be different. So that somebody who copyrighted a sequence of ones and zeroes would actually not be protecting himself as well as he could.

COMMISSIONER CARY: May I interrupt you?

MR. SALTMAN: Yes.

COMMISSIONER CARY: Are you saying that the ones and zeroes in the object code would be the same, even though the two people had expressed themselves originally in a different language?

The opposite. The opposite --MR. SALTMAN: No. that if they, in effect, had the same logic, copier could very well have changed the sequence of ones and zeroes for his computer -- it might be a different computer -- or put in a different set of storage locations and actually had a copying program, but it would not be clear that it would be the same because the sequence of ones and zeroes might very well be different.

It would be extremely hard -- it would be

extremely hard -- for the Register of Copyrights to compare two such programs to determine whether they were the same.

COMMISSIONER CARY: I don't agree with you.

MR. SALTMAN: And, furthermore, it would be extremely hard for the facts to be determined in an infringement suit. But I say, you know, under the present copyright law, it seems to me very clear that someone could take a sequence of ones and zeroes, put them on a piece of paper, and submit them to the Copyright Office for registration and, under the Literary Work definition, I don't see how they could refuse to accept it. But whether that would protect the copyright owner in any way excepting for the exact sequence of ones and zeroes, I hesitate to say.

Okay.

Now, my question here is, whether, with respect to object code, it should be able to be copyrighted independently of the program written in source language.

If it were independently copyrightable, a programmer could submit the object code to the Copyright Office for registration and never disclose the source statements at all.

This study finds that the independent copyrightability of object code is not in accord with the basic
principles on which its recommendations are based. The

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

· 1:

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

object code is unreadable by a person--except with enormous difficulty. As a result, copyright registration of object code discloses almost nothing in return for the full protection of law. Information transfer is deliberately minimized, not maximized. Furthermore, it appears to this study that it would be exceedingly difficult for the Copyright Office to assure that the bject code was "original" for registration purposes, and similarly difficult for the facts to be determined in an infringement action.

Now, my suggestion here -- it is not said in the report :-- but it seems to me -- it was pointed out me at lunch -- that someone could really write a program in object code and maybe, in the new micro-computers, they may very well do so. It is unlikely that such a program would be very long. I think that, as one increases the length of the program, one would/have to mechanize that process, through a computer or otherwise. A human being is limited, after all, by a certain amount of storage in the human brain. Certainly, chess games would be far less enjoyable than they are now if one could determine what the final solution of the chess game could be, immediately. But humans are limited and, therefore, the lengths of such object programs are limited.

Now, it seems to me that for copy registration of an object code, it would not be difficult to require

2

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

the programmer of an object code to convert it back into use of instructions, assembly language with mnemonic and the mnemonic; use of variables in a problemoriented manner, such that it then becomes a computer program in source language. And, since object programs are not likely to be long, it is not likely to be a large imposition on such a writer of an object code, if he were to do so, to require that to be done if it were to be copyrightable in the form of a computer program. And that is why I think the difference between a literary work and a computer program ought to be made clear, because a computer program implies something different than a sequence of ones and zeroes. It implies some kind of meaningful set of logical operations.

Now, my statements here should not be understood as implying the conclusion that an object code is not protectable at all. The copyrightability of programs in source language would have very little value if the object code could be produced or copied with impunity. It is concluded, therefore, that the conversion of a source program into object code, which implies no addition to the logic of the program and, therefore, no value added, constitutes the making of a copy. Thus, object code should be protected by virtue of the copyright in the source program, which, as I said, could be either in high level

1.4

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE
RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

но «Е (202) 347-0224

language, or in assembly language.

object code from a source program, the usual procedure is to combine certain necessary operating parameters into the object code. These parameters often select the specific peripheral units that will be used with the program when the program is run and, also, often select the location of the program in the computer storage units. In view of this study, these additions to the object code constitute almost nothing that could be classed as original works of authorship. Thus, the generation of object code, even with the addition of these housekeeping functions, cannot be classed as the preparation of a derivative work.

The translation of a source program from one source language to another source language should be considered the preparation of a derivative work. The translation makes possible the understanding of the program by an additional group of persons, and provides for wider dissemination and use.

One argument against copyrightability of computer programs is that the industry is burgeoning, and therefore copyright is unnecessary. It must be noted, however, that copyright does not specifically protect an industry but, rather, a particular work, in the marketplace.

This study has examined the arguments contained

1)

2.4

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

in two articles in which the possibility of the elimination of copyright protection is discussed.

Now, Economists Robert M. Hurt and Robert M.

Schuchman discussed in their article, the protection of books -- that is, the strategies for one author's protection of books under the conditions of new Copyright and, in an article in 1970, in the Harvard Law Review, be Professor Breyer proposed a strategy that could /employed by program developers in the absence of such protection.

A quotation from this article is as follows:
"One may wonder, for example, whether, without
protection, smaller hardware or software firms
would not find it easier to use parts of IBM
programs in their efforts to compete with IBM."

Similarly, one can say that it is just as likely for a large competitor to use parts of a smaller competitor's program —— as it is for the reverse to occur.

Professor Breyer did not extend his scenario.

It is possible to theorize about protective behaviors available to the originators of computer programs -- that is, large organizations or small -- to protect themselves in such hypothetical situation.

One such strategy could be for an originator to produce programs for sale in object code only, with minimum documentation, thereby making it very difficult

1.2

for a potential copier to know exactly what he had in hand. In fact, a proposal for a so-called "sealed-in-software" that might be protectable by either trade secret or copyright has been made recently by Calvin Mooers in the magazine Computer. I believe that was the March 1977 issue.

A conclusion that can be drawn from both of these examples is that there are transaction costs, regardless of whether the imperfect protection of law exists, or does not exist. Professor Kenneth Arrow has written:

" transaction costs.... are attached to any market and indeed to any mode of resource allocation."

And that certainly includes a market that does not have copyright, as well as one that does. In both of these examples, I think we have come to the conclusion that -- certainly in the Breyer example, which specifically relates to computer programs -- assuming the protective strategy of object code dissemination only with minimal documentation, among the transaction costs to be expected are the reduction in information dissemination about program content to everyone, including disinterested observers who might benefit in another context, the reduction in ability to recognize mistakes in programs and

1-1

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

F-0NE (202) 347-0224

to correct them, and the lowering of incentives to produce new programs that are genuinely novel or original.

So we postulate, therefore, where there is no Government copyright protection, that cut-throat competition losses in information flow, and increases in secrecy would result. In a society in which the market protection of copyright is available, Government regulation has its cost and some infringement from imperfect exclusion can be expected to result, but we suggest that, in addition, a more open society with greater opportunities for creativity exists. Thus the choice is not just between the size of transaction costs inherent in the alternatives but in the kinds of costs and their effects on society, which society is willing to tolerate.

This study concludes that copyright protection is particularly important for the smaller entrepreneur who does not have the resources to engage in the kind of retaliatory measures suggested by Hurt and Schuchman, or to protect himself against the predatory practice proposed by Breyer. Copyrightability promotes free competition and inovations. These aspects of the marketplace are as important criteria for public policy towards an industry, as are growth and size of the industry.

It is clear from the concept of copyright and from Section 102(b) of the 1976 General Revision, that only

the "expression" of a program could be protected.

The question may be asked whether protecting the expression only, rather than the concept, is valuable. An answer is that copyright protection hopes to prevent a major type of market failure with regard to computer programs, but cannot claim to protect against all types of market failure. Therefore, copyright protection is valuable; but not valuable for every purpose.

of computer programs, even without any further use of dissemination of the concepts of the programs, is a major type of market failure. The reason this is true is that examination of the program code to determine any unique concepts contained therein requires the expenditure of significant resources; while copying by itself requires only a bare minimum of resources. The copier who is assured that the program in question performs the functions he desires in an error-free manner has obtained something useful and of considerable value, at minimum expense.

On the other hand, the disclosure of unique concepts, certainly, will assist competitors in the development of competing programs, But, whether a particular unique or innovative design concept is protectable, would depend on how a Statute -- such as the patent law -- protecting such concepts might be written, or might be

. 3

1)

interpreted. This presentation is not the proper vehicle for a detailed discussion of this matter; but it can be pointed out that very few programs contain -- or need to contain -- new concepts as unique as the simplex method for the solution of linear programming problems or the fast fourier transform algorithm. Both of these were outstanding advances in computational procedures and, conceivably, of the type acceptable for additional protection.

For the most part, what is required of programs is that they carry out their intended functions with precision, and in an error-free manner. Performance is improved if, in addition, programs minimize execution time and use of storage space to the extent practicable.

I might point out that the major difference between programs today is, in a sense, those functions; whether they carry out their functions with precision, in error-free manner, with minimized execution time and use of storage space.

The variation in computer programs on those parameters, I think, is an indication of the different competencies, and the need for the use of originality by programmers in the design and development of computer programs.

As regards the unique and innovating programming concepts, I would say there clearly appears to be room for further study on this subject.

Now, in the study on Duration of Protection, it

seems reasonable to suppose that the author of a computer program should not be treated any differently than the author of any other type of copyrightable work.

Now, with regard to what Professor Baumol said this morning— to set the length of protection to such a point where the benefits might overcome the cost to a maximum degree——I would have to modify what I said:simply to say that, if that were done for computer programs, it seems reasonable to propose that that should be done for other copyrightable works, as well. Then you start saying that, really, the author of a computer program should not be treated any differently than the author of any other kinds of work,

A reason that has been given for proposing a shorter duration of copyright is that, with changing technology, computer programs would become valueless after several years. However, if the recommendation of this study is adopted, that an original copyright should be obtainable only in the source program, and not in the object code, then a separation of the programmer's expression from the hardware technology is encouraged.

Furthermore, even if popular source languages are altered or improved, or if new source languages arise, the copyright proprietor retains the right to modify his work, or prepare derivative works, permitting him to

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

update the program as required. The writing of programs, in source languages that can be expected to endure, is promoted.

Now, the Right of Computer Use: It has been often asked by computer users that, if the copyright holder retains the right of exclusive use, how is the computer user supposed to use the program?

Would he constantly have to make agreements with the author, or the copyright proprietor, in order to use the program?

And I would have to agree that the right of use of a program is meaningful and is an inclusive right which, in general, devolves upon the copyright owner.

However, we may note that there are other kinds of copyrighted works that don't require a right of use -- in this case because of technology -- and it would be very useful, and would minimize transaction costs, if that could occur with computer readable works. I see that occurring with computer readable works, if the computer-readable work can be sold, and transfer of ownership of the copy would result in the transfer of exclusive right to use and, of course, that exclusive right to use would be the right to use for the purposes of the individual user, or for the company that he represents, but not in general for further distribution in a network sense.

So that the right of use would evolve upon the owner of a transfer of a copy -- that is, the owner of a copy would have the right of use -- but this right of use would be limited to his own use, so that the computer program, or the computer data base -- as the case may be -- might not be put on a network for external users and, thereby, eliminate further sales of the computer data base, or the computer program, to these outsiders who might use the work through a network.

COMMISSIONERCARY: Stated another way, you are saying, are you not, that if he did put it on network, that is an infringement.

MR. SALTMAN: Yes. Yes. For the use of outsiders, outside of the organization.

By the way, I have not intended to describe it here, but we have had some results produced by Professor Ordover of New York University in cooperation with Dr. Willig of Bell Laboratories. This appears as an appendix to the work, which describes some mathematical results which demonstrate that it is economically correct -- or, I should say, "economically efficient" -- to permit a difference in subscription rate between individual subscribers and institutional subscribers to, let's say, scientific journals. This was done in four scientific journals. That is, the mathematics demonstrate that it is

economically efficient for a price discrimination to exist between individual and institutional subscribers.

One could extend this concept to works on computer readable media, as was talked about some years ago, where it was suggested that hard copy of works would disappear, and would be replaced by works on electronical media that would be distributed through the networks.

Well, if the concept of price differential between individual and institutional subscribers was adopted for such a situation, it would be reasonable to then use such a price differential in order to permit the copyright proprietor to obtain returns under such a situation.

We have not, however, looked at the legalities of price discrimination, by the way. I mean, I am saying here that by proposing a price differential, we assume that all legal problems have been worked out. I heard recently of some difficulties with this kind of an arrangement. So that, economically efficient, or not, we don't propose it because we don't know where all of the legal implications are.

Let me go on to computerized data bases.

There are two issues that we looked at in computerized data bases—that I think are important to mention to you, here.

One is the disclosure at the time of registration,

1.4

...5

and the second is the definition of "publication" for data bases published only in computer-readable form.

The maximum statutory requirements for registration -- of a literary work -- must include, in the case of an unpublished work, one complete copy and, in the case of a published work, two complete copies. These requirements are listed in Section 408(b) of the 1976 General Revision.

The Register of Copyrights is authorized to permit, for particular classes of works -- with classes defined by the Register -- " the deposit of identifying material instead of copies" as stated in Section 408(c)(1). Furthermore, " the Register of Copyrights may, by regulation, exempt any categories of material from the deposit requirements". And they are talking about the Library of Congress. This is stated in Section 407(c).

On the basis of findings of basic principles which I referred to; which were developed from the concepts embodied in several reports of various National Science Foundation Committees, and Science Advisory Committees and Committees of the Federal Council of Science and Technology — it is concluded that the transfer of information is extremely important, and there seems to be an underlying philosophy that, again, such

13.

. 25,

information should be maximized when that is possible.

Therefore, we have concluded that it would be important for the deposit of the complete data base, rather than simply identifying material.

Now, it is hoped, of course, that that would not provide an insuperable barrier to the copyright proprietors but, on the other hand, it would be consistent with the quid pro quo of disclosure for protection, and it would be an aid to scholarship, to historical review, and to the generation of new ideas for the future.

Now, it seems reasonable, of course, that since many, many, data bases are updated completely, even on a weekly or a monthly basis, that such a complete resubmission would be a barrier and an unfortunate requirement, if it were so required.

Therefore, it seems reasonable that such submissions of changes in the data base ought to be done, perhaps, on a single year basis, with complete resubmissions of the data base done on a multi-year basis, say ten, and I have to admit that these numbers are, of course, taken out of the air, and I have no economic basis for using such numbers.

But there has to be, I think, to meet the findings of the basic principles, somehow, an understanding of the disclosure for protection concepts and, hopefully,

1

2

3

an implementation of the concept of maximum transfer of information where such is possible.

The other point on data bases that was discussed

by the study was the problem of publication of a data base when it was done only in computer readable form. in reading the concept of the definition of "publication" from the new Act, it would seem that a certain amount of additional precision ought to be applied to such/concept as the concept of publication when computerized data bases are being considered.

One of the problems is the definition of the word "group", in the definition of what constitutes publication. Distribution to a group constitutes publication.

How many distributees must one have before they become a group?

That is not, really, defined anywhere.

Also, the problem of "What is it that is published", when the only thing that changes hands is a printout at a terminal, which is not part of the complete data base. That is very typical for computerized data bases to be distributed only at terminals where the users obtain printouts of only part of the data base -- not the whole data base. That is, they only obtain printouts of the responses to queries

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

24

25

that they have entered into the data base.

Now, one can wonder whether such a data base can be considered to be published, and it is not clearly, really, in our opinion -- in the opinion of the study --Certainly, if the printout that that is well defined. from the data base is provided to the user under no further restrictions as to further disclosure, then, certainly, the printout is "published". But it would seem to be reasonable, under those circumstances, that the complete data base ought to be considered published as well,even though only the printouts are, really, distributed.

COMMISSIONER CARY: Would you suggest, or would you consider the possibility of including a copyright notice on each printout, so that even if it were considered published --

MR. SALTMAN (Interposing) I think that a prudent publisher would do so, even if it were not clear whether it would be published, or not. I think it would probably be on the printout. I think, to protect oneself -- as a matter of fact, I do say so -- that it probably would That is, certainly, a prudent publisher be on there. would cause the computer to print out the copyright notice on each printout. So that would be "published".

Now, whether the data base, itself -- having not been disclosed, but only the printouts having been

disclosed -- is publishable, it seems to me to be questionable, at the present time. I think it is worthy of your consideration as to whether the data base in a computerized form, with only parts of the data base that are published in printout form, is really published.

That was the other comment that we had on data bases.

Now, there are other things in the report, of course, besides what I have described to you today.

We have considered the foundations of copyright; some of the decision-making on copyright as expected by technological change, going back to about 1903, considering, of course, White - Smith versus Apollo, and various cases, up until Williams and Wilkins, showing how technological change affected-how the Courts treated technological change as it came along, and it was not clear from the original law, as written, whether the new concept -- the new change -- fit within the law, or did not fit within the law.

We also have considered some economic concepts regarding, as we said, the price differential between individual and institutional subscribers, and some aspects of the clearing houses -- blanket license versus 'per use' license -- but I did not intend to describe that to you today.

We also have looked at policy making models for copyright, putting it in the Political Science framework as is normally done in political decision making and, hopefully, drawing some useful conclusions in this matter.

But, as I say, I did not intend to present that to you because it is not immediately pertinent to your consideration.

But I certainly thank you for your attention.

I would like to say that -- what is it called for here -- the title in your agenda/today, the title that is given, may have been the original title for the project. We, at NBS referred to it simply as Copyright Policy and Information Systems, and I hope the title of the final report will be Copyright in Computer Readable Works, Policy Impacts of Technological Change.

I hope that will be the title of the final report.

Thank you very much for your attention. I would be happy to answer any questions.

JUDGE FULD: Any questions?
Yes, Mr. Frase.

MR. FRASE: Mr. Saltman, when is your complete report going to be available?

MR. SALTMAN: I hope that it will be available within a month or so, and I simply say that because it has to go through a certain final review at the National Bureau

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

25

of Standards, and it has to be published -- that is, made available in published form for distribution.

I just say 30 days as a rough estimate of that. COMMISSIONER CARY: This will probably be available from N.T.1.S.

MR. SALTMAN: Yes. Yes. I hope so. it will be a special publication of the Bureau of Standards, and I guess it will be available from N.T.1.S., certainly, yes.

JUDGE FULD: Mr. Hersey.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: On the object program --

Would you make a differentiation the between the concept of/object program as a copy of the source program and a copy made of the object program? And how should copyright deal with this difference?

MR. SALTMAN: A copy of the object program? Well, as I said, the object program I envision to be, in a sense, a copy of the source program.

Now, another copy of that program is still another copy.

I am sorry. Do I understand the full impact of what you are asking?

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: You would regard a copy of the object program as another copy of the source program?

MR. SALTMAN: In effect, yes.

just to the Commissioners that, as long as we think of FORTAN copyright for the object program -- which is a mechanical device -- we are bound to run into contradictions and euphemisms. This study describes the object program as a copy of the source program.

The next to the last version of the Subcommittee Report describes the object program as a derivative work. The final version of the Subcommittee Report does not make any distinction between the source program and the object program, and describes the object as a literary work.

I think that, as long as we try to get this mechanical device into copyright, we are bound to have this kind of difficulty in dealing with just what the object program is.

I have, absolutely, no quarrel with your case for copyright for this source program, and it is only when you get to the object program that the difficulty arises, and it will rise, I think, again and again, because I think, at that point, something different has been produced.

Supposing you had an absolutely free political situation, and you could make a choice between this way of dealing with source and object programs through copyright,

and devising a new legislative form to deal with it. What would your choice be?

MR. SALTMAN: I have to say that there is either copyright protection, or there is protection of innovative ideas. There is either one or the other, and it doesn't matter what names you give them. You are, in effect, either protecting the expression; or you are protecting more than the expression.

Now, whether you call that copyright, or call it something else, I think there is still protection for the expression. As has been pointed out to me, if you start to protect the innovative ideas, you must first of all define what is innovative. You probably have to, then, begin a process of maintaining a state-of-the-art -- that is, you may, in effect, have a patent kind of situation where you have searches and extensive investigation of what has been already -- if I may use the word -- patented or not patented. Then you are more or less starting a more difficult situation -- a more costly situation, certainly.

Now, I mentioned two advances in programming techniques. Actually, they were mathematical techniques more than they were computer program techniques. But if the computer had not been there, there would have been absolutely no use for them. So that one may consider them

- 9

1 i

to be program techniques, as well as mathematical techniques:
namely, the simplex method for the solution of linear
programming problems, and the fast fourier transform
technique.

Now, both of those are very advanced and innovative ideas, in my opinion, in mathematical techniques, and, if the situation were right at the time that they were invented, I would at least consider them to be the kinds of inventions that certainly fall under the classification of "new" and "innovative."

Now, in addition, there may be -- now, those are mathematical. There might be some in computer programs. There certainly could be other kinds of innovations which relate to the computer itself, rather than the mathematical techniques of problem solving -- techniques of, oh, storage allocation, for example, where storage is conserved and under much higher conditions, much stronger conditions, than are now possible; those kinds of techniques which relate to computers that might appear on programs -- not in machine design, but in programs.

I do distinguish between machines and programs.

They might conceivably be acceptable for additional innovation. I don't want to say that they are, or are not, because that would be a policy statement that I don't wish to make, but I am saying -- I throw up the possibility --

]4

that those kinds of techniques are the kind of techniques that ought to be considered for such additional protection.

As I say, I think that there is either protection for expression, or protection for the innovative concepts behind it; and, whatever you call them, it does not matter. They are still the same. That is, there is one kind of protection, and there is another kind of protection, and you can call them anything you like, but those are the two basic kinds of protection. Whether you have it done by one department, or another department, I don't think really makes a difference. Whether it is done by the Legislative Branch, or the Executive Branch, or by Department A, or Department B, I don't think the administrative structure makes a difference in the kind of protection being offered, if there are two basic kinds of protection.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: But the protection for the fast fourier algorithm would be the kind that copyright would not be able to cover.

Is that not right?

MR. SALTMAN: Well, okay. I will say "Yes", qualifiedly. I have not examined computer programs which have employed this algorithm, and, therefore, I cannot state with certainty whether somebody else could

,18

write essentially a use of the same algorithm in a different expression, having had that algorithm published.

I have a strong feeling that someone else could use that algorithm and write an original program that would also be available for copyright. But not having really examined this subject, I really could not say for sure.

But I think so. I think someone could use the same algorithm and write an original computer program, someone else having already done so. Therefore, I think the concept of the fast fourier transfer algorithm would not be protectable under copyright. That is, the content of it.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: But you are saying that the concept should be protected?

MR. SALTMAN: I am not saying that it should be.
I am saying that it is of the quality that conceivably
could be-if people wanted it to be. Okay? I don't say
that it should be, because that is too high a decision
for this project to state.

JUDGE FULD: Yes, George?

COMMISSIONER CARY: Mr. Saltman, have you by any chance seen the reports of the CONTU Committees on Software and Data Bases?

MR. SALTMAN: Yes. Yes.

COMMISSIONER CARY: Do you have any comments you would

1.1

like to make at this time on that?

MR. SALTMAN: I think that, from my report, you have noted differences.

I think that I have been stronger in noting the difference between source code and object code, and making the point, strongly, that a program in source code discloses something, in my opinion, and that in object code does not disclose enough to be worthy of an "original" copyright, in my opinion. And also, in the data base area, I feel that the concept of publication needs further work. I think it was your addendum to the Data Base Report that made that similar statement, is that not true?

COMMISSIONERCARY: Partly, yes.

MR. SALTMAN: Those, I think, are the differences.

COMMISSIONER LACY: There is a difference in requirement of deposit, too.

MR. SALTMAN: Yes. I have made a point of more strongly urging that an actual copy of the data base be made available to the Library of Congress--rather than simply identifying material, on the basis of a concept, again, of quid pro quo, and a concept of transfer maximation when that is possible.

Those are, I think, the differences.

JUDGE FULD: Any other questions?

Thank you very much, Mr. Saltman.

g

The Commission welcomes Mr. Vernon Palmour,

He appeared before us, last year, to testify on a thenuncompleted study for the National Commission of Library

Information Centers dealing with the National Periodical

System. That study has now been completed, and the

Commission has received copies of the final report.

Mr. Palmour appears, today, to summarize the results of his study, prepared at the request of CONTU, of the cost of owning, borrowing, disposing of journals, by libraries, including relative costs for subscribing to journals as opposed to securing photocopies of journal articles through inter-library loan.

STATEMENT OF VERNON E. PALMOUR CONTU CONTRACTOR

MR. PALMOUR: Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here.

The results I am going to talk about today are still somewhat tentative, in the nature that we are finalizing and making a few more runs, and doing some more analyses of the data.

I am going to be reporting on the progress of CONTU-sponsored studies; of the cost of owning, borrowing, and disposing of periodical publications.

I am a Consultant of the Public Research Institute which has the contract for this study.

As we all know, user needs for journal materials are satisfied in one or two ways by Library Information Centers. The library either maintains that publication; keeps it in its collection, or, upon the request of a user, borrows it.

Both of these approaches cost money.

To maintain an item in its own collection, the library has to incur the cost of selecting the item, ordering it, shelving it and, of course, making the publication available upon request.

For a requested item that is not in its own collection, then the expenses include the staff time to check the completeness of the information requested by the user; locating a lending library; and filling out the appropriate forms to make the request from that lending library; the postage; and, in most cases, the photocopying charge-because, in a very high percentage of the cases, the request for journal articles are met through photocopying of the article rather than the actual article, itself.

The cost to satisfy requests by borrowing the item is, roughly, the same each time. The library has to ask in this way, whereas the average cost per use of a title that is owned by the library, obviously, is a function of how many times it is used, over some period of time

1.3

2.1

is some frequency of use at which it becomes cheaper for the library to acquire the publication, rather than to borrow it. in order to satisfy patron demand.

A mathematical model was developed by Westadt, Inc., a consulting firm, in 1968 under a contract with the Center for Research Libraries in Chicago, which compared the cost of owning versus borrowing to satisfy the demand for serial publications. The 1968 model used average cost data drawn from a survey of four university libraries.

It was found, at that time, using these average costs in 1967, I believe, that if a serial title with an annual subscription rate of \$20.00 -- which was the average subscription rate at that time-- if such a title was used less than about six times per year, it was less expensive for the library to acquire photocopies when needed, rather than to maintain its own subscription.

COMMISSIONER LACY:

Mr. Palmour --

MR. PALMOUR: Yes.

COMMISSIONER LACY: May I inquire if there has been an inversion in the text we have. It says more than six times a year.

MR. PALMOUR: Yes. I did not realize that they were going to send out the draft report. There are numerous

24

25

s i ©g

1

2

3

4

5

6

errors in that.

With the current attention that periodicals are receiving, due to the reduced library budgets, rapidly increasing cost of periodicals, the new Copyright Law, and the proposed National Periodical System, CONTU decided to, or desired to, investigate the economy of owning versus borrowing, periodicals using this 1968 model with updated cost inputs.

The contract was given to the Public Research Institute to conduct the study. I might add that this was primarily because two of us who were authors of the study in 1968 had some relationship with the Public Research Institute at this time.

The primary purpose of this study was to investigate the frequency of use at which it becomes cheaper for a library to own a periodical rather than borrowing the item when it is needed.

I will describe, briefly, the model, without going into any real detail of the mathematics.

As I said, the purpose of the model is to calculate how libraries' costs vary, depending on how it goes about meeting demands for periodical publications. library and determining when the frequency Using the model use for a given title becomes cheaper to own, rather than borrow. Depending on the anticipated level

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

.16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

of use for a particular title, the library is faced with of a number/alternative choices regarding the subscription of periodicals.

For current subscriptions it can:

- (1) Continue/subscription; bind, catalogue, and shelve the item.
- (2) It can continue the subscription, but dispose of volumes or issues over a specified cut-off age.
- (3) It can discontinue current subscriptions and dispose of all back files, which implies borrowing for all future requests.
- (4) The fourth option for current subscriptions is that they can discontinue current subscriptions, but continue to house all of the back files of a specified age.

These are just examples of options. There are numerous combinations.

For periodical titles not presently owned, the library can subscribe, bind, catalogue and shelve, or the library might decide to subscribe and dispose of issues over a specified cut-off age; or another option is that for all of the requests received for a particular title not presently owned, they can request these from other libraries by borrowing.

Now, by comparing the costs of the following

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

G

10

11

12

13

14

1.5

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

alternative policies, one can determine which policy is least costly to the library.

Costs are calculated over a specified planning period -- nothing more than a number of years that the costs are accumulated over. For each policy, the various costs incurred in each year of the planning period are discounted to the present value, and then summed over all years.

Now, briefly to go through the cost inputs that the model requires and describe them briefly:

First is what we have labeled the initial cost.

This is a one-time cost of ordering a new title. It includes the cost of ordering and cataloguing/title.

Secondly, there is an annual recurring cost.

This includes the subscription, the selection and review of titles, check-in, claiming, shelving, separation of serials list, binding, preparation, training, direct supervision, and bindery costs.

These annual recurring costs are independent of the number of years of back files, or the annual demand placed upon this title.

The third cost is storage cost.

We used storage cost only in the case where storage space is critical. In other words, if the library

į 7

has adequate space, we are assuming the building is assuming cost, and we are not putting in storage cost.

In those places where space is critical for a library, obviously, the storage cost depends upon the number of volumes in the back file.

The fourth cost is disposition, or "weeding" costs. This is the cost of removing from the shelves and discarding. It includes the cost of changing records, also. And, of course, this cost depends upon the number of volumes that are being removed from the shelves.

Again, we did not look at the case of weeding unless there is a space problem, which implies, then, that when weeding costs come into play in the model, there is storage cost as well.

The fifth cost is that of internal-use costs.

This includes the cost of circulation; re-shelving and shelf maintenance. This cost depends on the number of volumes in the back files and on the annual demand.

The sixth cost is that of borrowing. This includes the personal services to prepare the requests, postage, and the Inter-library loan fee from the lending library-when such a fee is charged. And, of course, this depends upon the volume of demand.

Now, I should comment that the way we have constructed the cost data in this project is slightly

Ì

different from the way we analyzed it in 1968. In this approach, we have only considered what we might call the "relevant cost", the relevant cost being those costs that come into play in the decision of loaning versus borrowing. In other words, if both policies would have a common cost that would be incurred independent of which policy you use, we have not worried about including those in the model, because they are not important to a decision.

Now that means that the cumulated cost over the planning period is not the actual expected cost of owning this title. As far as the model is concerned, that is no problem.

The other point with regard to the kind of model it is, typically, a present-volume model talks about the "residual" value; or the salvage value at the end of the planning period. Using a planning period of 25 years -- which we have done -- we assume that was of sufficient length that we have essentially ignored the residual value. There is some question as to this, but one of the problems is trying to compute what the residual value of a selection is at the end of a planning period.

In the earlier study, we had such a calculation, but we were not sure that it was really that useful, and it did not impact upon the decision.

Now, for certain options, some of the above cost
components that I have just gone through are, clearly, zero.
For example, if the subscription is terminated, then the
subscription cost is zero. If no volumes of a periodical
are weeded or discarded, that cost is zero. If a new
periodical title is not subscribed to, and all requests are
met by borrowing, then the borrowing costs are the only
ones that are relevant.

Inclusion of the cost components with their appropriate values make it possible to compare the cost of the range of alternative policies with a single computer model.

Besides costs, the other set of inputs required by the model are what I might call "demand" characteristics

Essentially, we need two attributes of demand:

We need to input the actual values of demand.

By demand, I mean the number of uses per year.

We also need to describe the shape of this demand over time.

As I am sure you are quite familiar, with periodical titles, the use decays as a function of time; and so the model has to have some way of describing this.

In 1968, the model had built into it only the capability of assuming a geometric distribution, as far as the distribution of use as a function of age.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1 1

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

25

That was found to be a limitation, and I will mention that a little later.

The model now has been changed to where one can put in any empirical distribution that he or she likes to describe the decay of use as the function of age.

Now, the range of average annual demands per title is actually input into the model. In other words, we specify the demand level and, for a given demand level, the model goes through and looks at the cost and then we, in the end, can analyze these for the minimum cost at various levels of demand.

Now, the regressionis necessary to explain what is meant by "average annual demand". When you are working with periodical titles, I think that you would find that a demand of ten per year for a new title, with only one year of back file, is not equivalent to the annualdemand of ten for an old title of, say, 30 years of back files. In other words, a new title has already generated ten annual uses when it has only been in existence for one year, versus an older title where the entire title, with the back files, is only receiving a demand of ten per year, certainly the newer title has greater potential. so in the model, in order to keep these straight, we We normalized it to the 10-year normalized the demand. title. That means the demand has been normalized to what

25

would be expected of the periodical title in its llth year. Thus, implying the model to a specified title of a particular age, one has to take into account the need to adjust the estimated demand for this normalization factor; and the table is provided that allows one to do this.

I will just go through some of the results briefly.

In order to update the model in terms of cost, we obtained permission from three libraries to actually come in and work with them and try to estimate the cost of handling periodicals.

That included two university libraries, and one large technical library.

I don't think I need to point out the difficulties in determining cost in a library operation. I won't go into any of the details, but it is a difficult task because they have not, typically, established cost accounting systems to keep up with these kinds of costs; and so the costs that we have here are very rough estimates.

But. looking at the four costs that we were able to estimate from these libraries, the initial cost -- that is the cost that the library incurs in making the decision to subscribe to a new title in the first year -- we had costs of \$12.00 per title added; and

\$71.00 per title added; and \$54.00 per title added, \$50 you can see the variation there.

Now, the library with the low costs is a much smaller library, and there is reason to expect that the costs should be lower. It is not clear that there should be as much variation as we observed, here, but the same techniques were used in the three.

As far as annual recurring costs -- and this is the cost per current title -- it ranged from \$9.00 to \$26.00

The internal use cost -- this is based on the per-item use -- ranged from 40 cents to 60 cents. That was reasonably constant.

Borrowing costs -- and this is the internal borrowing cost; in other words, primarily the staff cost involved in the library making the request. It does not inclute the Inter-library loan cost at the other end. This is based on per-item borrowed, and this ranged from \$5.00 to \$9.00. Those figures are not outlined with similar figures from other studies. We are looking just at Inter-library loans. In fact, they may be low, if anything

Now, other costs that we could not obtain from these three libraries where we had to use data from other studies included storage costs and weeding costs. The storage cost, as I mentioned, was assumed to be zero—where the space was not critical. In the case

걸음

where space was considered critical, 50 cents per annual volume was used for storage cost. This is based on a very rough calculation of the replacement cost of the building. This is 50 cents per annual volume, and "annual volume" means, essentially, the combined issues that come out in one year. That may or may not be for the bibliographic volume.

Weeding costs of 65 cents per annual volume was assumed, and this is a very rough figure based on a couple of other studies; essentially the staff cost of pulling the item off the shelf; discarding it; and then making all of the recessary charges in the record.

Now, a discount rate of 6% has been used, and an inflation rate of 4%. Perhaps I should comment that this discount rate is nothing more than just taking in account that dollars today are worth more than dollars in the future. An example is that 90 cents today is worth a dollar a year from now. That implies a 10% discount rate, and there are a lot of arguments on how you choose the appropriate discount rate. I suppose we could say that we arbitrarily chose 6%, and would not quibble if someone wanted to change that to 8%, or whatever.

But a discount rate of 6% and an inflation rate of 4% seemed reasonable.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

 $18 \cdot$

19

20

21

22

23

25

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PRUFESSIONALS

Now, demand data: I mentioned earlier that as we started this investigation, we realized that the model, as it had been developed in '68, had certain limitations on the built-in treatment of demand, and that primarily stemmed from the fact that, in '68, we only had data from about four large lending libraries, that gave us the distribution of use of individual titles as a function of age. These were large lending libraries. That included the National Library of Medicine which, at that time, was the National Library for Science and Technology.

Based on that data from the lending libraries. decay rate as a function of time was clearly geometric.

When one starts looking at an individual library that is primarily making use of internal materials, you find the decay rate is, generally, much more rapid than in these large lending libraries. That can be accounted for, I think, to a large degree, on the fact that much of the use that is made/in the early years with reference a lot of browsing takes place as new titles and are put on the shelf, and so internal use tends to be much heavier in the earlier years than, say, the interlibrary loan use of these large lending libraries.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

In order to check that hypothesis out, I requested the data from the British Library Lending Division, knowing that they had accumulated data in 1976 on some 63,000 interlibrary loan requests; and they had recorded this as a function of age for a particular title. So I obtained that data, and they already had the data in terms of broad subject areas.

Another hypothesis that we had -- which is well known in the library field -- was that, as to Science and Technology, it is expected that the use is much heavier in the early years than for the Humanities. The B.L.L.D. had the data in the areas of Science and Technology. the Humanities, and Social Science.

Upon analyzing that, it did turn out as we expected: off much quicker; Science and Technology taped Social Science was reasonably close; but the Humanities In none of the three was decayed at a much lower rate. the geometric decay perfect. The geometric decay was reasonable.

In looking at the data that has recently become available from the Pittsburgh study -- this was tentative data that they published in a progress report, but it is for a single library; and it is based upon internal use -- the distribution is much different, and so what we have done at this point; we have taken the demand data from the University

of Pittsburgh -- one of the three libraries that reflected cost data and they had, in fact, previously collected-over a period of one year-demand data. And so we have taken these two demand distributions. The Pittsurgh demand data that we have used essentially characterizes Science and Technology collections. The other university that we have as the demand data from essentially is described/what I would call a general Liberal Arts Library; heavy in the Humanities and Social Sciences and not much in Science and Technology.

So, taking these two demand distributions and the cost data that I have summarized, we have made numerous runs, and I am just going to review, very quickly, a few of the more interesting points today, because I am at a disadvantage by not having, essentially, some charts to show these.

The first decision that we looked at was that of whether a library should subscribe to a new title; or whether it should request material from another library for a library loan, in order to meet patron demand.

And the contrast -- what I would define as the cross-over point -- which is nothing more than the point at which borrowing costs equal owning costs -- I have that cross-over point here in terms of two sets of costs: the small library that tended to have low costs; and one of the

 \mathfrak{g}

other libraries which had higher internal costs, and, of course this is a function -- the cross-over point is a function of the subscription rate price -- the annual subscription price. For a free subscription -- which a few libraries have -- they do receive some free subscriptions, so that was one of the cases we looked at. For a free subscription, the model would tell you that if you had three or less annual demands, in your small library, with these low costs, you would be better off to borrow it. In other words, if you had greater than three in a year, you should purchase it.

That is, still, rather surprising. Three for a year is not very many.

If that subscription price: goes up to \$80.00; for a small library, it would tell you that you need twenty-five, or more, before you ought to own it.

If the subscription price goes up -- as you would expect -- then the cross-over point moves out. In other words, you need more annual requests to justify buying it.

Comparing those costs with the university library which had a higher set of internal costs; for the zero subscription price, the cross-over point is essentially the same -- still around three. As you move up on the subscription price to, say, \$80.00, rather than the cross-over point being at twenty-five,—annual usage for the small

library -- it is now fourteen for the higher cost, larger library.

COMMISSIONER DIX: What was the assumed cost of getting the photocopy on these two examples?

MR. PALMOUR: I should have mentioned that.

In the two cases I just adverted to, we used the actual figure that the individual libraries felt most represented their own situation; but the small library has an annual cost of \$1.25 for inter-library loan. They participate in the network.

COMMISSIONER DIX: That is what they had to pay?

MR. PALMOUR: That is right.

COMMISSIONER DIX: Including postage?

MR. PALMOUR: Yes. Rather modest.

The larger university library felt that \$3.00 for an inter-library loan was more appropriate for them. So those cross-over points that I mentioned cleared those.

Now that, essentially, looks at the decision on whether to subscribe to a new title, that is not currently owned.

Probably a more frequent decision, today, -at least in the smaller and moderately sized university libraries -- and I am sure this is true in the special libraries, as

y

9.1

well, is a decision on whether to maintain or terminate a current subscription.

In order to keep this simple, as far as looking at the results, this is the same: We are talking about maintaining or terminating a 10-year old title. which means that we don't have to annualize the normal demand. The decision is whether they should maintain the subscription; or whether the library should terminate it, but keep the back files, which means that with ten years of back files, they would meet some of the demand, but would have to borrow for all future issues.

Now, again, I have here for the example today, the library with the low internal cost; and the other one with higher costs.

Again, with a free subscription, the cross-over point is about two for each of the libraries. When the subscription rate goes up -- perhaps I should mention the \$40.00 subscription rate, since that is more typical of the average. The \$40.00 subscription rate: the cross-over point for the low cost library would be around nine uses per year; for the library with higher costs, it is about six uses per year. As the subscription rate moves up to \$80.00, then the cross-over point for the low cost library is about seventeen, and for the high cost library it is still only nine.

 $1\ddot{\circ}$

What does all of this mean?

Well, with regard to the average subscription price of a periodical title today -- which is somewhere between \$30 and \$40, depending on whose figures you use -- it varies, of course, for an individual library -- the cross-over points have not changed that much from the six that were found back in 1968. In other words, somewhere between five and ten annual demand, seemed to be the point where owning versus borrowing would change if the library manager is looking strictly at these cost components of his or her operation.

In terms of the CONTU guidelines, it has been suggested -- as you are well aware -- that six or more requests for a title in the last five years ought not to be considered out-of-line. I am paraphrasing that, roughly. That certainly is in line with the cross-over points found here in the model_-looking at the economics of owning versus borrowing.

The question as to the variation in these crossover points, of course, is not the actual magnitude of the
cost. If we just took the '68 costs and inflated them,
in the case of the high-cost university, it turned out that
we come reasonably close to the cost we found in the large
university here, this year, by just taking the CPI Index
and inflating it.

i 7

The key difference in the cross-over point comes about with regard to the relationship between the costs incurred internally, versus the borrowing cost that the library has. So, if the library has very low internal handling costs, and very high borrowing costs, then you get a big difference! It turns out that the reason the '68 cross-over point of six is very close to the cross-over point for the '77 case, where we make the same assumption, is that the relationship between the costs has not changed. The borrowing costs and the internal handling costs have gone up about the same, so it is not surprising.

Now, I don't want to dwell on weeding.

In the early report in '68, we did not spend much time, at all, looking at policies on weeding. There had been a lot of discussion in the library community about the anticipated need for a weeding policy, primarily due to the critical space problems that many libraries are now facing; and the little hope for new buildings.

But in the preliminary investigation of policies for weeding, I would just say that the **pre**liminary results indicate that a library is better off to terminate, and discard all back files, if the actual use falls anywhere near the cross-over point. And if space is not, I will say, highly critical, then the optimal weeding age appears to be around 20 years.

This is a rather surprising finding. That is the reason I have labeled this "very tentative", because most of the discussion is generally in terms of the three to five year cut-off ages, which would allow you to house the issues without binding them, and then once they reach three or five years of age, you just throw them away.

But it appears that the optimal weeding ages would be quite a bit higher than that!

Now, in closing, I would like to just mention a couple of limitations on the model.

First of all, it seems that borrowing and owning

-- as the two alternative policies are being compared -
are of equal effectiveness because our models essentially

want to minimize the cost. As you know, if you are going

to minimize cost, you need to be, essentially, working at

the same level of effectiveness or performance; or else you

are comparing apples with oranges.

Some might question whether borrowing has the same effectiveness as owning, and there is some legitimate concern that the current awareness activities—— the browsing activities that go on in the library—clearly have a value. We are not capable of quantifying what these values are—— in order to incorporate them into the model.

Another serious limitation that was pointed out in the earlier work in '68 and is inherent in this, as well,

. 20

is that we have no way of assigning a value in terms of cost to the user's time. He must wait, in the case of borrowin and with the present library-loan system, it sometimes comes in after one or two weeks, and, clearly, the user's time has some value. But this model does not account for it.

So one has to be well aware of these assumptions that go into this rather mechanical model before he can take these results and immediately apply them, without giving some real meaning to these cross-over points.

I personally think that, based on my own personal experience and those of the library community, that most libraries of every size, having seen the model, perhaps can be convinced that there is some reasonable cut-off point. And I think that most of them have an adequate number of titles which, essentially, receive no demand in a year; so it is not a matter of deciding whether it should be three, ten, or twelve—but a reasonable amount of weeding can be done without being all that concerned about exactly what the annual demand is. It would give you this equal cost between borrowing and lending.

Well, I appreciate this opportunity. I will try to answer any questions that you might have.

JUDGE FULD: Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Lacy.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

COMMISSIONER LACY: Mr. Palmour, we spoke on the telephone the other day about a point that I would like to pursue.

It struck me that your study was a very valuable one for a Librarian who is trying to make a decision about the relative economies within his institution.

Our concern, of course, is with the total social cost involved -- not merely the cost of a particular institution -- and with devising copyright recommendations that would provide an incentive to all those concerned to behave in a social and most efficient and useful way.

Now, one of the factors that has been fed into the subscription cost of the journal your equation is -- and quite accurately so, from the point of view of the library because the library ceases to subscribe or refrains from subscribing to a journal with a \$30.00 subscription cost, to save \$30.00.

However, all society is saving is the overrun cost of printing one more copy of the journal and mailing it, and doing the bookkeeping on these subscriptions. Nothing else is really of any saving. The cost of that, one could guess, is more like \$4.00 or \$5.00 a year. That is, the library that pursues the borrowing cost, and has made no contribution, in effect, to the cost of authorship, the putting or editorial cost, the selection, into type and the copy editing, and all of the other indexing,

-10

other costs involved in publishing a journal. These are real costs. They are not imaginary costs; but must be met.

This means that, say, the journal that is involved which has, perhaps, received \$4.00 in costs, and has lost \$30.00 in revenue, makes that \$26.00 up from other sources -- from a Federal subsidy, from a subsidy from the society or the university that publishes it, out of its profits, which, of course, come from the subscription rates, otherwise they would discontinue publication. The social cost, say, is much less when preferring to subscribe, than under the other calculation.

On the other hand, I suspect that the costs, relying on copying, are understated. They estimated \$1.25 to \$3.00. I think it is highly likely that this means that the institution that provides the copy is subsidized in making the copy. I cannot perceive that even \$3.00 reimburses a university library for the clerical work of receiving an order, digging the book out of the shelves, doing the photocopying, replacing it, mailing it, billing and collecting.

The Interna ional Periodical System estimated the cost

-- as I recall it -- to be \$10 to \$12 for a central second tier
service that the Library of Congress might administer. That
is certainly higher than the average cost, because you are

1.3

dealing with a large volume, and less frequently used material. It is probably nearer the true cost, so if you upped the cost of each photocopy from \$1.25-to-\$3.00 to something like \$6.00 or \$7.00, and lower the cost of savings from non-subscribing from \$30.00 to -- make it -- \$5.00, you would get, of course, a radically different set of equations.

Moreover, you mentioned two not-readily-measurable costs in relying on copying. One is the time. As you mentioned, that affects the user and his convenience, and the efficiency of his research.

The other: You also mentioned that this calculation assumes that the only uses that would be made of the printed copy in the library are those uses of a character that would relieve the user of undergoing the expense of all of the photocopying. That is, it will miss the fact that there will be not only browsing use, time and awareness use, but, also more marginal uses of actually reading the articles if they were at hand.

So it seems to me that the three major ways the social costs -- and I can measure this quite accurately, from what you said, I can measure the library costs, but if you are talking about social costs, you radically reduce that cross-over point. You reduce it very substantially, and I think it is fairly clear that the social cost of shifting

- --1 ,

from print to copy is far greater and the shift to social advantages and economies to the society as a whole is far less than most of the literature based on a calculation of savings to the library, alone, would suggest.

This means, I think, in effect, that a copyright regime that allows the library to acquire photocopies without making any contribution to cost -- that is, making it as if they owned it, without making any contribution for the photocopy to the cost of editing, selection, copying, referring -- all of that sort of thing -- all adds to the incentive of the library to behave in an uneconomic and socially undesirable and inefficient way. It increases the social cost of communication. It is a highly disincentive measure, so far as the economy as a whole goes; and I wonder if it has been possible to give any thought how one might measure the structure of social costs.

MR. PALMOUR: I have given that a little thought, but I have not concluded much.

The points you raised are exactly right. This model was geared to looking at the cross-over points for a single library. The model setup is such that the subscription price is essentially treated as being external, or independent of the decision made.

Clearly, if all libraries adopted this model and went out and put it into effect; and all adopted the cross-

 $2\overline{2}$

over point that was suggested here, I suspect that publishers would have to raise their prices. There would no longer be the assumption that the subscription price is external. That would be invalid. And so it is looking strictly at the optimization -- I use that word loosely -- of a single library manager.

You mentioned the fact that if you are going to look at the cost to society, you need to include all of the real costs. You mentioned the inter-library loan. I would guess that true inter-library loan costs for the lending library which, in my two examples--I assumed in one case that it was \$1.25; and in the other case it was \$2.25; and in other cases, \$3.00 -- it is more likely to be between ten and fifteen (dollars), in most cases -- at least in the large academic libraries that are doing a substantial amount of lending today.

So, clearly, applying this model and thinking in terms of society as a whole, it would be misleading, and you are correct in that, if you did want to try to take into account the cost to society, the cross over point would be lower. I have not been able to, actually, come up with any way of calculating exactly what that would be, because, as you are well aware, there is a whole host of social costs which we don't know how to compute.

From an economic point of view, I suppose that,

1.5

theoretically, it is possible to talk in terms of these costs to society. From a practical point of view, I am not sure that one could compute them. But you are correct: The crossover point, when looking at these decisions from the point of view of society at large, would move down much lower.

You mentioned that, perhaps, one place that comes closest would be for high inter-library loan borrowing costs; and in the draft, we did have some figures based on \$8.00. That is probably still low for the real cost of an inter-library loan but, based on the computations we have in hand today--assuming the library loan cost of \$8.00, and assuming a free subscription -- which is closer to the marginal cost of what it takes a publisher to produce one additional copy -- then looking at that case -- assuming the same model, which is still somewhat questionable -- that cross-over point does move down much lower than the optimal cross-over point for a single library.

I think that, in the model, as it stands, just the fact that we have used the real inter-library loan cost;—
that is something we understand. We know what that is.

Perhaps, in the final report, we will put in a section to, at least, comment on these costs to society,—— pointing out the potential effects if all libraries immediately applied this.

<u>0</u>4

I don't have any concern that all libraries will, but there would be some consequential effects.

commissioner LACY: Perhaps one of the ways of introducing some more realistic figure, you know, would be to take a look at costs, relying on private enterprise sources to provide copies which, on the one hand, through paying royaltie do make a contribution -- although I expect too small a one to the first costs of publishing the journal, -- and which do charge a fee which represents the true cost of providing the copy, so they don't go broke.

On the other hand, it should be recognized that the available private services cover only a few thousand titles, and those few thousand most in demand are the least expensive to supply. So, if you pushed the private service up to, say, the 40,000 title range—that is spoken of as "the second tier"in library service circles, that cost would certainly be substantially higher.

JUDGE FULD: Any other questions? Mr. Frase?

MR. FRASE: I understand that when we get the final report, we will also have a computer tape program which we can make available through the N.T.I.S. as a printed report, and libraries would then be able to purchase the program and input into it their individual costs, with all of these variations, on an individual title basis.

MR, PALMOUR: That is correct, although

the libraries need a lot of cost data which most of them don't have, in order to actually apply it to their own specific case.

MR. FRASE: But the report would include instructions as to how to go about getting this cost data, as was done by your three test libraries?

MR. PALMOUR: That is correct.

MR. FRASE: One other question, and that is:

What did these three test libraries use; and, in
general, what to libraries use, in the program for the
demand data?

Would it be their internal data on what is loaned -their loan records for a title? Or are libraries in a position
to measure both the loaning -- the use measured by loaning
but, also, the internal library use, such as browsing.
taking it off the shelf, putting it back and so forth?

MR. PALMOUR: Very few libraries have measured the actual internal use, because it is not an easy task. It requires having someone stand around and watch as individuals come, and go, and leave things on the table. You reallyhave to count the items left on the table.

In order to record browsing, that is even more difficult. Consequently, very few libraries have internal

1.1

use data, but I certainly think that, because of the difficulties that the libraries are now facing with budgets and, particularly, in the area of periodicals, more and more are going to be recording this data. I know several that have started, now, and this is because they have to justify their own budgets; and the questions that are being asked about the actual use in the libraries. But I think, for the purposes of using this model, a library would not be far off if they used the demand data that we have from the two libraries now.

This demand data, while it is very important with regard to the weeding end of the decision, does not affect the cross-over point that much. In other words, the decay rate, at which the use of a particular issue falls off as a function of age, does not affect the cross-over point that much.

In other words, any reasonable distribution of demand would work sufficiently well, I think.

MR. FRASE: Did these three libraries have an efficient method of measuring internal use?

MR. PALMOUR: I would not call it really efficient, no, because it was the first time they tried it.

Now, as they continue -- well, one is Pittsburgh, and I know very little other than what I talked to Professor

Kent and his colleagues about -- the internal operations there,

at Pittsburgh but from the other one that I am familiar
with; they have been collecting internal use data for about
one year. They closed the periodical stacks in order to
better monitor the use of periodicals, and, as more and more
libraries close the stacks, the better opportunity they will
have to record circulation.

COMMISSIONER DIX: But distorting the use, at the same time?

MR. PALMOUR: That is right. There is an interaction there.

MR. FRASE: So, in using the model, the library would have to be very careful about trying, really, to measure internal use.

MR. PALMOUR: Well, no. What I am saying is that, I think as long as a reasonable distribution of use is input into the model, the individual library doesn't have to be that much concerned. In other words, the use at a Physics library at M.I.T., or Princeton, or a smaller university.-- I think the decay rate of the individual issues, or the use of individual issues, over time would not vary that much among these different Physics libraries. So, as long as the Physics library had the general shape of the demand as a function of time for Physics, it would not matter whether it was their own data, or not.

MR. FRASE: Doesn't it exclude the level of use, as

well as the decay?

MR. PALMOUR: They have no absolute level, but that is separate from distribution. In the model you see the absolute level, if you want to look at it.

MR. FRASE: But what I am saying is that if the absolute level is underestimated, then the model does not give you a right answer.

MR. PALMOUR: That is right. They have to have a reasonable handle on the actual use, or else the model is of little value.

COMMISSIONER WILCOX: I have kind of a comment, and then a question.

One is: Would it be correct that the total cost of the serial would not just be the cost of a subscription but the cost of the ordering, and the storage, so that the cost of the subscription would be about a third of the total cost to the library?

MR. PALMOUR: A third? I am not sure that I have that readily, at hand.

COMMISSIONER WILCOX: I think some place in there, it indicates that it is about \$70.00. The average cost is about \$20.00.

A previous study indicated -- the Stanford study -- that the cost ran about three-to-one in the cost of the subscription price as opposed to the cost to the library.

MR. PALMOUR: Yes.

COMMISSIONER WILCOX: That is much more related than just saying that there is more cost to the library than the cost of the subscription that is saved.

MR. PALMOUR: Oh, clearly.

COMMISSIONER WILCOX: The second point would be: In the Pittsburgh study, there seemed to be an indication that, if anybody in the library were going to use this model, that it would be clear as to which titles were never used and they would seldom ever have to go into selecting the titles that might come close to a cross-over.

MR. PALMOUR: That is right. As I say, I think most libraries would weed titles that, for the most part, are getting one or less use -- many of them getting zero use -- in a year. There is a question: One has to not jump to a conclusion that annual demand is the only variable of interest. You can ask a question: Why consider the number of uses in one year? Why not two years, or three years? So all of these stock-controlled models -- if you want to call them that -- tend to talk in terms of annual estimates.

COMMISSIONER WILCOX: Well, this would get to my comment.

That is that I don't think any library knowingly, or willingly, decreases its amount of subscriptions. It does it under these pressures that we talked about this morning with Professor Baumol. So I don't think that is

going to have to be due to irresponsible management.

MR. PALMOUR: No. But I would say the pressure is sufficiently great that many of them are reducing their periodical budgets, now.

COMMISSIONER WILCOX: But maybe they are doing that to maintain their book collection.

MR. PALMOUR: That is right.

You are right. In the last three or four years, book budgets have been reduced, in some cases, to rather alarming rates, in order to keep the periodical subscriptions going. Many libraries can no longer do that, so the periodicals are coming under scrutiny.

JUDGE FULD: Any other questions?
(No response)

JUDGE FULD: There being none, thank you.

Our final speaker for this afternoon is Dr.

Bernard Fry. He is a Dean of the Graduate School of
Library Science of Indiana University Dr. Fry previously
has appeared before this Commission with a report on a study
prepared under a National Science Foundation grant on
Economics and the direction of the publisher/library
relationship in the production and use of scholarly and
research journals.

Today, he will report to us on the results of the CONTU-funded survey of publisher practices and present

attitudes on the authorized copying and licensing of journal articles.

Welcome Dr. Fry.

STATEMENT OF DR. BERNARD FRY
DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF LIBRARY SCIENCE
INDIANA UNIVERSITY

DR. FRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

By way of preface, I should tell you that our study has just been completed about a week ago.

JUDGE FULD: We have it before us, yes.

DR. FRY: I am not sure how many of you have copies. Those copies do not, yet, have an index, or a satisfactory table of contents, I believe. But that will be remedied in the next week, hopefully.

Our task for conducting the study was two-fold:

- (1) To determine publishers' practices at the present time, in providing copies of journal articles; and
- (2) To $\mathfrak s$ alicit publishers' attitudes towards alternative ways of supplying, or licensing, copies.

The report which some of you have runs to over 200 pages, and about 60 tables, and I will not try to encompass the whole report this afternoon, especially since the afternoon is getting on. But I would like to identify some of the highlights of our study, of the finding, and, of course, answer any questions that may occur.

I think the context in which the study was done should be understood at the beginning.

The study was undertaken on the basis of two questionnaires, prepared by CONTU, and with our interaction and, also, with a pre-testing among publishers. These were circulated during the month of March -- of course, well after the passage of the new Copyright Law, but prior to much of the publicity and, certainly, the promulgation of the A.A.P. Copyright Payment Center, and discussion of clearing houses and their functions.

So that some of the reactions from the survey, I thinl reflect a lack of information, and a serious need for education of many publishers -- especially the oness journal publishers, the numerous ones whom we contacted -- about the functions of the clearing house; about the functions of the provisions of the Copyright Law, itself.

I think, in general, this was the major finding of our survey.

We based the survey on a list in excess of 2,500 technical, scientific, and scholarly and research journals, however defined, which was used earlier in a study for the National Science Foundation, and was amended for the purposes of this study by an examination of births and deaths in the journals field.

This list we have found reasonably reliable as

1.3

a representative list of scholarly and research journals; and I will be glad to give you breakdowns of the survey population in several different ways, if you wish.

One of the points that came out clearly, I think, in the survey, overall, is that a large portion of the non-response from journals that we survey came from journals which are not copyrighted.

First of all, let me identify the response rate, itself.

We did approximately 32% of the 1,672 publishers, and 39% plus of the journals of the 2,552. A total of 872 -- or approximately 90% -- of the responding journals indicated that they were copyrighted; and, by contrast, analysis at the Library of Congress, indicates that only 59% of non-responding journals are copyrighted.

The response levels, therefore, represent, in all probability, a greater proportion of those journals whose views and decisions concerning copyright policies are significant in the measure of attitudes.

The responses to the questions in the questionnaires were analyzed, in total, for the publisher or journal group responding, and, also, to determine differences between for-profit, and not-for-profit publication sectors; between subject disciplines of pure science, applied science, and technology; social science, and the humanities; and by size

of circulation for each journal.

At the request of King Research -- which is, of course, doing a parallel study for CONTU -- publisher responses were broken down between those who published only one journal; and those who published more than one.

Of the total responses referred to earlier,
450 approximately come from publishers who published only
one journal, in the survey. This represents 84.6%

of the responding population, and 46.5 % of the journal population.

Of the publishers in the survey, 95.5% distrib five or fewer journals, and these, in turn, include 61% of the responding journals.

A point that I think emerges from this data is that the scholarly and research publishing consists, to a large extent, of relatively small, non-profit journals, whose publishers probably have little knowledge, or they pay little attention to the complex and lengthy provisions of the new Copyright Act.

Clearly, a number of major publishers, both in the for-profit and not-for-profit sectors, have done so, but this represents only a minority, although it is a substantial minority.

Inexperience and lack of prior thought by a large proportion of the response group shows up clearly

. 18

in the responses to the survey.

We received numerous letters of comment from publishers, which provided a back-up to the actual data that was reported.

I would like to, briefly, discuss the journal survey, itself; the differences in publication frequency as between not only the commercial and the non-profit sectors, but also as between subject disciplines.

Better than half of the non-profit journals published quarterly, or less frequently, while the same holds true for commercial journals in only 36% of the cases.

Scholarly and research publishing is heavily populated by small journals. Better than half of the journals in the survey had a circulation of under 3,000 copies, and this figure is even higher for commercial than for non-profit journals. However, large -- that is between 10,000 and 100,000 circulation -- journals are representing only 19.5% of the journals, and include 74.2% of the issues distributed.

Less than half of the responding journals reported foreign circulation which exceeds 20% of the total; and only 27% have foreign circulation of above 30%. However, smaller circulations are more heavily dependent on foreign subscribers.

1-1

::5

Journals: The great majority of journals which responded to the survey and, particularly, the commercial journals, copyright each issue published. They do not, however, include individually copyrighted articles in many cases, and commercial journals tend to avoid this, in particular.

About three-fourths of the journals responding do not employ page charges at all, and only 3.35% have mandatory page charges. Of course, commercial journals make less use of page charges; and large commercial journals, responding, don't use them at all.

Better than one-half of the responding journals currently sell reprints directly, but only about one-third sell reprints through an Agent. The use of such Agents is fairly concentrated among commercial journals. The two Agents -- that is, Xerox's University Microfilm and Information Unlimited, which is dominated by Xerox's University Microfilm.

Rates charged by journals which sell reprints vary widely, although most non-profit journals are willing to accept \$3.00 or less for a 10-page article -- this is for non-profit journals -- and better than half of the commercial journals are willing to accept orders for \$5.00.

However, a sizeable minority -- particularly in the commercial sector, charges even \$7.00-or even more-for a 10-page article-supplied on pre-payment to domestic customers.

1.1

Perhaps surprisingly -- and indicative of lack of informed judgement mentioned earlier -- journals which do not sell reprints express themselves as satisfied with lower payments, in response to a hypothetical question, than journals which do sell them.

Two-thirds of the responding journals indicate no reprint sales at all; or sales which average under six reprints a week. Only 13% of responding journals sell more than 30 reprints per average working day and can be considered to be in the business of selling reprints.

Responses indicate that more than half of the journals filled orders within five days of receipt, although 17% take a month or longer to comply.

More than 50% of responding copyrighted journals expect no payment to them from the operation of a clearing house, or from an Agent, and this lack of expectation was particularly pronounced among commercial journals. Where compensation was expected, 50 cents was acceptable in about half the cases. However, a small minority indicates considerably greater expectations -- in some cases, well above \$5.00.

At the same time, because of lack of information
-- apparently because of lack of information -- responding
journals do not wish to commit themselves to licensing
directly; or through an Agent; or clearing house. Where

].‡

lå

there was willingness, 50 cents is an acceptable payment in more than half the respondents, but a small minority hold out for as much as \$7.00 or more.

By a substantial margin, journals prefer to sell microform editions through an Agent, rather than directly. At the same time, they are not willing to authorize copying from microform during the current year of publication, and only slightly more are willing to permit unrestricted copying from past year microforms.

Although many journals do not presently exact payment charges from libraries, they are overwhelmingly unwilling to grant blanket permission for copying, or blanket permission for inter-library loan.

This negative reaction to carte blanche subsidies, subsides only to a certain extent for back year permission; and is particularly strong with relation to libraries; and for-profit organizations.

Where there is willingness for back year unlimited copying, the cut-off is most frequently set at one year.

Only a small percentage of responding publishers feel that inclusion of I.S.S.N. numbers would facilitate the provision of reprints or photocopies at a lower price.

This may be true, in part, because only slightly more than one-third of the responding journals presently are identified with I.S.S.N. numbers, and some responding publishers

may not even have been aware of what I.S.S. ${\tt N}$. numbers were. This would apply, primarily, to the smaller journals.

Under licensing preferences, all types of
publishers indicate a strong preference for direct licensingas against the use of either Agents, or clearing houses.
It should be stressed that this question was answered as
something of an abstraction, since no specific clearing
house mechanism proposal had, as yet, been proposed and
distributed, either by the A.A.P. or by any other organization.

For what are probably the same reasons, responding publishers express a strong preference for supplying authorized copies directly—rather than through clearing houses, or Agents.

As stressed in the General Comments, the use of clearing houses and Agents is a concept which is probably little understood by some of the publishers of small and scattered journals; and it would require explanation and publicity to gain wider acceptance.

Responding publishers saw little practical utility in teletype equipment for receiving orders, in large part because very few publishers have such equipment, at present.

Of the 43.5% publishers who responded to a question as to whether they presently sell reprints or

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

photocopies directly, or through an Agent, about threefourths continued to express their unwillingness to do so in the future.

I believe this covers the principal points -- the principal results -- of our study.

I would be glad to entertain any questions, or requests for explanation or elaboration that you might have.

JUDGE FULD: Mr. Cary?

COMMISSIONER CARY: Dean Fry, I believe I heard you say that about 50% of the publishers indicated that they expected, I believe, fifty cents as a return.

Did your study have any information which would indicate whether or not a viable organization could be established, if you assume that 50 cents would be the average receipt?

That may be an unfair question.

If it is, I apologize.

DR. FRY: Well, I don't think our study could be interpreted as leading to that conclusion, simply because discussion of the clearing house concept was not yet widespread when we queried the publishers.

Now, their response, as I indicated earlier, except for the larger publishers -- the large society publishers; the large for-profit publishers -- there was frequent indication of a lack of information, and a lack

1.1

of concern about selling reprints--if they were not, already, selling reprints.

Those who were not already selling reprints, for example, showed an inconsistent posture of agreeing to a lower price -- that is, as a hypothetical question -- for selling reprints, than those who were already in the business.

So that I think this illustrates the extreme diversity among publishers; also the fact that at least the almost 500 small publishers who reported among the total group were not yet aware of the total ramifications of a clearing house. They were looking on it, also, I think, perhaps as a mechanism of convenience and, also, perhaps, as a deterent, rather than a source of income.

COMMISSIONER CARY: Thank you.

JUDGE FULD: Mr. Frase?

MR. FRASE: In view of the very large proportion of these journals -- you take your 2,500 universe -- that are not copyrighted, and others who would be willing to go beyond what the law requires in permitting copying, especially by non-profit libraries, would you suggest that, for the convenience of the user, it might be a recommendation of this Commission to make sure that there is something in the journal that tells the user whether the journal cares whether you copy, or not; how old an issue you may copy, and so forth.

1.1

DR. FRY: Yes. I think our Study 15 would agree to that, fully. As a matter of fact, this was one point which I skipped earlier, in my presentation.

We feel that this would be a <u>very</u> useful step to take; and have prepared some specimen terminology to be distributed as potential notices, which would include such phrases as -- and these are just examples -- "For private study and research"; "Willing to let non-profit users copy"; "Restrictions limited to the first year following publication", and so on.

That kind of explanation appended to the copyright notice should prove very useful.

JUDGE FULD: Are there any other questions?

COMMISSIONER Dix?

commissioner DIX: I am a little puzzled by this No. 20 in your summary list here -- the last comment that you made:
This large group of publishers who said that they were not now selling reprints, and they had no intention of ever selling reprints.

Now, is this a "public be darned!" approach?

Or is it that they simply are perfectly willing to be giving permission, without selling?

I wondered if you had enough supplementary comments to indicate what the trend of that answer was?

DR. FRY: No. I don't think it is at all a "public be darned" approach! We did not discover that --

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16.

17

18

19

20

21

23

24

25

either in the formal responses, nor in the two or three hundred letters that accompanied them.

Rather, many of the publishers took the view that this would get them involved in a complicated, bureaucratic mechanism; that it was, perhaps, not worthwhile from that point of view. Many of them also provide their authors with reprints, and some of this group referred to, undoubtedly on request, would provide permission to reprint.

I think a word of caution is due here, though, that as the meaning of the new Copyright Law filters through to the smaller publishers, that perhaps some of these present attitudes that we have reflected will be changed.

JUDGE FULD: Any other questions?
(No response)

JUDGE FULD: Thank you very much, Dr. Fry.

Did you have something to announce, Mr. Levine?

MR. LEVINE: In the continuing saga of a Commission in search of a meeting room, tomorrow morning we will be meeting next door, down the hall, in room 2220. We are preempted, I think, by Congress, from this room.

JUDGE FULD: We will reconvene at 9:30.

COMMISSIONER DIX: And it is your expectation we will be through about lunch time?

MR. LEVINE: I would anticipate that the speakers, and the discussion with the speakers, would last a maximum

>	
1104 CARRY BUILDING 927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005	10 11 12 13 14 15 16
H STRE N, D.C.	ć
1104 CARRY BUILDING 127 FIFTEENTH STREET, N WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005	, Z
110 927 FIF WASH	ŧ
	6
	7
•	8
Ш	· (
RVIC	10
IG SE	1.
ORTIN FESSIC	1:
ILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS	15
BIAN	14
OLUM CORD-I	1.5
ER-C	16
MILL	. 17
	18
	19
	20
o •	21
12] 347-0224	22
(2)	

of two hours. It may be longer than that. It is merely a question of how much Commission discussion takes place after that.

JUDGE FULD: Do any of the other Commissioners want to say anything?

If not, we will adjourn until 9:30 tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the meeting was adjourned until 9:30 a.m., July 12, 1977)

-000-

23

24

25

*	. 1	NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES
LER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE 927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.A. RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005	2	OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
	3	(CONTU)
	4	
	5	
	6	
	7	Second Day of
	8	FIFTEENTH MEETING
	. 9	July 12, 1977
	10	
	11	CHAIRMAN: Judge Stanley FULD
	12	and
	13	MEMBERS OF THE PANEL
SIAN AKING	<u>]</u> 4	
_ UMB JRD-M/	15	
R-CO REC	16	
PHONE (202) 347-0224 MILLE	1.	
	18	
	19	
	20	Room 2220 Rayburn Building
	21	Washington, D.C.
	22	
	23	
	21	
		$rac{1}{a}$

927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 1104 CARRY BUILDING MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS PRG서E (202) 347~0224

CONTENTS

STATEMENTS OF:	Page
ALLEN FERGUSON President, Public Interest Economic Center	164
BERT COWLAN Co-Director, Public Interest Satellite Association	197

1.5

JUDGE FULD: May I call this meeting to order?

This morning, we shall hear from representatives

of the Public Interest Economics Center and the Public

Interest Satellite Association. These consumer oriented

public interest organizations have been engaged in a project

to identify the consumer impact of changes in the copyright

law regarding computers and photocopying.

This project is involved in the preparation of economic analyses by the staff of the PIE-C, and the convening by PISA of meetings with the representatives of consumer and public interest organizations, to comment on the economic analysis.

Our first witness will be Dr. Allen Ferguson,
President of the Public Interest Economics - Center, who will
summarize the findings and conclusions of his study.

He will be followed by Mr. Bert Cowlan, Co-Director of the Public Interest Satellite Association, who will summarize the results of the meeting with public interest organizations' representatives, and present PISA's reactions to the PIE-C report.

STATEMENT BY ALLEN FERGUSON PRESIDENT, PIE-C

and

BERT COWLAN CO-DIRECTOR, PISA

JUDGE FULD: Dr. Ferguson, we welcome you here,

today.

1.1

DR. FERGUSON: Thank you very much. Judge Fuld.

I want to begin by, essentially, congratulating CONTU, if I might do so, for running what seems to me to be an extraordinarily sound experiment in public interest participation in government decision making.

JUDGE FULD: It is a subject in which we are very much interested.

DR. FERGUSON: Well, that is good! It is very unusual that a government agency both encourages public interest participation, and provides resources that permit public interest participants to be reasonably well informed on the issues through some special analysis, rather than leaving them to dig their information out of more or less casual sources.

What I would like to try to do is go through a fairly brief summary of our report, and I will cut through the material on a different tack from the way it is written, to give you a somewhat different view and, also, to avoid boring you -- and especially myself -- to death with the same material in the same sequence and structure.

In going through it, I notice that there are a number of errors; and we are going to try to reclaim the ribbon copy and clean up some of those things. The first two pages should not be in your copy. Our contract calls for

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

1.2

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

publishing a summary, in our own newsletter, as a partial means of disseminating this.

The first two pages are the two pages that were supposed to go into our newsletter, telling of things that you already well know.

Let me begin by identifying the questions.

In broadest terms, the basic question is whether the interests of consumers would be advanced by increasing, or decreasing, the stringency of present copyright law.

There are a number of associated questions, of course, as it applies to these particular areas.

There are a number of associated questions, many of which came up in a meeting of the public interest advocates called by Bert Cowlan and his colleagues. Let me read those, briefly.

Should any royalty charge at all be permitted?

Should any royalty charge be permitted only

for particular uses, or for particular users?

A closely related question raised by several individuals or groups was whether individuals or public interest groups should be exempt from payment of royalties under some sort of fair-use doctrine.

Should research and development paid for by the government be subject to copyright assignable to private interests?

] .[

....

Should copyrights be available only to individuals -- rather than to corporations or government entities?

Since an individual, or a small firm, cannot realistically defend its copyright against the large firm, what, if any, adjustments in copyright law should be made in that direction?

Finally, a kind of sweeping question of whether technology will overtake us.

questions -- i.e., conclusions -- and then build up the
analysis that underlies those answers.

Let me begin with photocopying, and answers to the basic question. The answers are really in the form of recommendations which would answer that question, in our judgement, and bring about a situation whereby the consumers' interests would be maximized.

With regard to photocopying, we recommend that no royalty charge should be allowed on photocopying other than photocopying for re-sale. To put it more precisely, the general conclusion of the analysis is that CONTU should not recommend any further restriction on copying beyond those that are included in the 1976 Act; and that fair-use should be formally defined to include photocopying and similar reproduction for personal use.

With regard to software, our conclusions not only are more complex, but are basically different. -- in fact, opposite, in large part, from those on photocopying. We draw a distinction: The problem of monopoly runs through this whole thing, since we are talking about a "special" privilege" monopoly. For independent software firms not in control of a substantial portion of the market, continued use of non-disclosure contracts should be allowed. For the same firms, copyright availability should be formally enacted, probably, or possibly, under a separate title of the copyright law, but with the term of protection still equal to, or longer than, the expected commercial life of most software.

Here we differ rather significantly from

Professor Baumol and his colleagues; and you may have some
interest in why we do that.

Research should be undertaken to find methods of making copyright protection more effective, to more small copyright holders.

Research should be undertaken immediately to ascertain the extent to which hardware manufacturers have monopoly power in the software instrument; or are likely to develop it.

Measures should be taken to eliminate the existence and the danger of monopoly power in the software field.

	In decreasing	order of	desirability,	the
neasures	are:			
		_	, ,	

- (1) Denial of trade secrecy and copyrights to large hardware manufacturers.
- (2) Statutorily forcing hardware manufacturers to spin off their software operations.
- (3) Anti-trust litigation to force hardware manufacturers to divest themselves of their software activities, and to split up any presumably future software firms with major market power.
- (4) Compulsory licensing with regulation of prices -- i.e., of royalties -- holding profits down and prices down to the competitive level.

Our final recommendation in this area is that research should be undertaken to ascertain whether there are general operational useful criteria for Federal subsidization of software—essentially as an alternative to the copyright royalty scheme.

The third area which was to have been examined was data bases, and computer-created works, which we consider to be essentially a form of data base.

We have three conclusions:

(1) Copyright should be available for both the information inputs into, and the outputs from

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

] 4

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

computerized information systems,

(2) . Computer created work:

Empirical study of the structure and function of the industry should be initiated and continuous monitoring of the changes should be performed.

Finally, (3) **f**ederal policies to reduce or prevent monopolistic tendencies. Essentially the same list in the same order as before should be undertaken as appropriate.

Now, those are our basic answers to the basic questions of general policy in these three areas.

Now, since I raised the half-dozen sets of other questions and what I have called associated questions -- and they do not play a big role in our analysis -- I would like to sort of interrupt the flow of this, and not only read to you the conclusions, but take a minute or two on why we arrived on the answers to those conclusions; and then go into the analysis that backs up the conclusions that I have just read to you.

As already indicated, we have concluded that copyright protection for photocopying should be available in the event of reproduction for re-sale, and should be available for all computer-based information.

]4

 $21 \cdot$

	The question is whether the fair u	se doctrine
should be	expanded to permit royalty free use	e of such
materials	by non-profit firms.	

Professor Baumol came out against that; and he did it.

I think, entirely on efficiency grounds.

In the usual constraints of economic analysis, there is no basis-on efficiency grounds-for granting any such exemption. However, social policy should -- in my judgement -- be based on more than efficiency grounds, alone.

Further, there are, in economics, some very important reasons why such exceptions, or such special treatment, can be shown to serve the interests of the public at large.

First, there is what economists call "externalities"

-- the product of public interest groups' non-profit

corporations is judged, as reflected by the special status

under tax laws, to be special, to be of broad public interest,

to be of broad public valuer of a value greater than the

market places upon the products of those institutions.

Second, many such organizations are involved in the redistribution of wealth in one way or another. Some are involved in the direct redistribution of wealth -- for example, by making information available to people to whom the information would otherwise be too costly to obtain.

The market produces optimal results in a social

sense only if it begins from a socially optimal wealth.

So, unless one believes -- which I would find rather extraordinary -- that the existing distribution of wealth is socially optimal, then the market solution to any allocative problem -- including the value of the output of public interest groups -- is not socially optimal.

One way to move toward the social optimum is to provide various kinds of support for such organizations.

Third, there is a more modern justification, maybe I should say more recent -- in what is called the "public choice literature" -- that is basically defined.

decisions are made on the basis of information -- nothing rew -- and that if anyone is rational in gathering information, he or she gathers it somehow reflecting the cost of obtaining it for any expected value of that information. This leads to what I will call "special interest groups" -- which are particular producer-interest groups, but not exclusively, which have a motive for subsidizing the availability of information.

One need only to look at the lobbying activity on the Hill, to see the validity of that.

Subsidized information distorts,-which can be demonstrated. It distorts the decision-making process, and it equally can be demonstrated that the subsidization of the objective or countervailing information leads decision makers closer to their optimal decision,-if they

had all of the information available to them.

So we have three bases for saying that public interest organizations have some special plan.

Theoretically, there would be more efficient ways of meeting this special plan. For example; direct Federal subsidization of public interest groups.

The difficulty with that is pretty patent. Since a great many of the public interest groups are involved in criticizing what the government does, it is not reasonable to suppose that there will be an unbiased distribution of Federal subsidies to public interest groups.

So, for both practical and theoretical reasons, it is our judgment that such an exemption -- exemption from royalties -- even in the case of re-sale, would be desirable for both administrative convenience and social policy.

The exemption for administrative convenience, I would think, should be extended only to 501(c)(3)'s, but I would not quibble over where, within the 501(c)(3) category, the cut should come.

The second of the questions is whether copyright ownership should be restricted to individuals.

Our answer to that is "No"; that, even if one were only interested in the welfare of individuals, denying

individuals the right to sell the property right to corporations, or government entities, deprives the individual owning the copyright of much of its property value. The question whether research and development funded by the government should be free of assignable copyright, is just too much for us to have handled in this study. It is a worthy subject, but much too complicated to try to get now.

I have already said that we recommend some form of assistance—or at least exploring how to develop assistance—for small copyright holders in defending their copyrights, and with regard to technology. Our recommendations are restricted only to the present state, and the more or less immediately foreseeable future.

The reasons for that are threefold:

- (1) We found ourselves lacking in clairvoyance, which was something of a handicap!
- (2) Most of the arguments that appear to arise on the grounds of things over the horizon -- technologies over the horizon -- are recommendations for restriction against use of copyrighted material as a means of forestalling adverse contingencies; and there are two aspects of that:
- (1) I think casual observation of it and a lot of written work suggest that once a government institution is established, it is very difficult to dis-establish it; and

11.

]4

얼구

 $\tilde{c}\tilde{z}$

(2) I think that when and if the real problems emerge, we can count on the affected special interests to make the case-effectively-on the basis of existing data, rather than on speculation.

Now, I am through with the second set of questions. I want to go back to the analysis that underlies our conclusions about what I have alluded to as "the basic question". I want to touch on two things -- sort of straight through -- as to how we reached the conclusions that we did, and why the conclusions are so different in the A.D.P. area, versus the photocopying area.

I will outline the general analysis, and then pick up the specific analyses in the three areas.

To begin with, in talking about consumer interests, we have to define "consumer". We define "consumer" to mean the ultimate consumer -- the household; the individual who buys things at the retail level, essentially. This leaves out a number of people who are sometimes thought of as consumers; and we are talking not about a category of people distinct from other categories of people. We are talking about people in their function as consumers.

In a sense, in reality, everybody is a consumer-but, if one begins to mix the function of an individual as
a saver, as a worker, as an investor, with his or her function
as a consumer, the analysis becomes false, in part, in my

judgement.

1]

Next, it seems reasonable to define "consumer interest".

A consumer in economics plays an extraordinary role. The only legitimate purpose of any economy, in my judgement -- and there is a substantial body of concurrent opinion -- is to increase the well being of the people in that society and, since everybody in the society is a consumer it is quite reasonable to say that the purpose of any economic activity is to increase the well being of consumers. That would have to be elaborated in some areas--if we got into a problem of the trade-off between a consumer and a worker position. That does not seem to be a problem in the present context.

Where does the consumer's interest lie?

How does the consumer's well being get increased as a functional policy?

Basically, the consumer's interest lies in the efficiency with which the economy responds to consumer needs. It is not just the efficiency with which the economy works—unless you define "efficiency" in terms of consumer "needs"; which is the way most economists would define it.

In the specific area -- since information is so ubiquitous a part of the economy -- the consumer's interest can be defined one degree more narrowly. I should say, "less

 21

broadly.

The consumer's interest is in an adequate amount of valuable information, both now, and in the future, and the question is: Whether to manipulate copyright possibilities in order to create a superior balance of information now, versus information in the future.

Before going into that, we have to talk a bit about the peculiar characteristics of information. There are a lot of them; and I will mention only the two most important ones.

One is what we call

-- in the economist's technical jargon -- "exclusivity".

I am sorry: Non-exclusivity, or non-appropriatability.

The concept simply means that the value of a product is non-appropriatable if the producer cannot appropriate from the user, the benefits to the user of using that output. He cannot exclude people who do not pay for the use of that entity. Information has the non-exclusivity characteristic—very strongly. Once a thing exists, if there is no legal mechanism or secrecy to protect it, it is physically easy to reproduce the information, without hindrance by the producer.

So that--in the absence of constitutional constraints -information is characterized by the special quality of "nonexclusivity".

9.

]4

Also, there is another characteristic. That is, the copying cost of an existent piece of information is a great deal less, typically, than the total cost of producing and copying a unit of that information. So that an outsider -- so to speak -- once the information exists and the work of whatever it is -- doing the research, or making the program -- has been done, a copy can be made at a very small fraction of the cost of both its original production and reproduction process.

The significance of that is that;—to the extent that creation and dissemination of creative work is stimulated by the prospect of monetary reward; to that extent—the supply of information tends to be less than the socially optimal supply, because the producers cannot capture the full value of what they produce.

Now, when I say "full value", I would have to modify that to say that's at the margin; and that could carry us far afield. I have a footnote I would like to insert there.

In other words, there is a tendency for consumers to be provided with less than the optimal amount of information, by virtue of this characteristic.

Copyrights are designed to provide producers of information with monopoly privileges intended to increase the prospect of monetary reward--so as to remove some, or all, or more than all, of the innate disadvantages associated with

1:

the non-exclusivity.

This brings us to what we called-three times in the report--"basic trade-off".

Let me read the statement, because it was once written with a certain amount of care.

"To the extent that the supply of information is dependent upon royalties, there is a clear trade-off.

"The greater the cost imposed on users of copyrighted material, as a whole, the higher will be the return to the producers, and the greater will be the supply of information.

"Higher prices to consumers, on the other hand, raise the cost of using existing information and, hence, reduce effective availability. To the extent that new research and other creative work is dependent upon using existing information, the problem is made more complex.

I said this was carefully written. But I don't think it came off very well. What I am saying is this:

That the imposition of a royalty reduces the availability -- i.e., raises the cost of the use of existing information -- that is, the immediate cost to the consumer. At the same time, that increases the incentive for the production and dissemination of new information. So, initially, you have a fairly simple trade-off. The higher the total sum of the royalties, the greater the incentive for producing

11.

new information which, subsequently, benefits consumers by making the possibility of further development of information, or the development of new things, more readily available.

There is a small wrinkle, and that is that the latter process of development of new information depends on the use of existing information. So a high cost of using existing information does tend to reduce, somewhat, the creation of new information. That, I think, is a secondary consideration; and its basic trade-off is the one I mentioned, between present and future information.

We specify the conditions under which increased copyright power would serve the consumer, or the public. The supply of information is -- or in the absence of copyright protection would be -- less than socially desirable; and more stringent copyright authority would increase the supply toward the optimal. Imposing a copyright system--or permitting a copyright system--would be the most efficient way to move the supply toward the social optimum.

Royalty payments on prices charged reflect the value of the product to its user.

Finally, there are no significant barriers to entry.

Now, with regard to the first, whether the supply

11.

of information is less than the social optimal -- as I have already indicated -- given the non-appropriatability, there is a tendency, in this direction, that may or may not be offset by such other things as the governmental subsidization of the production of information. But there is a tendency in that direction.

Greater freedom to impose royalties would, presumably, be used by producers of information only to the extent that it would increase their revenues and, in the absence of severe constraints, any increase in revenues would tend to increase the supply of information. This is a restatement of the basic motivation for the use of the royalty.

There are two caveats with that:

One is that it does not follow if producers are totally insensitive to monetary rewards, or the prospect of monetary rewards; and

Secondly, it does not follow if there are restrictions to entry.

This is the way the monopoly thing runs through this all the time. The more effective the monopoly, the less the responsiveness of the particular sector of the information system will be, to any kind of increase in revenues.

So there is a basic way of arguing that there is some justification for a larger, expanded role of copyrights.

별

There are three questions that remain. They can be collapsed into two; and I will collapse them into two:

To what extent are producers of the relevant form of information responsive to the prospect of monetary reward, including other significant barriers to entry; and, secondly, are there more efficient and more equitable ways of moving toward some concept of the socially desirable amount of output?

We can say that a movement towards the socially desirable amount of output is, or should be, correlated with capturing and appropriating the benefits produced.

What I want to do is address these three questions, area by area, beginning with photocopying,

We have concentrated on photocopying, although your mandate, as you are well aware, calls for your examination of use of copyrighted works in machine reproduction. We narrowed to one area—what we say lies elsewhere, but we have no data anywhere other than photocopying, and one little bit of information on offset, which I will come to immediately.

I need to make a couple of statements -- background statements -- about photocopying, before going into the analysis, and I want to emphasize that all of the empirical information is extraordinarily weak. This is an area of,

essentially, just no good, systematic, extensive data; so one has to work with a combination of intuition, casual observation, and shreds of information.

is photocopying of copyrighted material. From a very helpful letter from Robert Gray -- commenting on our earlier draft -- we get the following information:

There are no good sources of information, today, on the fraction of photocopying that is copying of copyrighted material, but there was a study begun at the University of Amsterdam in 1972, and it showed that something in the order of six percent -- five percent -- of photocopies were copies of copyrighted materials, and considerably less than that -- something in the order of two-and-a-half to three percent -- of the offsets and stencil materials, was copyrighted materials.

This certainly concurs with national observation ——
and that is nice, when you have casual observation and
shreds of information going in the same direction. You feel
much more comfortable, although I would never have gotten
this far as an economist if I did not know how to extrapolate
from a single point, anyway.

The second kind of information is that photocopying is apparently highly concentrated in technical journals -- by which we mean cultural and professional journals -- for which

 $1\hat{8}$

 22°

there are perfectly obvious reasons -- analytical reasons.

The cost of purchase per page of a technical journal and of certain other things, is very high, relative to the cost of copying, in contrast, for example, with a novel, where the cost of copying is a large multiple of the cost of purchase per page.

The photocopying appears to be largely done in institutions -- including businesses. It is largely a substitute for note-taking--not a substitute for purchase, or subscription. Again, the data is abundantly bad and, in the absence of data, we resort to the usual trick of quoting an authority; and you are familiar with the statements of Dr. Gordon Williams, Director of the Center for Research Libraries in Chicago...

He says:

"In my own observation, use of these machines"-that is, coin-controlled photocopying machines, and likewise
--"and, indeed, in my own use,
is so rare as to be absolutely insignificant. They are
primarily used in lieu of note-taking by hand. If the
operation of these machines is to be stopped or hindered, I am
confident that virtually no more book of journal sales would
result. The available evidence indicates that the number of
people who -- faced with photocopying restrictions -- would
subscribe to journals, is low. Many journals have few

readers.

A person might casually, photocopy an article from a journal with no intent of subscribing as an alternative."

Again, quoting Dr. Williams:

"The American Psychological Association found that the average number of readers is only seven per article in their publications, and the American Chemical Society found it to be only ten."

So that the $_{\mbox{frequency}}$ with which articles are read in these journals is extremely low.

There is some additional information in the article by Line and Wood that Professor Machlup quoted yesterday.

Let me touch a couple of things, here, that he did not allude to.

About 30% -- only 30% -- of the photocopying in the British Library Loan Division appears to be photocopying of issues <u>currently in print</u> -- not the current issue -- issues in print. There is an extraordinarily low ratio of articles versus circulation. He touched on three or four of the highlights. Let me elaborate a little bit.

The worst example, so to speak, was

Research Communications in Chemical Pathology and Pharmacology.

350 articles published in the three years

 $2\overline{2}$

prior to the survey were copied. The circulation is estimated at a thousand. So this sounds like 35% of the journals are copied. Now, you say, "That is over a three-year period" and, roughly divide it by three, and make the assumption that there is an average of ten articles per issue, which is a reasonable assumption -- although I must confess I have never read Research Communications in Chemical Pathology or Pharmacology, so I may not be competent to quote. But if we make those two assumptions, then we are down again to something like the equivalent of 1.2% of the number of subscriptions being copied once in a year.

Now, these are funny numbers; but that is the worst case in his list.

Now, that is the background information that I think is important. Let me -- since I have taken so long with this -- recapitulate:

Most photocopying is not of copyrighted material.

It is concentrated in technical journals.

It is concentrated in libraries and other institutions.

It is largely a substitute for note-taking -- not for purchase or subscription.

Now I move to the first of the three questions: Are producers responsive to the prospects of

13.

monetary rewards through royalties?

We can practically say, as far as authors are concerned, the answer is "No". Authors of technical journals predominantly have other sources of income.

The royalties that they get are, at best, miniscule, and they publish for other motives.

Now, publishers, on the other hand, are, in fact, responsive to the prospect of monetary reward. At least, that is what they tell their stockholders, if they are commercial, but about 68% -- according to Dr. Bernard Fry -- of the technical journals are published by "not-for-profits". Now, as a person who runs "not-for-profit", I am aware of the fact that that does not mean they are insensitive to revenues. It means that they may respond in a somewhat different way.

The question is: How responsive, then, are the producers of photocopyable works - - if I can use that particular non-word -- how responsive are they to potential monetary incentives?

Does that include the right to charge royalties to provide the potential of monetary rewards?

The first question that is related to this is whether publishers, as a whole, need the increase in revenues that might be generated by the imposition of royalties on photocopying. There are several things to that

]4

without answering the question in a definitive way--because, again, the data do not permit a full answer.

Most of the output of commercial publishing hous is not of the kind that is vulnerable, so to speak, to photocopying. There is no evidence of serious financial need; and part of the reason, perhaps, for this lack of evidence -- although it is not very persuasive -- is that there are no data on line-of-business profits and loss in most of the publishing industry.

In light of the fact that I think any economist would agree that there is a presumption against the grant of a monopoly, I would think that the burden of proof lies squarely on the industry to demonstrate, through line-of-business reporting—— any such need.

Furthermore, most of the existing publications are far beyond the minimal efficient level for production. Again, the line, indeed, there, shows that there are only thirteen journals in their sample out of fifty-nine for which they have the information, with circulation of less than 5,000 a year, and there are a number of journals that are operating at one and two thousand per year subscription levels.

The fact that some of these journals are subsidized, or are run by non-profit organizations, of course, makes the break-even level -- I should say the minimum

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

. 13

1.4

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

efficient	size	level,	or	the	surviva1	level	 lower	than
otherwise	would	be th	e ca	ase.				

The last point on responsiveness to monetary incentives is, again, the monopoly question.

There appears to be very easy entry into the journal publication activity, in spite of the fact that there is a moderate degree of concentration in commercial publishing and, rather, very high concentration in the publication of reference works as classified by the Census manufacturers.

So we come to the question of responsiveness.

Are the producers significantly responsible to the prospect of monetary reward through royalty?

The answer is, "No".

It can be modified a little bit, but the basic answer is, "No".

If expanded journal output is desirable, is the royalty system the most efficient way to do so?

In other words, is it an efficient way to recapture any non-appropriated benefits?

The first question is: How efficient is the royalty system?

There is no evidence that it would increase subscriptions significantly--or purchases.

It would, if it is of any value at all, increase

1.3

revenue and increase output, but it would do so at the cost of a mis-allocation of resources, shifting resources from the photocopying activities -- from the consumers of photocopying services -- to publishers -- a straight transfer, encouraging publishers to produce more than appears to be the optimal output, and encouraging the providers of photocopying service to produce less than at least the present, if not the optimal, level of that output.

A single royalty rate, if it should be necessary

-- as I gather is the case -- to apply the same royalty

rate over a very wide range of kinds of publications, that

is incredibly inefficient. There is no way that a single

price that is independent of both the marginal cost and

the marginal revenue of a product, can do anything but

distort the distribution of resources -- the allocation

of resources.

Finally, it appears -- again, we are in, essentially, data-less world -- it appears to be an institution that would impose very high administrative costs. But that tail should not, necessarily, wag the dog -- witness Professor Machlup's statement -- which I concur with -- that the clearing house problem should not be solved. The problem, whose solution, once it exists, will -- if history is any guide -- tend to drive the machine without regard to its social utility. The people who have a vested interest in the invention of

1.7

the clearing house system will have an enormous motive for tossing it on the world. This is the way economy works -- especially the political economy.

Now, we can raise the question, again, of: How equitable is the system?

I shall try to conclude in another ten or fifteen minutes. Is that all right, Judge Fuld?

JUDGE FULD: Ten minutes will be fine.

DR. FERGUSON: Picking up the question of the equitability of the system:

First, it involves a windfall profit to existing publishers of existing journals.

Second, To the extent that there is a problem of non-appropriatability in the library use of publications, it is a consequence of free library use -- not simply a consequence of photocopying. So that there is a kind of arbitrariness which you may, or may not, consider inequitable. There is an arbitrariness in selecting photocopying as the thing on which to hang the efforts to recapture any non-appropriable evidence.

Furthermore, there is an alternative -- and it is an alternative that is now practiced -- whereas I agree with Professor Baumol that doing something for a long time does not constitute a justification for it, the fact that it has been practiced indicates that the problems of feasibility

2

3

4

ā

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1.4

15

16

17

16.

19

20

21

22

23

 $24 \cdot$

25

are manageable, and it is a system with apparently low administrative costs in contrast with the royalty system.

That is, of course, the mechanism of price discrimination, whereby journal publishers charge -- and some book publishers charge -- higher prices to institutions than to individual subscribers, following essentially the guidance -- so to speak -- in the Baumol work, that is referred to in the jargon as "pricing in accordance with the elasticity rule".

Now, then, the case, it seems to us, against the use of royalties for personal photocopying is clearcut. "Clearcut" may be too strong a word. The preponderance of evidence here lies against that. In other words, lies in favor of defining fair use to include personal photocopying.

The only significant exception would be where copying is for re-sale. There, of course, you do have, clear-cut appropriatability of the benefits generated by the producer of the information.

Let me move to computer software.

There are three background facts:

About half to three-quarters of the cost, itself,total computer cost of the industry--is the software cost,
itself. The vast majority of these are incurred within the
using organization by its own programming and computer staff,

12.

and hence, is largely irrelevant -- so far as copyrighting is concerned.

However, purchased packages, of more or less standard programs, is increasing rapidly.

With regard to the first question: "Are our producers responsive to prospective rewards?", The answer is, clearly, "Yes".

This is true both in the database case, and in the software case.

Most of this work is done by commercial entities.

The split between author and publisher has no substantial analogue in the data processing area. However, there are alternatives: both industrial secrecy and patents.

At least, they are conceivable alternatives.

So we come to a set of questions:

Does the currently predominant system of licensing trade-secrecy, have inefficiency which would be reduced or avoided by a Statute making copyrights clearly available to software?

If so, should trade-secrecy be banned?

Should patents rather than, or in addition to copyrights, be available for software?

Is software unique enough to justify a new form of statutory protection?

<u> 1</u> 1

The arguments that trade secrecy is less satisfactory than the copyright mechanism are:

First: That the transaction cost of trade secrecy is very high. That appears to be, probably, true, in an absolute sense, but not very large in a relative sense -- relative to the cost of software and costs in the data base industry.

The maintenance of trade secrecy sometimes asserted to be characterized by economies of scale -- in other words, it is argued that large corporations can maintain trade secrecy better than small -- that argument does not appear to be validated by the existing information.

The needs for the maintenance of trade secrecy tends to steer producers away from general purpose, mass-marketed software; and that appears to be a valid and potentially very important argument, because a firm selling mass-

-marketed software -- over the counter, so to speak, cannot readily enforce -- if at all -- trade secrecy restrictions; cannot enter into a contract with everybody at a store, effectively. And the term of the protection under trade secrecy is totally unregulated. If trade secrecy works, it either works forever, or it works on a random basis until somebody in Industry Intelligence breaks the code.

But, on balance, since the copyright mechanism also has its cost and disadvantages, the consumer appears to have relatively little absolute preference between the two mechanisms: trade secrecy and copyrights. However, the potential growth of the mass marketed programs -- and this is about as far as we go into future technology -- the potential for that growth would appear to be stimulated by clearcut copyright protection. So we come to the first conclusion; that copyright protection appears to be desirable. And I will come back to the exceptions in a moment.

However, even with the availability of unambiguous copyright protection, we see no need or desirability of banning all secrecy contracts. Given close competition, it is in the interest of the consumer that the sellers have the option of using either secrecy or copyright; -whichever appears to them to be more effective in protecting their innovations.

I shall only say, with regard to the question of patents versus copyrights, that programs and software in general are sufficiently different from the typical kind of opyrighted material, so that it is an interesting question, and if, in fact, it turns out that the desirable period of protection is shorter for the software than for other things, there might be some mechanical advantage in putting such legislation in a separate portion of the Act.

 $Z\bar{D}$

Now, the argument supporting the availability of both -- I should say, either -- copyright or contractual licensing is applicable only where monopoly power is absent. Given monopoly power, the supply response will not be as predicted -- the royalty would not bring forth the supply response it is supposed to bring forth. That is what I am trying to say.

Now, I will mention one or two salient things, if I may, about computer data bases.

The area of most interest appears to be the general purpose data bases. Firms who create them are called "wholesalers". They tend to purchase the inputs. They don't go out and get the basic information. They purchase the inputs from suppliers of standard bibliographic works, or Standard and Poor, or whatever, and mix them up with lots of other people's information, and organize them in a way that is useful to their customers.

This part of the business is highly concentrated. There were, until recently, only two major firms in the Industry: S.D.C. and Lockheed. There is a third one and, lo and behold, when the third one came in, the price collapsed -- which suggests something about the existence of monopoly power, and also suggests the efforts that will be made to co-op the third partner, to get the price back up where God intended it should be.

<u>:</u>4

To cut through quickly, we do, in fact, recommend that copyright availability be both at the input and the output side of the data bases.

It would be desirable, again——if possible to do so——
to restrict that to non-competitive areas but, in this
instance, it would appear much more appropriate to go
directly at the monopoly problem, either through Statutory
or judicial proceedings.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, that concludes my allegedly "brief" summary.

JUDGE FULD: Thank you.

We will hear Dr. Cowlan's reaction, which, I gather, is the PISA study.

DR. COWLAN: Thank you, Judge Fuld;

I should explain first that PISA was chosen for the task not by virtue of any expertise in copyright, but because of some experience with the network of citizen and consumer organizations who are entering into experiments and experiences in new and high technology. My personal credentials may be a shade more impressive. For my sins, I once spent a year as a resident Social Scientist in a middle-sized computer facility, and I spent the time working with satellites. One learns both legal and engineering jargon in self-defense and, since this project started, I must confess I picked up a fair number of words in economics.

Dr. Ferguson stole my opening -- which is one of the disadvantages of going second--but I am going to use it anyway because I worked hard at it. We do wish to make a specific suggestion, which was not included in his opening remarks and, in the interest of time, what I will attempt to do is go through the report. It is not this lengthy -- there are various other documents attached to it -- to indicate our perception of what people said at conferences that took place, whether they agreed, or disagreed; or where there may have been some doubts in terms of the PISA report.

Further, I apologize for redundancy, but I am sure you all realize, in this kind of a situation, it is almost unavoidable!

If for no other reason than that the recent series of conferences commissioned by CONTU and organized by PISA took place, the project must be seen as successful. CONTU's attempt to seek out and hear from that segment of the public rarely heard in deliberations on such issues as copyright legislation can be seen as ground-breaking—especially because, while public voices have been heard in the past in the legislative process, this marks the first time, to our knowledge, that a government agency or Commission took note of the fact that most such organizations live in a state of near-

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

]_1

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1.

poverty; and paid the costs of the attendance of citizen organization representatives to participate in the process which affects them so importantly.

The organizations which participated were well aware of this precedent having been established, and have nothing but high praise to offer CONTU for having taken such a step.

It would seem to PISA -- and perhaps this should be viewed as one of its major recommendations for the future -- that this activity, and the way in which it took place, merits publicity, not only for the sake of what CONTU did, but to act as an exemplar for other government agencies and Commissions to emulate in the future. The facts of fiscal life in most citizen, community and consumer organizations are such that participating in the democratic process as exemplified by various regulatory and legislative hearings is sadly often far beyond their means. Yet, as has been suggested, regulations and legislation affects their very being, their goals and objectives, and their way of doing business. Indeed, one organization represented at the Conferences -- an entity whose purpose is to share information with other non-profit organizations, -would be so gravely affected were non-profit organizations to have to pay copyright fees for photocopying material to be retransmitted to other non-profits, that it would have to cease its

existence. In a society where information is increasingly a power; where citizens and consumers need information not only as part of their working life but for their very survival as individuals, the ripple effect of such an organization closing its doors could. since it serves the underprivileged essentially, be not only of serious consequence to its organizational constituency but of serious consequence to a portion of society, itself.

PISA is somewhat at a disadvantage in the preparation of this report, and would like to be candid about the reasons for it. The PIE-C document which, in various stages of draft, the Conferences had considered on two separate occasions and on which PISA is to comment in its current and final form, arrived only the day before this was being written. This is by no means to fault PIE-C; it was a function of the mal-service of what is euphemistically referred to as the U.S. Postal Service.

Further, only two days remained, then, between the opportunity to examine that document in some depth; the writing of these comments; and our appearance here today.

However, a great deal got said at the Conferences, and in thoughtful papers that a number of participants presented to them, and this paper will attempt to summarize and analyze and comment upon those, as well as upon PIE-C to the maximum extent that we can.

1104 CARRY BUILDING 127 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 MILLER.COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD.MAKING PROFESSIONALS

The format of the Conferences was fairly simple.

CONTU, at the first one -- May 2nd -- welcomed the group.

PISA described the background -- CONTU's desire to elicit

the views of citizen and consumer organizations as to how

they would be affected by the new copyright law -- and

CONTU then spoke of the work of the Commission, the history

of copyright, the state of uncertainty that exists vis-a-vis

computers and copyright. There is attached to this statement

a copy of a transcript of both Conferences, which attempts to

recount in some depth what was said by whom, and when.

PIE-C presented an outline of its paper.

The same procedure was roughly followed at the second -- June 13th -- Conference except that, by then, papers had been received from five participants; a letter of commentary had been received from a non-participant, in response to an item in a newsletter published by one of the participants' organizations; and these were read by their authors.

Another new element of the second Conference was the presence of a representative, Mr. Ordover, of an NYU Working Group, and the distribution, for participant consideration, of several additional documents. These were: "Software Subcommittee Report & Additional Views" and the "Data Base Subcommittee Report & Additional Views", both CONTU documents.

Once the formal presentations had taken place, the

1.2

balance of both meeting days was, essentially, devoted to questions and answers; and to discussions. One need only glance at the "transcripts" to note that they were lively and thoughtful, both in terms of questions and responses.

The word "transcript" appears in quotes, it should be noted, because these were not verbatim; they were an attempt to reconstruct, after the fact, based on extensive note-taking and some use of the audio tapes that were made at the Conferences.

There was a prevailing mood which soon became apparent. The non-profit sector representatives present felt a strong concern for any bottlenecks -- real or apparent -- which might obstruct what many felt to be a prime organizational objective: i.e., their function in passing information which they felt to be of political and economic importance, to their constituencies, and to the public-at-large. They viewed themselves as having a key role in the transmission belt that gets information to those who most need it -- generally that portion of society least well-equipped to get it for itself: the consumer, the poor,

and groups which find themselves excluded from main stream society because of race, ethnic origin or sex.

There was some confusion about the role -- and it was never resolved. At some points, the participants were representing themselves as organizational entities whose

purpose was to encourage and promote the "free flow" of In-
formation to the public. Many felt that they were part of an
emerging "public interest" citizens movement which, of itself,
could be considered a separate "interest group", and which had
an enormous organizational stake of its own in the issues
being considered by CONTU. This represents, of course, a
considerable difference from PIE-C's stress on individual
consumers of goods and services.

This difference in perception made for some tension—and for some confusion. There was a continuous pulling and hauling—a virtual tug—of—war—between the participants as organizational representatives who had concerns about the protection of the integrity of information they produced, and the participants as, themselves: consumers.

Integrity was more a concern to the participants as organizations than was revenue; that is to say, they cared less about the possible re-sale -- except in one or two cases -- of information they generated as providers of informational services to others -- either individuals or organizations -- than they cared about the information they produced not being distorted, used out of context, or misquoted. Almost needless to say, virtually every organization represented had had bad experiences of the sort suggested above. From a very practical point of view, such misrepresentation can cause economic problems. Either their

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

organizational credibility is lowered -- and there may be some cause and effect -- or their capacity to attract funding is impaired.

Now these perceptual differences also caused questions to be raised over the appropriateness of the economic model being presented for participant consideration by PIE-C. One participant raised the issue when he pointed out that most of the organizations present were not interested in economic efficiency as a criterion or rationale for their Public interest groups, many felt, did not suit the economic model. They raised, time and again, questions about what should be the basic purpose of copyright and other forms of protection; whether they should to encourage and promote the creation and dissemination of information in a society in which, as previously noted, information is becoming increasingly critical to the needs of economic and political life. One participant -- as a reflection. I suspect, of both the tensions and confusion -exploded. She exploded over the issue of "why are we here?". Her point is worth amplifying since it was, to some degree. representative:

"PIE-C's report," she said, "is in a consumer-needs vacuum. What are the uses we make of all this? This has been an economics seminar. PIE-C and PISA should have conducted two separate forums. There has been too little time to

<u>_</u>13

21,

reflect on consumer needs, comments, and recommendations.

There has been no chance for consensus on the reports we submitted, for us to consider them as a body. We are being asked to rubber-stamp a set of foregone conclusions."

In fairness to PIE-C, CONTU and PISA, it should be pointed out -- and it was -- that this paper should represent the point-of-view of participants to the extent that the PIE-C final draft might not, and that the CONTU process is by no means a closed one. Participants were encourage to react further, either as a result of the Conferences, and any afterthoughts they produce, and to CONTU's contemplated open hearings -- and to this paper, itself.

The tension may have been creative, though, since, in the end, there was a surprising degree of unanimity, especial in regard to the issues posed by photocopying.

All felt that <u>no royalty should be allowed on</u>

<u>photocopying other than for resale</u> -- a conclusion also
reached by, and explained in depth, in the PIE-C report.

Indeed, the PIE-C final report aptly summarizes many of the concerns expressed, " * * * attempts to retain the current forms of proprietary rights could severely retard progress in increasing information creation and dissemination."

The participants also endorsed the concept that the "fair use" doctrine should be extended to cover all non-

commercial uses of photocopying of copyrighted works.

This finding of PIE-C's echoes the statement previously referred to by the participant who pointed out that non-profit organizations are generally not organized for economic efficiency.

The participants also felt, and PIE-C concurs, that:
"Our judgement is that such exemption (from royalty payments)
would be socially desirable, and for administrative convenience
should be extended to all 501(c)(3) corporations." PISA is,
of course, in complete agreement with the concept, and would
only wish to raise the question here as to whether there are
not other 501 corporations, other non-profit organizations
who hold other than the (c)(3) designator, who might qualify
to be similarly exempt. That seems, at least, to be worth
further study.

In regard to the precedents cited as social policy for such exemptions, it might only be noted that "non-profits" do qualify for considerably cheaper bulk mail rates; some are granted tax-exempt status; there are special "wire service" rates for the Associated Press which holds a non-profit charter.

One participant offered a recommendation in a submitted paper which is worth noting here. She felt that, in light of considerable discussion about monetary versus psychic rewards for writers/creators of print material,

especially as it pertains to copyright and photocopying,
the establishment of two classes of copyrights would allow
authors/creators to opt for that which best satisfies her/hi
particular needs. She went on to suggest that "Class A"
copyrights would essentially be the same as copyrights now
in existence. It would provide a limited monopoly for the
creator, assuring both credit and royalty protection and
recognition. Copyright owners of "Class A" copyrights would
be able to litigate in infringement cases based on current
procedures, statutes and precedents.

"Class B" copyrights -- a new class -- would allow reproduction and distribution on a not-for-sale basis.

Pirating for profit, of "class B" materials would be litigatable; as would reproduction and dissemination without author credit. This would ensure psychic rewards, but would provide for widespread distribution. And she did mention a fee structure for these two classes of copyrights.

Another participant wrote at length about the needs, of the public interest community, for copyright protection. Her rationale -- and virtually all of the Conference participants seemed to share it -- was to the effect that: "Both public interest groups and individuals need, and will continue to need, regardless of technology, copyright protection for a variety of purposes.

		(1)	Prev	ent	theft	of	an	idea	with	out	compensatio
bу	а	corporation	or	indi	ividua	1 wh	o m	arket	s it	for	profit;

- (2) To insure against plagiarism of original concepts of works of art;
- (3) To guarantee proper credit, citation and quotation when materials are re-used by others; i.e., legal recourse;
- (4) To protect the accuracy and credibility of people whose ideas are recorded; a form of registration protection against suits for libel and slander.

PIE-C pointed out several other issues and questions. The Conference participants have been asked to react to the final report, so suffice it to say here that, in PISA's view, several of these will be received favorably, judging from what was said at the conferences. Others may not be. There will likely be some disagreement about the statement that, "It would appear to be undesirable to restrict copyright ownership only to individuals." At least one Conference participant felt strongly that this should be the case: copyrights should be so restricted to individuals only.

PISA feels virtually all participants would agree with the thought of further pursuing. The question of whether research and development funded by the federal government should be subject to copyrights assignable to private parties. This topic would require more analysis than was possible in our study.

1.7

If asked for a "sense of the meeting," PISA's view is that most -- if not all -- of the participants would $$\rm not $$ favor such assignment.

To make copyright holders effectively equal under the law, some form of assistance to small business, individual and non-profit copyright holders appears to be highly desirable.

PISA feels all would agree.

The report goes on to say, "However, to determine the appropriate form, and the practicality of any form, lies beyond the scope of the study reported here." This is certainly a fair statement. PISA would urge that this matter be studied further; and in-depth.

While there was "creative tension" and some degree of unanimity in the discussion of photocopying, little consensus could be reached regarding computer copyrights. There are several obvious reasons for this to have been the case. Photocopying is ubiquitous in the non-profit world. Computers, while proliferating, are still a large unknown at most non-profit organizations. Among the organizations represented, there was a general "awareness" of the potential power of computer technology to manage information and to be of value to their own operations. But there was really, no clear notion of what this will really mean; of what it

] 4

will cost; and for what achieved effects, And, hence, there was a considerable reluctance to say very much about what form of protection should, or should not, apply at this point in time.

and many of the participants, want to endorse PIE-C's recommendation on software -- which is on page 13 of the attached report -- and on computer data bases and computer-created works -- pages 16 and 17.

Two letters were received: one prior to the second Conference, and one subsequently--from individuals responding to information, about the first Conference, in a newsletter published by one of the participants. A computer engineer offered an approach similar to that proposed in my reference to "A" and "B" copyrights. He felt that there were two general classifications of software producers:

- a) large companies who produce expensive software to support large computers, and/or extensive systems. A lot of time and manpower is invested here. This is a commercial product.
- b) individuals or institutions who may only contribute occasional software designed for small computers; i.e., home or hobbyist. Many small business and non-commercial applications also fall into this category.

He then offered a series of rather ingenious suggestions

as to how to go about this, but the end line of what he had to say, the bottom line, was:

"I believe that any regulations proposed should work to maximize the availability of copyrightable software to the general public. One never knows who's out there and what contribution to society they could make-given the proper set of circumstances. Writers must also be rewarded and encouraged to produce. I don't think that availability and reward are mutually exclusive."

PISA would agree with the above, and believes that the Conference participants would, as well.

Another letter was received in response to that newsletter item, and the author -- who was, again, an engineer -expressed the view that, " * * * I believe that wide availability of software is the primary concern, and that protection
of rights and the acquiring of rewards be at the minimum-to ensure sufficient motivation for talented people to produce
high quality work of general interest. ... I don't think
that the rate of increase ofknowledge should be the overriding concern, but agree with Ithiel de Sola Pool that
the seed of diffusion is what should be rewarded.

Society presently has immense amounts of useful knowledge
that are not well utilized; the problem seems to be getting
it to the right places."

This is something that has come up time and time

1 i

again at the conferences, where several people especially had pointed out that the problem of copyright should be perceived as one relating more to the distribution of information than to its creation.

The sender of the letter also said, " * * * As more and more of our knowledge that is vital for social functioning (e.g., financial transactions, communications - personal, governmental, corporate, etc. - recreation, education etc.) is expressed as software, then the question of who is creating it, who is disseminating it, who is using it and for what purposes becomes very important. If this knowledge is concentrated in few hands then we will have taken another step in the direction of centralization of power and dependence on massive interest. On the other hand, with appropriate legislation that favors smaller social units, there is a chance, albeit a very slim one, that the trend can be reversed slightly."

We have underlined that section. The statement echoes a brisk exchange at the Conference between some who favored the creation of a huge and probably governmental data bank, a software version perhaps of the Library of Congress; and those who greatly feared putting that kind of concentration of data power in the hands of government.

The sender of the letter also offered what he called "scale-dependent protection", where he indicated that

1104 CARRY BUILDING 927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

there could be some upper limits on the number of patents; the time limit could decrease; the tax on royalties could increase, and so on. He pointed out that there were already a good number of precedents for making the registration procedure and cost depend on size; e.g., income tax, building permits, licensing for vehicles, day-care centers, etc.

He also made the point—and I think it is worth pointing out here: "Restrictions of small copying is almost unenforceable if it is an infringement, and is probably a healthy thing, anyway, and so should not be made an offense." And we would venture to point out that,/small computers and home computer utilization and the increase of message networks among computer hobbyists proliferates, it would almost be impossible to enforce the type of situation in which a piece of copyrightable material is put on a CRT Tube transmitted to another computer, read off by someone later on, and then taken off the tape—once it has achieved its value.

We quoted this man's testimony because he expressed an approach not heard at the Conference; and I wish it had been, because it might have benefitted -- in terms of sharpening the focus of what might be characterized as a "soft" discussion, due primarily to the lack of experience with the technology involved. Our hope is that when this paper is distributed to the participants, they will react to the approach.

13.

The question of "enforcement" was raised, peri-
pherally, in that letter. The question of "who should
qualify" was touched on earlier to some extent, when PISA
endorsed the PIE-C recommendation that 501(c)(3) corporations
be granted exemption from copyright royalties. There was,
though, a decided difference between the PIE-C approach,
which dealt with this question in terms of whether or not
there was effective competition in the marketplace :
where there wasn't, no form of protection, copyright or
other, should be granted; where there was; copyright should
be made available. Others argued strongly that only
individuals not corporationsshould be permitted copyright
protection.

PIE-C did endorse providing assistance to small business, individual and non-profit copyright holders, but indicated that how to achieve e this was beyond the scope of the present study. However, Ferguson, in the transcript of the May 2 Conference, did say, "Needed is a federal agency to litigate on behalf of small holders."

PISA has already made its view known that this matter should be pursued; a view that is strengthened in the comments offered by at least one of the participants.

The question of granting protection to private parties whose information is obtained by federal government research and development was seen by PIE-C as needing more

1.4

() : () - - -

analysis. PISA feels most participants -- and PISA -- would favor not assigning copyrights to private parties for work done under federal R & D auspices.

One of the speakers, representing the National Association of Community Health Centers, spoke rather eloquently on the effect that this might have on the work that they do.

PIE-C's final question in the Executive Summary to its report, was: "Will technology overtake us?"

Technological prediction is a risky business; its history is strewn with the thoughts of those who felt that airplanes would never be of value in war, that battleships were unsinkable, that rockets were children's toys, that the automobile would never replace the horse.

PIE-C points out that, "Our recommendations pertain only to the present and clearly visible applications of existing technology."

It goes on to say, "Further, the 1976 Act provides for the review of the technology of photocopying at five year intervals. We recommend not only that the review be extended to other computer-based information but that there be a sunset provision: unless existing protection in both photocopying and computer-based information is justified every five years, it should be discontinued."

PISA strongly endorses this recommendation, and strongly believes all Conference participants and others

1104 CARRY BUILDING 927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

in the non-profit sector would do so, as well.

During the course of, especially, the second Conference, a number of suggestions were made regarding the need for further knowledge and research. These are noted in the transcript but not taken specific note of, here, since all of them seem to be not necessary in light of the overreaching recommendation to CONTU that non-profits (i.e. 501(c)(3)'s -- and it has been recommended that perhaps others qualify)-inot be charged copyright royalties. recommendation stands, and is implemented, it is not seen as of value to survey the non-profits' volume and manner of use of copyrighted works. Should the recommendation not be accepted, this research suggestion and others to which similar criteria would apply need to be reexamined.

The Conference could be faulted on the question of how "representative" were the participants. That is, of course, a potential flaw in any attempt to generalize knowledge through the mechanism of holding a Conference. If there are serious doubts -- and we have none -- on the part of CONTU or on the part of others to whom the findings and recommendations may be displeasing, the obvious next step would be to hold more -- perhaps many more -- of the same; or to combine the Conference approach -- which, at least, did allow for explanations and dialogue -- with a massive questionnaire. Let there be no doubt, though: it would be

. 7

].1

massive; there are known to be some 6,000,000 non-profit organizations in the United States. While statistical sampling techniques are quite sophisticated -- in terms of arriving at a high degree of generalization from a relatively small sample -- we must note here that we are dealing with immensely complex matters-from the point of view of comprehensibility. The initial PIE-C document received immense impetus from the fact that Dr. Ferguson was able to explain it, to answer questions about it; and that CONTU staff were able to do the same. PISA-- and we are sure the participants would concur -- are in his, or their -- debt.

Obviously, there is more to be done. CONTU will hold its hearings; the Conference participants will undoubtedly participate -- and urge others to participate -- and those, as well, will, undoubtedly, file further comments to the PIE-C final report and to this effort. PISA, to the extent of its ability, intends to do the same. We feel -- to return to the beginning of this paper --privileged to have been part of what can well be characterized as a ground-breaking effort. We intend to do our utmost to urge other Commissions and federal agencies to follow CONTU's example so that the ability to pay need not be the criterion for the ability to participate in the legislative and regulatory process.

Thank you, sir.

ī -

JUDGE FULD: I am sure there are questions from the Commission. We will recess for a few minutes, at this time.

(Brief recess)

JUDGE FULD: The meeting will come to order.

COMMISSIONER LACY: I thought the study was interesting but just for that reason, I have a number of questions and comments about it. A number of terms are used which have various meanings to various people -- some of them rather emotion-laden. I suspect, Dr. Ferguson, you and I agree on what the words mean in this context; but to make them explicit, I wonder whether we could deal with some of them.

You suggested, for example, that the consumer was closely compatible with public interest generally, and, certainly, we would all agree with that. But you suggested that there might be exceptions to the case -- with worker interest, for example.

I suppose we would all agree with you, and would define consumer interest very narrowly as being able to get goods and services of the highest quality at the cheapest price. For example, labor legislation, child labor laws, and wage laws are anti-consumer -- to a degree.

I suggest the possibility that in the case of information areas in which consumer interests are narrowly-defined as being the cheapest material at the highest quality, these interests may not be consistent with the long range public interest.

!)

I

21.

For example, surely the Government Printing Office is a great service to consumers in the sense that -- being heavily subsidized by tax funds--it is able to provide material substantially cheaper than comparable materials from private sources. And many scientific journals of the sort that are most frequently photocopied,

could be published with various forms of Federal subsidy.

To the extent that one creates a situation in which it is impossible for a publisher to recover his costs from the purchases of consumer-buyers of his product, and has to rely on federal subsidy, you create a trend toward a situation in which only that which the federal government approves of can be published.

If it were the case, for example, that scientific journal publishing was almost entirely-consistently-of federally published and subsidized material, it would do away with the photocopying issue, because the government would probably dedicate -- by public domain -- free copies, and would probably have lower subscription rates than privately published scientific and technical journals, at, hence, a consumer saving.

At the same time, you might have a situation where

1 .

2

3

4

อ

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

there would be no strong	g critici	sm of gov	ernment	policy,	-
let's say, on Nuclear	Energy.	There is	public	interest	ir
the preservation of cons	sumerra	ther than	govern	nentally	
supported enterp	orises.	,			

I don't think there is any difference except to say that consumer interest is not necessarily, overall,

MR. FERGUSON: I think there is a difference in emphasis, that we might want to come back to, after you finish.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Further, it is that exclusive use by an author of his own works -- which was conveyed by the copyright law -- that is referred to as "monopoly."

I think we all ought to recognize,—and I am sure you do, when we are talking of monopoly and copyright—we are talking about monopoly, by the person, of his own works—the kind of monopoly, for example, that a farmer has over what he grows on his farm, or a cabinet maker has over what he does; or that an economic consultant has over his consulting, or that a doctor has over his medical practice. We are not talking about the elimination of competition.

We are talking about a monopoly where a novelist writes a novel. He has a monopoly over that novel because he wrote it under copyright, but no monopoly over all novels.

He publishes in competition with several thousand other novels at the same time.

He doesn't, even under copyright, have a monopoly over the ideas that he thought of and put in the novel; or the information that he researched, and put into the book he wrote. He has monopoly only over his own work.

Could we agree on that?

DR. FERGUSON: Well --

COMMISSIONER LACY: It is a monopoly that he can assign to someone else.

DR. FERGUSON: It is an assignable monopoly, obviously, but I think that the analogy with the wheat farmer is kind of strained.

commissioner LACY: Only because all wheat farmers produce about the same quality of wheat. Novelists write novels of different quality; but otherwise it is the same.

DR. FERGUSON: Well, that is throwing the baby out with the $_{\hat{0}}$ th water, isn't it?

COMMISSIONER LACY : Y: No. Because, as a matter of fact, most wheat farmers are in a monopoly situation, whereas the great majority of novelists publish at a loss because the competition in the marketplace is so intense.

DR. FERGUSON: Let me go back to what I think is a significant distinction.

A monopoly over something for which there are virtually identical substitutes is no monopoly. And so, to say that a wheat farmer has a "monopoly" is not, in the economic

sense ----

1

2

3

5

6

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

22

23

24

COMMISSIONER LACY: A doctor has a monopoly to do heart operations. Obviously, he has a monopoly over his operations. It is essentially the same thing.

DR. FERGUSON: The basic question, I think, is if a copyright is worth a lot, then -- put the other way around -- unless the item in question is, in fact, significantly distinct from the best available substitutes,

the copyright is not of any substantial value. whereas I am in complete accord with your basic proposition that there is an important distinction between a monopoly over an item -- we make this distinction in the text -and the monopoly of a market. There is such a distinction -and when we refer to restrictions on entry, or the lack of restrictions on entry, we are talking about the existence or the non-existence of monopoly in the market--not on the particular item.

Nevertheless, a monopoly on a particular item can be c f substantial value and, if it were not, there would not be the interest that there is in copyrights.

But the value of an author COMMISSIONER Just so. being able to have the exclusive use of his works, like the value to a doctor over his having the exclusive capacity to offer his services, rests, not in the fact that he can eliminate competition; but that he offers something better than

the competition.

As you say: what makes the copyright valuable to an author, though, is the superiority of his product over the other thing -- not the limiting of competition, but his superiority over competition.

I think we can readily understand each other on that.

I wonder, on some of the statements, if they were really meant literally as they were said. You suggested that there should be no royalty payments; and I assume no permission of the proprietor required for any photocopying not done for resale.

For example, suppose a professor at the Dade

Community College in Florida teaches a group of people of

primarily Hispanic background, and -- finding the available

text books unsatisfactory to them -- without the permission

of the authors involved, reproduces 500 copies each of a

number of short stories that deal with Hispanic subjects

and puts them into a text book, which he then distributes

free to members of his class.

Do you feel that is proper?

 ${\tt DR.}$ FERGUSON: It is my understanding that, already, face-to-face teaching is ${\tt excused.}$

COMMISSIONER LACY: No. That is not what teachers mean by face-to-face teaching, at all.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

DR. FERGUSON: It is not?

COMMISSIONER LACY: No, it is not. They are talking about the teacher who comes in and sees something in the <u>New York Times</u> that morning, and reproduces it.

I am talking about something that is done weeks ahead-for the whole class.

DR. FERGUSON: I did not know the time and the place was that important. I don't know the definition of face-to-face teaching. I read it in a fairly generic way.

COMMISSIONER LACY: This is something that you recommend should be possible for a college to do?

DR. FERGUSON: Well, I think the question is: What do you have to pay to provide that degree of protection?

Where do you draw the line?

If the particular kind of example you cite is unique, obviously, there is not much harm.

COMMISSIONER LACY: It is not unique. It is common

practice.

DR. FERGUSON: If it is widespread, then it becomes a problem; and it should be coped with when it becomes a serious problem.

Where would you draw the line if you don't draw it at re-sale?

That seems to me to be the critical question.

COMMISSIONER	LACY:	What you	seem to	be s	uggesting	is	that
nossibly a	line ought	t to be o	irawn sho	rt of	re-sale?		

DR. FERGUSON: No. I am saying that it seems to me to be practical and relatively easy to enforce, if you deal with re-sale.

COMMISSIONER LACY: That is, you think there should be a dfference if you charge the students \$2.50 for each of these books?

DR. FERGUSON: Yes. I think so.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Let me run through, for a few minutes, the second point.

Suppose you have a community action organization that feels that one of the real needs of the group that it is working with -- being consumers - isconsumer information, and the quality of products it buys. Suppose this organization decides that the way to fill that need would be to reproduce, for each of its members-there are thirty or forty members in the group--Consumers' Union Reports, and distribute it free, without the permission of the Consumers' Union.

Do you recommend that as an appropriate action?

DR. FERGUSON: This was a public interest group?

COMMISSIONER. LACY: Yes. Dealing with a group of impoverished clients, and they feel that those clients need better consumer information. It decided that the way to do that would be to reproduce at least thirty or forty copies of Consumers'

Three-fold, really,

think that makes sense is

Union Reports, rather than subscribe to the journal, and
give it to each of them.
DR. FERGUSON: That would fall within the concept
of fair use that we are talking about, and the reason why l

One is that there is clearly the alternative of simply referring these impoverished people to the local library, where they can read Consumers' Reports, or the Annual Guides, at exactly the same contribution to Consumers' Union as in the photocopying case.

two-fold.

Secondly: If they are, in fact, an impoverished clientele, the expected loss of revenues to Consumers' Union I would think would be rather small.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Not to their subscription, but there might be a loss as compared with the organization using the alternative method of subscribing to the Consumers!

DR. FERGUSON: These questions, of course, come down to quantities.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Do they? That is exactly the point I am trying to make. You are saying that all photocopying that is not for re-sale should be free. I really don't think you meant that.

DR. FERGUSON: I did mean that. That does not mean that I am not in error.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

36

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I have mentioned erroneous things before.

As a matter of fact, I don't think we are in error on this.

COMMISSIONERLACY: Suppose it were the Retired Teachers Association with 100,000 members which decided to reproduce the Consumers' Union Report and give it to the members free.

MR. BRESLOW: May I'respond? COMMISSIONER

LACY: Yes.

MR. BRESLOW: It seems to me if we force the students who are to read the short story, or the teachers or people that are to read the Consumers! Union Reports-to come into the library, one at a time, to check out the short story; or if they have the convenience of reading it at their home, or at their desk, the publisher is in, essentially, the same position.

In one case, the user would come to the library, borrow the short story, sit down there, and read it. The publisher would receive no revenue from it. In any case, if the person were to take the photocopy home, sit down and read it, the publisher would receive no revenues from it. The essential difference is that, in the latter case, the person reading the short story finds it a lot more convenient than if he had to stand in line behind 499 people to get the short story.

COMMISSIONER LACY: The alternative would be to reproduce the story at a fairly nominal sum.

MR. COWLAN: ! just want to add one thing to Mr. Lacy's last comments.

Some of the organizations which do disseminate copyright material do seek permission, for whatever set of reasons. It is a sad fact, of non-profit organizational life, that they rarely get an answer.

COMMISSIONER LACY: I think that is probably not true. I suspect that, in a number of cases, they do get an answer, rather than that they don't, in the majority of cases. Large organizations get hundreds of such requests.

MR. COWLAN: The answers may come too late, and and frequently do.

DR. FERGUSON: May I take one more crack at answering that one?

I think it is a non-trivial question, and it seems to me that you are talking about the possibility of some kind of arbitrary cut-off on the number of not-for-re-sale copies. One might think of such a number. And you are also talking about the case where permission is readily granted.

Clearly, if it is readily granted -- i.e., granted at little or no royalty -- there is no significant economic problem involved. The economics are essentially the same -- whether permission is granted, or not.

1.5

Now, we are talking about the charging of royalties. We have not talked, at all, about other aspects of copyright protection. Whatever right the copyright gives to an author, or the copyright holder, for accurate reproduction, accurate sourcing -- citations -- we have not addressed that all.

recommend opening up fair use to all cases except copying for resale.

I am sorry to intervene but this is, in essence, for the author, because the issue of integrity of the text -- the need for some control over how material may be used -- is very important.

The fair-use doctrine was originated to allow reviewers to use a few sentences to make a point; or scholars to use examples, and so on. It has been eroded over the years, and extensively, in this version of the Copyright Act. But authors would very strongly oppose-as being an erosion-what you are recommending. I believe that, indirectly, this is an argument in favor of something which you have proposed. That is, the mechanism of the clearing house because, speaking, for example, to the need for exemption for public interest groups, I think it's conceivable that a clearing house would be able to regularize that to recommend to all creators that they follow certain formulas.

We are in the process, now, of setting up such a

clearinghouse for television, making it possible for public
television to use literary material at substantially lower
rates than they would in the open market; get quick per-
missions by telephone; and I think that the A.A.P. clearing-
house does suggest a kind of model that might make possible
quick permissions and provisions for low royalties, or no
royalties, in cases where that seems to be in the public
interest.

But the issue of one to maintain some control over the integrity of the material is of the essence, for authors.

One of the difficulties that I find with the PIE-C report as a whole is one which the PIE-C people also found. That is insistence on the efficiency of economies as the overriding consideration. It has to be tempered with the notion that quality of life and other elements may be, also of very great public interest.

Indirectly, there may be a public interest in making sure that authors do have control over the integrity of their material.

DR. FERGUSON: May I react to that?

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: Yes.

DR. FERGUSON: I think part of the problem may be that we have misused the phrase "fair use".

We have made an unfair use of the phrase.

When we say that the concept of the doctrine should be extended to embrace reproduction not for re-sale, let me say more precisely what we mean; and you can tell me whether that means "fair use".

We mean that no royalty should be charged.

All other aspects of copyright protection, as far as we are concerned, should remain intact.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Does that mean that you should have the author's permission before you reproduce it?

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: That is the essential question.

COMMISSIONER LACY: "Fair use" opens that up.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: Yes.

DR. FERGUSON: I think we have not thought specifically of that. It would seem to me that if there were a requirement of permission, as distinct from some more general statement that reproduction has to be accurate with proper attribution and so on which might be possible to do in the Statute, or through judicial process, or regulatory process: if the requirements for permission were retained, it would seem to me to cover the point that Bert raised, with which Mr. Lacy disagreed: where permission is not forthcoming, it should be essentially negative. If, within thirty days, or some such time, permission is not denied, then it is implicitly granted.

]4

It is impossible to overestimate, I think,
the importance of making material readily available.

COMMISSIONER. WEDGEWORTH: There are a couple of points
I wanted to emphasize, just to be sure that I was understanding what was being said, and if that is correct, I wanted to add emphasis to them.

The two most significant lines of argument that

I see emerging from your work bear upon the notion of the

consequences of monopolistic practices, and the notion of the

tendency to disregard the added value to the copyrighted

product that comes from the distribution function of the

photocopying service or, perhaps, the library providing direct

service to the consumer.

I want to be sure that, first of all, with regard to monopolistic practice, focussing on the market approach rather than the individual product, as was discussed a few minutes ago: Would you agree that given your assumption of inequitable distribution of wealth and, therefore, an inequitable distribution of publishing capability in the information industry, that your analogies would tend to show that the distortion of revenues recovered from one or more types of royalty schemes applied to photocopying, could result in at least one of two outcomes.

variety of works from a number of producers and/or that you might have, at the same time, a dramatic increase in the number of works being available from certain producers that would be above that which you might normally expect resulting directly from demand?

DR. FERGUSON: Let me pick up those three things, as I understand them, in sequence.

Let me paraphrase and see if I get the essence.

Would the imposition of royalties lead to the possibility or the realty of excessive profits associated with the reduction in the availability of existing works to customers and consumers?

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: The variety.

DR. FERGUSON: And an increase in the number of works available.

Those are the three?

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: Yes, but not necessarily an increase in the number of works that would have a manifest demand.

DR. FERGUSON: Let me try to pick them up in sequence.

We do point out that the introduction of a royalty system for photocopying would bring about -- would be expected to bring about -- windfall profits to the existing publishers of existing photocopied journals.

lā

JUDGE FULD: You mean copyrighted journals?

DR. FERGUSON: Yes. Copyrighted journals. Right.

Those windfall profits under conditions of competition in Mr. Lacy's sense; where there is free entry into the market -- easy entry into the market -- those windfall profits would gradually be eroded away on a current basis -- on a current windfall basis. In the third year, or something of that sort, the windfall profits should be eroded away.

They would be eroded away--if they are eroded away at all--as a consequence of the stimulus to produce additional works that the royalties constitute.

Now, there would be some permanent windfall profits on works that were in existence before the introduction of the extension of the royalty system.

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: I understand that. I guess
I am adding another complexity to the argument in addition
to the windfall profits that would normally accrue from
the archival products already available.

DR. FERGUSON: And, also, new products by the existing firms during a period of transition.

commissioner wedgeworth: That is really what I was concentrat in on with my question: The new products. If you assume an inequitable distribution of the capability of making new products available, this means that there will be an added

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1.1

15

16

17

18

19

20.

21

22

23

4

15

stimulus to make many new products available, by those with the capability, and, therefore, a resulting lack of variety by the number of producers who are able to enter the field.

DR. FERGUSON: I think that is not likely in the relevant area; that the price of admission in the technical journal market seems to be very low.

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: So the bottom of the curve doesn't make any difference?

DR. FERGUSON: As indicated by the fact that there are a number of journals that seem to be surviving quite nicely at one or two thousand subscriptions a year. That does not require massive amounts of capital, since the authors do not get any compensation. Now, again, we are in the data-less world, but that appears to be the indication.

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: So the consequence of the argument would be you would have the great stimulus for new products, and the resulting erosion of the profits from those products by the additional stimulus and, at the same time, the marginal products could continue to be produced.

DR. FERGUSON: The existing marginal products would tend to remain viable. Yes.

MR. HAVERKAMP: Let me carry that one step further.

The windfall profits are nothing to sneeze at.

The existing journals have been priced with the expectation of no royalty charge for photocopying. Publishers,

.23

as I understand it, have not had any inkling that they might be paid a royalty fee until very recently. So they have priced their journals -- and they have priced their journals higher to people, to users, who might make multiple use of the journal, such as libraries and institutions, than they have to individual subscribers, through price discrimination; sometimes charging two times the fee to institutions that they do to individuals; and, sometimes, higher for non-profit journals.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: Do you have the source of that statement?

MR. HAVERKAMP: Yes. Well, we have to go to the U.S. Postal Service for that.

The "two-times price discrimination provision" is all that private institutions are permitted as a rule of the Postal Service.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: I would like more specifics on that.

I am fairly familiar with the Postal Service.

I want you to tell me the source of what I think is an irresponsible statement.

MR. HAVERKAMP: I will do that in my report.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: I would like to know your source of the so-called price discrimination—where the publishers of small journals are charging more to one category of subscriber than they are to the other.

. .

The following extract from the U.S. Postal Service regulations describes the limitations on subscription price discrimination for commercial publishers wishing to qualify for second-class mailing privileges:

"132.228 Nominal Rate Publications
Publications designed primarily for circulation at
nominal rates may not qualify for second-class privileges.
Persons whose subscriptions are obtained at a nominal
rate shall not be included as a part of the legitimate

rate shall not be included as a part of the legitimate list of subscribers required by 132.225. Copies sent in fulfillment of subscriptions obtained at a nominal rate must be charged with postage at the transient rate (see 132.13). Nominal rate subscriptions include those which are sold:

- a. At a token subscription price that is so low that it cannot be considered a material consideration.
- b. At a reduction to the subscriber, under a premium offer or any other arrangements of more than 50 percent of the amount charged at the basic annual rate for a subscription which entitles the subscriber to receive one copy of each issue published during the subscription period. The value of a premium is considered to be its actual cost to the publisher, the recognized retail value, or the represented value, whichever is highest."

(underlining added)

You can get the subscription list of any library, and you can run down, very quickly, a number of journals for which the publishers are charging more to libraries than they are to individuals.

COMMISSIONER KARPATKIN: That is common with news letters.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: I am thinking as a trade publisher.

Forgive me.

MR. HAVERKAMP: You can charge quite a bit more to institutions than you do to individuals. This might increase your subscriptions.

Let me finish up on this real quickly.

As a result, this is very much analogous, I think, to a case where General Motors is able to charge a mileage fee to people that have already bought their automobiles.

This would be the provision of any royalty charge that charges for journals that are already published, that have been priced with the expectation that there would not be a royalty charge. I don't know if you follow me on that.

COMMISSIONER

WEDGEWORTH: I think it is fairly understandable.

The other point I wanted to emphasize -- which you sort of toss in, but don't go on to give a further explanation -- is the matter of the added value provided by

.

1)

the photocopying service, or whoever provides the distributing function, and I think that that probably deserves more emphasis than has been given, because what your analysis clearly tends to indicate is that revenues will be taken away from that function and returned and, therefore, would tend to inhibit the ability to perform that function.

Is that accurate?

DR. FERGUSON: If I understand what you mean by "added value", I think I agree with you. Let me state it, and let me paraphrase it, and see whether we agree.

There seems to be some indication -- again,

Line and Wood have a useful statement on it -- that

photo reproduction of existing especially small, new

journals, is, itself, a useful stimulus to the sale of

those journals. That is Point No. 1.

Point No. 2: It is really the same point but said in a slightly different way.

The authors, in particular, get a substantial benefit out of any dissemination of their work. Their reputation is enhanced, so that rather than their suffering -- or let me say, rather than, or in addition to, any suffering they may endure as a consequence of free photoreproduction, they get a benefit. So both the author -- especially the author of technical pieces -- and apparently at least some of the publishers of especially small and new

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

journals, get a degree of benefit out of free photocopying.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Bob, are you through?

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: Yes. Yes.

COMMISSIONER LACY: I will make this as brief as possible.

When we were talking about terms, when one speaks of consumer and producer, the image that comes to mind is of the consumer as an individual — whereas the producer is likely to be a large corporation.

Of course, in this case, this is frequently reversed. The producers of the copyrighted material in the literary field are, mostly, individual authors, and even in fields like computer software, the ones that are entering the market are likely to be small partnerships of very small firms. It is principally the consumers who do the bulk of the photocopying and purchasers of computer programs tend to be quite large corporations -- almost a 180 degree reverse of the normal image of consumer and producer.

In view of that, I wonder, again, if what was really intended $_{\rm was}$ that photocopying not for re-sale should be subject to no requirements of royalty.

Let me give you a concrete example:

The New School for Social Research -- not a notably wealthy institution -- has just started a publication

in New Yor	k, and uses a	lot	of descriptive material of the	3
financial	situation in	New	York City, in trying to provid	dε
objective	reports on a	ver	y valuable form of research.	

They are having to charge a relatively high subscription cost; \$450.00 for twenty-four editions. It is very expensive to produce.

The twenty-four issues for \$450.00 could probably be copyrighted for five dollars.

If one took literally what you are saying about being able to reproduce photocopying as long as it is not for re-sale, the Chase Manhattan Bank would be in a position to reproduce a hundred copies for all of its staff.

I take it that you don't really mean that that should apply.

DR. COWLAN: I take it that the Chase Manhattan Bank is hardly a 501(c)(3) case.

COMMISSIONER LACY: No. I am talking about re-sale. I will come back to non-profit in a minute.

DR. FERGUSON: That would certainly seem to be an abuse of the system, as the system is set up.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Let's come back to "non-profit".

DR. FERGUSON: Let me stick to this one for a moment, if I may. I keep getting concerned about your -- what seem to be -- tales of the distributions.

IJ

The question is, essentially, how many instances are there likely to be of this sort of thing?

COMMISSIONER LACY: A great many. Numerous.

DR. FERGUSON: There are certain problems in certain areas, but the question is: What is the cost of eliminating that abuse?

COMMISSIONER

LACY: It is not a question of eliminating anything. Let me point out one thing in your circular argument. You started out by saying -- and I agree with you on this -- that the kind of photocopying that is done today by libraries, generally speaking, is mostly lawful within the present law. I think the great majority of libraries' photocopying is fair use-- or else, would be photocopying justifiable under 108(c).

You are saying there is no evidence it does any harm.

I probably agree with that. It probably does no harm. So you are saying that the lawful photocopying now going on does no harm; therefore, we should change the law and permit a great deal of photocopying that would now be unlawful. You are not talking about putting in new restrictions. You are talking about saying: One can photocopy in any quantity as long as it is not for re-sale -- which is certainly not the present law.

It would require a major amendment to the law to.

] 4

You are saying any non-profit organization ought to be subject to, essentially, no limitation.

DR. FERGUSON: I said 501(c)(3).

COMMISSIONER LACY: Let me illustrate this point.

Many products are sold only to non-profit organizations. That is their only market. Hundreds of millions of dollars worth of material a year are produced for no market except for schools and libraries.

The State of California normally -- or more for frequently -- use text books/which, instead of buying them from the publisher, it enters into a contract with the publisher under which it obtains permission to reproduce these copies, and pays a royalty to the publisher.

Now, you are not suggesting that the State of California should be able to do that without paying a royalty?

DR. FERGUSON: We said specifically 501(c)(3)'s, and left open the question of whether someone else wanted to draw the line somewhere else.

COMMISSIONER LACY: There is nothing in the present law that gives a 501(c)(3) organization any freedom that anybody else does not have.

DR. FERGUSON: That is not true. We are exempt from local sales tax.

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13.

14

15

16

1.7

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

-25

COMMISSIONER LACY: I am talking about copyrights.

You are suggesting an amendment of the copyright law to suggest a whole new branch of free copying; and your justification is that the present photocopying done within the law does not do any harm.

DR. FERGUSON: That is not the justification.

I thought I was fairly careful in spelling out the justification.

We are, in fact, suggesting a change in the law.

And the justification is a three fold one of the externalities, so to speak: the general public value of the product of public interest of 501(c)(3) organizations, which is recognized, so to speak, through the legislative process by setting them up with special advantages in other areas: the tax area; the Postal area; for example. The Postal Rate area.

Second: The fact that, by and large -- ror a large fraction of them, at least -- they tend to contribute to a lessening --albeit a very small lessening -- in the uneven distribution of wealth; and

Third: The demonstrable social value of having non-private interest information made available to decision makers and the public.

That is the rationale.

COMMISSIONER LACY: So you are not making any assumption

that	that	would	d be	harmf	ul to	auth	ors	, a	nd	50	on,	as	
you	assum	ed on	the	first	one.	۱t	is	not	a	sub	o st i	tute	for
subs	cripti	ons.					į						

DR. FERGUSON: Certainly that might be a substitute for subscriptions but, nevertheless, it is not likely to be harmful to most of the authors.

commissioner LACY: Well, I don't see any limitation-at all-on the number, or quantities, or mode of reproduction-as long as it is not for re-sale -- by a 501(c)(3) organization.

DR. FERGUSON: We have not thought in terms of numbers. It might be worthtninking about whether there should be a cut-off in terms of numbers.

I think it is fair to say that we have not thought of it.

COMMISSIONER LACY: New York University, I think, is a 501(c) organization.

DR. FERGUSON: I doubt that it is a 501(c)(3) organization.

COMMISSIONER LACY: I am not sufficiently familiar with those definitions. But assuming that it is, could it reproduce, in printed form, 2,000 copies of a text book and distribute it to its students?

DR. COWLAN: It would be totally uneconomic for it to do so.

] 4

COMMISSIONER LACY: If they could make photocopy plates they could do it for half the price--not having to pay the author, not having to pay for typesetting; not having to pay for marketing.

COMMISSION KARPATKIN: Professor Ferguson, I think your stroke might just be too broad on this issue and, in light of Mr. Lacy's questions, may require some further refinement.

You used the word "personal use", and you used the word "re-sale".

You don't seem to deal with the question of redistribution, not for personal use, and not for re-sale. I think that is an area which you would have to look at further, because, in fact, it is possible -- and I think that Commissioner Lacy had a good analogy here -- for the American Association of Retired Persons to redistribute a total publication -- News Week, say, or Time Magazine, or Gonsumer Reports -- to its entire membership which, I think, numbers in the hundreds of thousands. And that would be a market which, by and large, could subscribe, or would subscribe-but for the fact of its free availability.

I think that your study has to consider that question of redistribution -- not for purposes of advocacy, but for some other purpose. That is one of the refinements that I think you will have to look at.

Another one which you may want to look at is the question of the extent of the photocopying; whether it is photocopying in total—or for just a portion of the work.

I think there may be some distinctions available, if the photocopying is for the use of a particular part of a work, rather than to reproduce the entire, say, magazine or book, for whatever purpose. So that is an additional refinement.

I also think you have to, perhaps, take another look at the analogy that you draw -- even though I think it is a good working analogy -- as to benefits conferred on 501(c)(3) organizations with respect to taxes and Postal rates, because both taxation and Postal revenue involve revenue to the government, whereas what you are talking about now is revenue to a non-governmental interest.

I think that is a question that you have to at least look at--however you come out on it.

DR. FERGUSON: Okay. I think those are good points!

COMMISSIONER DIX: You used the word, a minute ago, that I think is the key here. That is the number of copies made at a particular time.

I can now almost say -- this controversy has been going on so long -- the traditional library position has never been in favor of unlimited multiple copying and distribution; but in favor of single copies made for individuals -- students and scholars

7.4

DR. FERGUSON: I think that Ms. Karpatkin's point that we use personal use and other than re-sale as being synonymous. -- I think that that is some of what you are driving at, Mr. Lacy. -- requires re-examination.

Then the other points that you made are also good points.

Let me say one thing. I want to repeat that the question of permission in no way arises in connection with our conclusion. We are talking only about royalties -- no other aspect of copyright.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: First a comment, generally.

In all of this discussion of monopoly, I think we may be falling into a semantic trap.

Copyright has traditionally been described by writers, by commentators -- and before this Commission -- as a "limited monopoly." Maybe -- just maybe -- we ought to think about copyright as a limited form of private ownership, of private property, because if we look at it in that light, we may come to some very different conclusions -- at least by analogy.

A copyright is private property.

It is a form of intangible private property.

The limited monopoly is not a limited monopoly but rather a limited right of certain portions of the consuming public to divest the owner of his dominion of that personal

property.

Looked at in that light, we may be a little

offended at some of the "fair use" doctrines that are
espoused by various witnesses before us. We come to some funn
moral conclusions: If I own an automobile, and I can
afford that automobile, and someone else wishes to get
from Point A to Point B, does he have the right to take
that automobile from me for that limited purpose?

The answer follows, "No. At least not without my permission."

What is the distinction between an automobile and a copyright?

There are substantial differences but, at least, let's start thinking somewhat the other way, instead of this dirty word, "monopoly". Let's start thinking in ownership terms.

Then we get to the other thing, which is the note that runs through both the photocopying and the computer world -- and the reaction of PISA,-which seems today to be the common strain, that people's use of other people's copyright material should be geared into not the principles of law, not the overriding principles of law, but rather, their ability to pay. And I think that is very much part of your testimony today.

25

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 2 3 I am interested in learning is: What is the impact of photocopying? 4 5 6 7 8 LACY: COMMISSIONER 9 and comments. MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE 10 RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS 1.3 12 in computer software. 13 1.4 15 LACY: COMMISSIONER 16 17 18 as substitutes for Anti-Trust laws. 19 20 21 if that is what you heard. 22We are saying: 23 24

Just as a final, somewhat extraneous, point: I think if there are more of these conferences, what

What is the bulk of the considerations of photocopying and computers upon the public interest, not upon the 501(c)(3) organizations. On the general public. I have a couple of very brief questions

One of the suggestions, as I recall it, was that large corporations should not be able to obtain copyright

Am I quoting you correctly?

DR. FERGUSON: No. "Large hardware manufacturers". There are, of course, monopoly questions that can be dealt with under the Anti-Trust laws. I think there are grave problems about using Copyright laws

DR. FERGUSON: We are not intending that, at all.

Somehow, we have failed completely to communicate --

That the purpose of a copyright -- the social purpose of a copyright -- is to stimulate an increease in supply.

(2)	That to the extent that there is a monopoly
in a market,	the increase in supply, responsive to any
given increase	in revenues, will be less than in a competitive
market.	

That is all we are saying. And, therefore, granting copyrights in instances of monopolized markets
-- not of monopolized items; of monopolized markets -- does not accomplish the Constitutional purpose.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: What is a monopolized market?

DR. FERGUSON: One where entry is difficult; and is

difficult as a consequence of some kind of institutional or technological barrier.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: Give me an example of a barrier.

MR. BRESLOW: IBM has dominance in the computer hardwar manufacturing industry.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: You are talking within the copyright area?

MR. BRESLOW: This comes into it, in the case of software. Their dominance in hardware also gives them a great deal of input into the software.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: You are talking about monopoly in the Anti-Trust sense--not monopoly in the copyright sense.

DR. FERGUSON: No. Monopoly in the economic sense-being a restriction on the supply response; a restriction on
the opportunity, or the reality, for increasing supply

16.

254
in response to an increase in demand; or revenues.
COMMISSIONER LACY: Does this apply to IBM, or any manufacturer,
no matter how small in hardware particularly micro-
computer; or process; or a piece of auxiliary ancillary
equipment?
MR. BRESLOW: I think there are seven hardware
manufacturers in the United States, each of which has more
than 2% of the market.
COMMISSIONER LACY: So you would say that those seven,
by name, should not be able to get copyrights?
MR. BRESLOW: Probably not by name-but by a percentage
of the market.
COMMISSIONER LACY: Two percent of the market?
What would you say ^{if a} publishing house had
three or four percent of the market?
MR. BRESLOW: We did not say anything specifically.
IBM, itself, has something like 70% of the market.
COMMISSIONER LACY: You are just talking about IBM.
You are not giving the small competitors a chance to
compete with IBM by getting revenue from the royalty program?

MR. BRESLOW: Well, what we are suggesting is that it would be a desirable trend in the industry -- which tends to be occuring anyway -- that we would hasten to encourage that the hardware manufacturers not be engaged in the production of software at all.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Do you think it is useless, and that they should not produce software? That software has no social value, and they should not produce it?

DR. FERGUSON: If it had no social value, they could not sell it; so, of course, it has some social value.

COMMISSIONER LACY: It could be reproduced from their own, if they had no protection.

DR. FERGUSON: That's right.

don't see how you can get away from the assertion that it is a way of using the copyright law to do something which is really an Anti-Trust function. I think it is patently obvious -- which is passing no judgement on whether it is socially desirable or not. It ought to be very clear that that is what is happening.

DR. FERGUSON: It seems to me there are a couple of things. There is the basic proposition that I began with that if the market is monopolized, the response that is indicated in the Constitution is at least inhibited, if not precluded.

The question is: Given that this Commission has the responsibility for recommending legislation in this area, isn't this fact significant?

, 9

 21

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: Yes, but it is no more significant
than it would be for five or seven publishers to totally
dominate the publishing industry in this Country to such an
extent that it would distort the desirable products that
are made available.

DR. FERGUSON: Certainly, it would be contrary to my construction -- or our construction -- of the social interest to provide them with an additional instrument for expanding their control.

COMMISSIONER LACY: How would you fill this, statutorily?

What would you write in the Statute?

DR. FERGUSON: We are not writing statutory language.

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: It is not really the function of this Commission to deal with that.

MR. LEVINE: But there is an analogy -- if I may -in Copyright law to deal with Anti-Trust situations and
that goes back to the 1909 Act in which the Aeolian Record
Company was buying up the rights of musical compositions
and it was feared that they would monopolize the record
industry, and the compulsory license was specifically written
into the 1909 Copyright Act to deal with that situation.

There is at least that analogy in the area.

COMMISSIONER LACY: But you are not setting up a class of persons who would be thendenied the right available to

i2

15.

other people. You are not saying that Messrs. X, Y and Z may not get copyrights, although Messrs. A, B, and C may.

You pointed out -- and certainly, it is very difficult to be clairvoyant about the long term future, and--hence-we are looking for short term solutions -- unfortunately we don't have the same opportunity to escape the law and responsibilities as the general pattern of history, in that, once copyright laws are enacted, they stay the law of the land for a century or more.

Whatever legal recommendations we make now, if they should be accepted by Congress, would remain the law for a long, long time.

You had suggested that the pressures for the changes in the law would be largely to provide new protection. Actually, that is not an accurate statement. The pressures in the course of the Copyright law were almost entirely to provide special exemptions: special exemptions for libraries; special exemptions for certain types of material; special exemptions for a wide variety of organizations.

I think, by and large, contemporary groups would be content with a law that simply defined the generalized copyright exemptions that could be applied by the Courts in changing times, and in the future.

What does frighten me is that experience indicates

3

4

5

'n

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

] 4.

15

16

1.7

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

2.5

it is very difficult to get exemptions out of the law, rather than the other way around. The 1909 law had a special exemption for coin operated machines to produce music, because they had in mind the nickel-in-the-slot sort of things that were played. On the basis of that, there came a large juke box industry with quite large revenues to, perhaps, somewhat unsavory aspects of society—without any revenues to the composers whose works were enjoyed.

It took three quarters of a century, almost, to get that exemption removed from the law.

One of the other things that we need to be concerned with is the change in technology, which is likely to move away from many standard forms of practiced dissemination -- the kinds of dissemination that rely heavily on reproduction on demand.

If that reproduction, on demand, can take place without making any contribution to the original cost of creating the product that is reproduced, I think, then you have a situation in which you force governmental subsidy into many activities, and you get a mal-distribution of resources.

I think I would feel rather adverse to what you were saying about the freedom from royalties.

I don't know whether you had a chance to read Mr.
Palmour's report that was presented yesterday.

It was a study of cost factors when a library would find it more economical to subscribe to a journal than to acquire photocopies elsewhere. This was based on a set of calculations, assuming what the library would save on the subscription cost of the journal by relying on photocopying, among other factors, and the cost that would be incurred by getting photocopies was the cost charged by the supplying library.

Now, in point of fact, if a library stops subscribing to -or refrains from subscribing to -- a journal that costs \$40.00 a

year, it is saving \$40.00. All that society is saving is the
incremental cost of running one more copy of that journal, and the
postage and the mailing and the materia al. So the social
saving might be \$5.00 -- not \$35.00.

The cost the library incurs by getting photocopies is, let's say, \$3.00 to the library involved. I think most libraries agree that the cost to the library providing the photocopies may be eight or ten dollars. So the library is induced by the fact that when it makes a photocopy, it does not pay the true cost of the photocopy, and it makes no contribution to the basic cost of creating the journal, having it written, having it edited, having it set up. It is choosing a course of action economical to itself -- but one that is very costly to society.

] 4

Ĵij

	l sug	gge s t	that	t ma	al-dis	tribu	ution,	of	cour	se,	may
really	require	the	user	to	make	some	contr	ibut	ion	to	the
first o	costs.						•				

It probably does not matter much in a situation where there is a marginal, or peripheral, situation. But if we set up a legal structure -- based on an immediate situation -- that carries forward into a day when the distribution of journals very heavily takes place; where more people get articles by on-demand photocopying than see it in the original journal; if this is the predominant use, and the entire first costs of the journal are borne only by those that get it into print, you are placing an extraordinary cost on the institutions that subscribe to it.

You are producing, I think, a false sense of economy in relying on the individual copies.

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: Let me beg to differ with you -- with the analysis that you just made.

I think that is sort of a misconception that is given about journal subscriptions. That is; that the cost of the subscription is significant in comparison to other costs of handling that subscription; storing it; and retrieving it on occasion for the various users.

COMMISSIONER LACY: I said many other costs.

commissioner wedgeworth: That is the point I want to make—because it is not an exaggeration. These costs are the ones that are significant; not what the library saves on the actual subscription cost, itself. It works conversely—such that a decision to subscribe to a given journal or periodical is a much more serious decision than buying a monograph, because you are buying the incremental costs that go on for years.

COMMISSIONER LACY: We are not disagreeing with that, at all.

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: I just want to correct it for the record.

I said that there were many other costs besides the cost of the subscription.

COMMISSIONER LACY: I am saying that the saving made with a subscription is greatly over-stated because society does not save the \$40.00 which is the subscription rate.

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: That is true, But the only way to affect the other savings, is to save the cost of the subscription.

DR. FERGUSON: If you did assume the cost, you would find out that the cost of the subscription is very high and by emphasizing the cost of the subscription -- as we have -- we have probably under-estimated, rather than over-estimated, the social saving.

1104 CARRY BUILDING 927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 _14

MILLER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS

COMMISSIONER WEDGEWORTH: There are a couple of points that I want to make very quickly.

One is that I think there are some weaknesses in the conclusions, as they have been indicated by the discussions and I find that the value of the product is more in the framework of analysis that you presented—and the conclusions will certainly need to be confirmed by the use of actual data—in the future. I think that is very significant.

But there is a point that I think is important to bring out here, and that is that -- again, talking about the added value of the service, or distributed functions -- you have revealed an area that is very closely related -- when you talk about royalties for photocopying -- to arguments which have come up in other Countries, related to royalties for the circulation of items that appear in libraries. And you pointed out that there is a very specious argument being raised because, in order to effect that argument, you have to ignore the added values that these institutions and services provide to the original cost; which would modify the statements that Commissioner Lacy made -- that this is done without a contribution to the original cost of making the product available.

In fact, there is a substantial social benefit

1.1

1.5

that results from those added values.

COMMISSIONER HERSEY: One very brief comment that I would like to make -- one that I feel is important -- on the computer program part of your report:

You acknowledge at one point the fact that, after a certain point, computer programs become part of the mechanical process, but the burden of your report recognized that copyright should be granted to computer programs.

The law precludes our granting copyright to processes. I know that you have not seen the very tentative model, for alternative legislation, that we have since circulated, and I was glad to see that—at least as a kind of a footnote here—you had kept your mind open about the possibility of another alternative.

because this is a highly technical matter,—we tend to blur the real meaning and uses of the computer program. For example, at one point, you say that programming for educational use is intended to communicate not only with machines, but with students. Programs in those circumstances don't communicate with the students. They manipulate material which communicates with the students. They don't communicate with students any more than the button on the slide projector does, or the focussing apparatus on a time projector does. They

1.65

are essentially mechanical. They are much more versatile
and complex than the examples that I have given, but they
are simply mechanical; and it is for this reason that I
believe that a computer program should be dealt with under
a different form of protection or copyright.

MR. BRESLOW: In looking at the available options, they did not appear to be any different in substance from copyright that you would want to give to software, whether you call it copyright, or not. Copyright seems to be something that would be desirable to have for software and there would be no other real alternative. We would have no objection to putting it under a separate title of the law, and calling it something else, but the substance of the type of protection that you would be giving would be still the same.

If, for instance, having a separate title would make it simpler, administratively and politically, to have a different term of protection for software than other copyrighted materials, I don't see any objection to that.

JUDGE FULD: Does that complete the questions?

Shall we have a discussion among ourselves?

MR. HAVERKAMP: I want to give a brief response to

Mr. Perle's comments. What he said, I thought, was very

useful to the arguments on the other side of

Mr. Lacy's -- relating to public interest, in general.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.1

25

The assumption that using Mr. Perle's car in going from Washington to San Francisco is somewhat analogous and similar to photocopying an article or a journal that I read in the . is a mistake. These are not the library same thing, or even analogous. For one thing, photocopying is not the source of the amount of appropriatability of the publisher's cost. I don't know if we have made that clear, or not. Free lending libraries, themselves, give multiple users a chance to use a publisher's output, again, and again. It doesn't really matter if a person checks out a copy of a journal and reads it, or sits there and reads it, or takes it to the appropriate machine and photocopies it. There is still the opportunity for multiple use, there--no matter what he does with it. For some reason -- I think it is probably because it is easiest to get revenues from the photocopying sector, from the photocopying consumers -- that the photocopying industry has been blamed for this. Really, it originates with the free lending libraries. Publishers realize it is a big mistake to attack free lending libraries, so they go after the photocopying.-somewhat erroneously. PERLE: If we could get people thinking, perhaps, COMMISSIONER in ownership terms rather than monopoly terms, then we are, walking down a road toward rationality. I think. MR. HAVERKAMP: I am certainly not against walking

.6

- 18

down a road of rationality.

COMMISSIONER LACY: Along those lines, I think publishers or authors have never said that nobody should be able to use anything without paying a toll. If they had ever said that there should not be free lending libraries,—if they had ever said that libraries should not do any photocopying,—if they had said that libraries should not do the kind of photocopying that most libraries do. If they tried to exercise a blanket control over that, that would be foolish; and non-productive; and an unrealistic thing.

I think, similarly, when one suggests that there that should be no restraints in this, the thing should be wide open-that is an equally unproductive contribution.

I think we all recognize the fact that there is a rule of reason; there is a question of balance; there is a question of concern; and no blanket exemptions, sweeping away copyrights, would be useful.

MR. COWLAN: I would like to express a concern, which I have alluded to earlier. My fear, however, is that the numbers of copies become the criteria for access to critical or essential information.

One of the organizations that we work with in some of our satellite experimentations -- the South Dakota Indian Association -- I suspect there is a free library in Rapid City, but I know full well that to get from Rapid City

23 -

of driving a four-wheel drive truck. Sometimes...if you are lucky -- you get there.

There are a number of other reservations scattered around the area. There is a highschool on one, way out but all the libraries are in Rapid City.

Where do you draw the line, in humanistic terms?

Where do you draw the line in costs -- not to

publishers; not to government -- but in total cost to

society as a matter of cost benefit? I am not talking about

cost-effectiveness. Probably one of the greatest problems

that PISA had was the economic approach to this entire

problem. There is no way, for the life of me, that I can

attempt to assign to education, an economic cost effective
ness equation, because my definition of education has to do wi

improving the quality of human life; and I don't know how to

put a price tag on that.

I would urge that you read what I found to be a very moving piece -- a moving article -- and I did not even touch on it. It was submitted to us by the National Association of Health Care Centers. This is a group that serves Chicano migrant farmers and other indigents with health care information. They use copyrighted material almost exclusively because they don't have the money to produce it. They take it where they can get it, and shove it out as fast

1.0

as they can, in the hope that people will read it and will learn something that will help them alleviate medical or other problems--or in a life threatening situation.

At what number would you draw the line?

How many copies should they be allowed?

Or how much should they pay out of a budget that they don't have?

Now, it is true that an organization like that is funded largely by the federal government; and it would seem to me that one piece of economics that needs to be done is to take a look at the cost of a federally-subsidized or other subsidized program -- whether it be a foundation, a state grant, or a local grant organization -- which is performing a public service function to other people who may, in this case, be on welfare.

Take a look at the total costing of this thing as against the question of: Should the ultimate user have to pay a copyright fee and come out with some kind of balance, as to which costs society more, or less?

It is a complicated equation; but I can't think of any other way to deal with hardship problems. I am not really concerned with somebody ripping off a copy of the Journal of whatever -- Radiological Chemistry, or whatever -- in the NYU Library. I am concerned with the citizens, consumers, and public interest groups, many of which -- were you to

.10

charge a fee -- I fear you would have to close them down, because they would be in violation. They would not pay because they can't pay.

JUDGE FULD: What do they do now?

DR. COWLAN: They rip it off. They don't pay.

Some of them are more careful than others. They know that they are probably violating even fair use as it exists.

The only alternative is to close them down.

COMMISSIONER PERLE: As a matter of fact, we have a discussion of that somewhere. I wonder if that assumption is correct.

I don't know what happens in Wounded Knee, South Dakota.

I have a very strong feeling that everything that is done in the photocopying world out there is probably that which is pretty nearly legal, right now.

What we are talking about -- what we are really concerned with -- is systematic, multiple copying on a regular basis, and you are talking -- I am quite sure -- about isolated examples.

DR. COWLAN: I wish I were.

Let me come back to the National Association of Health Center. That is systematic. It is a program. It is in large numbers, and it is being done right now. All that I am asking is that some consideration be given there.

JUDGE FULD: You may rest assured that consideration will be given.

2	1
927 FIFTEENTH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000S	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
H STRE N. D.C.	3
127 FIFTEENTH STREET, N. WASHINGTON, D.C. 2000S	4
927 F1F WASh	5
	6
	7
	.8
Ш	. 9
RVIC	10
AG SE	. 11
ORTIN FESSI	12
_ER-COLUMBIAN REPORTING SERVICE RECORD-MAKING PROFESSIONALS	13
BIAN	14
OLUM CORD-	15
ER-C	16
MILL	. 17
	18
	19
	20
24	21
ыноме (202) 347-022	22
1E (20Z	23
O H L	24

DR. COWLAN: That is my only plea.

JUDGE FULD: Do any of the Commissioners wish to say anything more?

MR. LEVINE: I have one brief announcement.

 ${\tt COMMISSIONER}$ PERLE: Could we go into a short Executive

Session?

JUDGE FULD: Yes. We will recess and then go into Executive Session.

(Whereupon, the reported portion of the meeting was concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

-000-

25